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THE Public Opinion *QUARTERLY*

LABOR AND IN A

PRINCIPLES

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INTRODUCTION

A MAJOR portion of this issue is devoted to a series of articles on labor-management relations in wartime and after. That these articles should appear in the *QUARTERLY* at this time is fitting. No issue has, like the relations of labor and management, created such deep and dangerous cleavages in American opinion. The events and conditions which have led to this situation are rightly the subject matter of the student of opinion. So too are the methods of amelioration.

In this issue, authors of widely different backgrounds assess both the condition of opinion on labor relations and the factors which have molded it. But more, they discuss action—how to correct a situation which gives promise of getting dangerously out of hand.

The following series of articles is not a comprehensive treatment of this complex field. It is, rather, a highlighting of selected topics which are noteworthy either for their urgency or because they represent new ways of looking at old problems. Nor are all the authors scholars in the traditional sense. Some are "labor," some "management," others "government." But all are alike in one respect: they have been working in intimate contact with new developments in the field of labor relations.

When the present issue was planned, it was expected that sharply conflicting points of view would be expressed by writers representing such different interests as "labor" and "management." Yet, in point of fact, the agreements are more noticeable than the differences. One cannot help coming away with the conclusion that common, basic principles are there. What has yet to be worked out is the implementation of those principles. If we fail in that task, the principles will have been for naught. If the pages which follow are proof of anything, they are proof that we need not fail.

—THE EDITORS

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN WARTIME AND AFTER

By ROBERT J. WATT

"THE soundest approach to the problem of labor-management cooperation," says Mr. Watt, "is that which relies upon the democratic system of self-government by the democratically chosen representatives of organized wage earners and organized business." Legislation from Olympus can never be a substitute. To the question of how self-government can best be stimulated and most safely regulated, this article is devoted.

Mr. Watt joined the Painters and Paperhangers Union in 1913. Perhaps more than any other man in the American labor movement today, he has seen the operation of unionism from the local to the international level. As International Representative of the American Federation of Labor and a Labor member of the War Labor Board, he is in close touch with the problems of workers here and abroad.

OUT OF THE FUMES of Nazi and Fascist propaganda of the past twenty years has emerged an insidious and poisonous suggestion that the masses of people are incapable of self-government. Using the prejudices of which people are unfortunately capable, the preachers of hate have sought to foment the egotistical ideology that the people are incapable of handling their own affairs as individuals, and that they are destructive of community well-being if entrusted with a share in managing either the political or economic affairs of the group.

The democratic concept that government is based on the consent of the governed is founded on the recognition of reasonableness among the people of any community, a reasonableness which establishes law as a rule of conduct by which all yield a little in order to be protected in the possession of the essential.

St. Augustine propounded this in his thesis that justice is the characteristic which distinguished the state from the robber band. Rousseau developed it in his philosophy of the Rights of Man, which the American and French revolution established as the trademark of democracy. In a broader way it can be seen in the spirit of modern civilization as it has struggled out of the murk of the ancient efforts of man to better his way of life.

What obscured more general recognition of the essentially contractual basis of government was the rise of modern industrialism during the predominance of Adam Smith's doctrine of *laissez-faire*, which

set the standards of the jungle as the "law of economics." Even though the robber band had been discredited as a way of community life by the overwhelming pressure of popular government, the evils of jungle barbarism were overlooked in the popular ignorance of the artificiality of the "law" which sanctioned brute force as the way of economic life under the exploitation of machine production.

It is a harsh anomaly that this resurgence of a discredited and outworn anarchy should have occurred in our economic life a century and a half ago even in the centers of political democracy. The economic barbarism in effect jeopardized the existence of the political civilization in so stealthy a fashion that only now are people beginning to recognize its implications—that the world cannot endure the essential conflict between the civilization of political democracy and the barbarism of economic piracy. We must choose. And we *are* choosing now, choosing in the struggle between the nations which have elected democracy as a way of life and the nations which under Fascist totalitarianism are already enslaved politically as well as economically.

In the election of 1932 as well as in the intervening elections, the abandonment of *laissez-faire* has been ratified by the electorate. By investing the right of organization and collective bargaining with the sanction of law and by adopting the system of Social Security, the American people have established as a declared policy of the nation that we should move toward economic democracy. The American goal—although we may only have started in our long journey toward that goal—we have firmly established as the economic enfranchisement of the masses of wage earners.

Nothing, however, is farther from the wishes of the members of the organized wage earners than to establish a system of paternalistic government or a political control of our economic affairs. The American wage earner wants an opportunity to cooperate with management in order that he may earn a decent, and constantly improving standard of living for his family. Only for such balancing of conditions as will assure that opportunity do we look to government. We want neither fascism, communism, nor suicidal cut-throat individualism.

What the organized wage earners want, on the contrary, is to preserve a system which will prevent any breakdown of the integrity of individual property rights which the wage earner earns from his own efforts. We want a system in which freedom is the heritage of every wage

earner willing to work, the foundation which guarantees enjoyment of the full fruits of his labor in terms of health and happiness. So much do we prize private property, indeed, that we want a full share of it for ourselves and our families.

The soundest approach to the problem of labor-management cooperation is that which relies upon the democratic system of self-government by the democratically chosen representatives of organized wage earners and organized business. Instead of attempting to control the detailed operation of business and the complex labor-management relationships through statutes or through confused and cumbersome administrative machinery, the aim should be to provide necessary broad authority for the operation of representative labor-management controls. The law should serve only to encourage the maximum self-government within a geographic area or an industrial field, and to provide sanctions against the chiseler who tries to undermine the foundation.

Such a proposal is neither revolutionary nor radical. It is, for example, the essence of the British system of industrial relations—a system which was operating so smoothly at the outbreak of the war that it could and did become the structure through which the British met the extreme dislocation and pressures of an economic mobilization far more exacting than anything experienced in our nation. Because they proceeded on a basis of labor-management cooperation, they attained far more for the wage earner (and that far more enduringly) than did the Popular Front in France, where the reactionary Right and the extreme Left simply invited chaos and calamity.

In our own nation, organized wage earners hope that industrial leaders and those who treasure our freedoms will join with the responsible leaders of labor in laying the foundation of such a system. It is a step which should not be delayed. Unless the foundation is laid well, and laid now, the storms of the post-war world may rip asunder the existent superficial cooperation, already sorely strained by our war emergency needs.

Alongside of the necessary transfer of industrial relations from political to economic control is the need for a maximum of decentralization. Just as the success of our political institutions depends on our solving the problems arising out of centralized policy-making by localized administration of civil government, so will the success of our efforts in the field of labor-management cooperation depend upon finding the

right formula and developing the skilled personnel for the central determination and the local application of economic policy.

Wage earners are afraid we have not been intelligent enough to realize that American trade and industry, America's system of competitive capitalism, America's tradition of private property, and America's system of Free Labor, all depend upon a basic unity between labor and management. Whether we like it or not, this is so: labor and management have so much in common that joining forces is the only way to preserve a free system.

To organized wage earners that seems as essential as it seems conservative. We don't want government interference in negotiations between labor and management, although we recognize and admit the need for government or community participation upon request when the parties are deadlocked. All we need from government is the foundation upon which labor can deal with management in a democratic equality of influence and initiative. Wage earners know that regimentation of labor is the essence of fascism at the outset, but regimentation of industry is usually a very close and inevitable companion.

No matter what the industry is, wage earners believe that whenever there is any question of an economic character, there should be participation by representatives of labor and management, who can and would help seek solutions and help to formulate remedies before "directive orders" become necessary. They believe that major economic problems can be solved through the processes of representative deliberation by labor and management, through pooling their ideas and thus playing an important part in formulating programs. Such representative labor and management committees could be organized on geographical as well as industrial lines. The important point is that they should not be composed of people hired by the government; they should be persons democratically chosen by the groups they represent. Both sides must earn and hold the confidence of those they represent. That proviso constitutes the best system of checks and balances we can have in the operation of an economic democracy.

Most unions welcome the opportunity to work in harness with management. Some unions, in fact, take an over-optimistic view as to the extent of the opportunity it creates. Too many managements, on the other hand, resent any cooperation, or reject any participation, on the ground that joint collaboration means a sharing of the prerogatives of

management. The main handicap, however, seems to arise out of a lack of understanding of the job to be done.

We need to decide first how labor and management can work helpfully together. To operate effectively requires real substance on which to exist. Presumably management is already rendering its maximum resourcefulness; hence any real gain can be expected only from tapping the ingenuity, practical experience, individual sense of responsibility, and collective self-discipline of the workers in the plant.

As a means to this end labor-management committees are neither revolutionary nor radical. They simply bridge that gap between management and the worker which has been created by the size and complexity of modern industry. In trades where the shops are small, the employer talks directly to his employees and hears their ideas and their complaints. Here too the results are direct. It is a human characteristic for anyone to seek ways to do his job faster and better if he gets suitable recognition for his part.

The way to get real labor-management cooperation in industry as a whole is similar. Use the channels of organized labor and organized business to carry the message of practical labor-management cooperation based upon the establishment of joint committees in every possible plant in the nation. Such committees, beginning at the plant level, could deal not only with problems of hours and wages and working conditions, but with problems of health and safety, manpower, production, transportation, and the like.

If this job were done at the plant level by labor-management committees carrying out definite programs of cooperation, there would be little need for the ideological ballyhoo campaigns. Too much tub-thumping, indeed, is more likely to make a worker suspicious than to concentrate his energies on increasing production.

Labor-management committees in every plant of the nation are the pattern of democracy in industry. They are likewise the cure for bureaucracy in industry. Powerful and progressive employer and labor organizations are the only alternative to government control. We face in industry either government control by those chosen for their political ability, or management and labor controls. At the best, government controls are poor substitutes, because they represent essentially the concentration of economic controls in a political framework rarely geared to meet the needs of the people in the economic field.

We have made mistakes. Most of them have been due to our failure to recognize the services which could be contributed on a voluntary basis by management and labor on a local, state, and national basis. There has been little recognition of the fact that there is great merit in democratic representation, that utilizing the work experience of wage earners is just as essential to the operation of our system as is the function of management. Unless every unit has the brains, the energy, and the intelligence to tackle every necessary job in its own backyard, our system isn't working. And this we have failed to understand.

Representatives of management and labor can solve industrial and labor problems better than outsiders. Carry that a step further. Management and labor in a particular area understand the problems of that area better than anyone else. The way to get real cooperation between management and labor is to put the settlement of industrial problems in the hands of those most concerned and let the machinery function in everybody's backyard.

Although the National War Labor Board, a war emergency agency, is not in high favor with the ideological folk who abound in Washington, it represents to a greater degree than any other governmental agency industrial democracy in action. Representatives of management, labor, and the public meet around the council table, hammer out their differences, forge economic and labor policy, and plan with a single aim.

The experience of members from industry and from labor working together on the National War Labor Board has proved that labor-management cooperation is not an impossible dream. Both sides have learned not only to work together, but more important, to trust each other. There have, of course, been differences. It is right that there should be in a democratic system. But it is well to note that approximately three-fourths of the decisions of the Board have been unanimous.

The opportunities for such cooperation in the United States are nearly boundless. Vigorous, competently-managed management and labor organizations can and would correct the major weaknesses of our economic system. All of us want a fair measure of security—not static, but progressive security. Through strong management-labor organizations the formula for economic progress can be written into the terms of working agreements and into the rules of our social and economic system.

The objectives of management-labor cooperation should be a full-

fledged partnership and the establishment of a wage system which will give to the workers the purchasing power to enable them to become customers of industry—customers who can and will buy enough to keep the mills and stores busy; customers who will sustain employment and create more and more jobs at decent hours and wages; customers who will enable both management and labor to enjoy the fruits of their partnership.

Full cooperation would be a tremendous force for stability, both in business and government. It would to a large extent eliminate price-cutting and chiseling competition without requiring the setting of standards by government. It would maintain wage values and prevent demoralization of property values. Lack of such cooperation, on the other hand, opens the door to wage and price slashes.

Full cooperation, however, has not always been possible. The unions, which are law-abiding respectable groups today, have had usually to fight their way to respectability. If the workers are serious-minded, the chances are that their leaders will be of that sort. But leadership also depends much on the immediate function of the union. If the employer is a tough, salty person and doesn't believe workers should join labor unions, it is a safe prediction that only the tough, salty workers will have the courage to join, and then their leadership will provide the tactics required to meet the needs of the occasion. By and large, American unions have had to spend most of their time organizing—and usually organizing against strenuous opposition. Hence, the leadership of many unions has been and still is in the hands of the organizer, who is usually a salesman (or maybe a rabble rouser in the opinion of many employers).

That is why relatively few of our new unions are headed by skilled administrators. As long as the union must fight to live, it must have a fighting leader. Once the union has won its fight, then management-labor cooperation begins; then the function of the union becomes that of servicing its membership and cooperating with management, and only then does it begin to need an administrative type of leadership.

After years of such struggle in the United States, we are approaching a condition in which management-labor cooperation is being accepted in practice, in which the right of representation by organizations of management and labor is becoming an accepted basis for industrial relations.

In so far as cooperation between management and labor is concerned, labor in the United States is motivated by well-recognized principles. It recognizes, for example, that public interest is paramount and that nothing in labor's program or its activities must impede or adversely affect the higher public interest. On the other hand, labor is a vitally important and integral part of the community. When labor's welfare is properly safeguarded, the results benefit the entire community.

Likewise, it must be remembered that labor and employer organizations are voluntary agencies in a democratic system. Cooperation between management and labor must be arranged in such a way that there will be on the part of the government as little interference as possible in their internal affairs. Compulsory arbitration is opposed by labor in the United States. Open conflict, which is a characteristic of the pioneer days of collective bargaining within an industry, is outgrown as both sides realize their respective responsibility for cooperation. The cost of conflict is too apparent for either side to plunge into a conflict merely to prove its strength when such proof no longer requires demonstration and when the damage to respective interests from a protracted siege becomes self-evident. Direct cooperation with a minimum of governmental intervention appears to American labor to be far superior to any official or semi-official tribunal or agency, whether temporary or permanent.

Representative organizations, in short, should themselves designate their representatives for cooperation. Designation by public authorities may in some situations be the only alternative, but, as far as labor is concerned, it is an undesirable solution. To any people accustomed to expression of choice through the ballot-box, representation imposed from without is not true representation.

For effective cooperation in the economic field, labor believes bipartite bargaining processes are the essential foundation, with tripartite determination of issues agreed upon by direct negotiation. It believes that to the greatest possible extent the legislative should be divorced from the economic field. Representative government cannot be carried out successfully if the representatives are so swamped with duties as to be unable to function effectively in any specific field or if they are so diversified in their functions that they cannot be chosen for competence

in any one field. Management-labor cooperation can be truly effective only as the participating representatives establish their capacity for the job by actual performance.

They must establish likewise the fact that they act in a truly representative capacity. Since labor is a vitally important and integral part of the social order, any tripartite governmental arrangement vitally affecting management and labor must provide proper representation. Under no circumstances is it advisable merely to appoint representatives from either management or labor without checking with their representative organizations. Labor in particular has often been criticized for the misdeeds or lack of ability of labor representatives on government bodies. Obviously labor cannot be expected to assume responsibility for the conduct and deeds of representatives who may be members of labor unions but who have not been selected by the recognized labor organizations. Responsibility goes with direct participation; and direct participation is possible only where labor itself designates those who are to act as representatives.

In our planning we must recognize that the institutions of political democracy have grown by process of trial and error through many long centuries. There is a lesson here for us to apply in economic relationships. We must fit our processes to the mould we find; this we must do before these processes can be effective for reshaping the mould.

We must be patient even when confronted with emergencies, because the very urgency of the necessity requires an effective remedy. We must deal in our cooperation with a program which must meet human needs, allow for human weaknesses, and adjust to the developing human capacities.

Together we will be intelligent enough to make our system work for the best interests of all our people, or we will be compelled to give way to some other system. The prospects for cooperation between management and labor after the war will depend upon the extent to which we accomplish such cooperation now.

We in our nation are privileged to have the opportunity to make our system serve the needs, the hopes, and capacities of the American people. We are privileged to live in a nation which has the physical resources and the manpower capable of accomplishing that objective. Together, management and labor can lead the way to democracy, to

jobs, and to that brand of freedom which respects the rules free men make through representatives they authorize to act in their behalf. Together management and labor can seek as their objective the kind of system through which we will face the future unafraid, eager to insure for all our people the rights we want for ourselves.



MANAGEMENT-LABOR COOPERATION IN WARTIME AND AFTER

By ERIC JOHNSTON

MR. JOHNSTON's article is a plea for self-government in management-labor relations—less elaborate and centralized government machinery; more working out of differences at the grass roots. The production drive of the WPB with its local labor-management committees is a successful experiment in this direction. Let it continue after the war. The effort of labor

to make production more efficient, more rational, and more satisfying to the men at the machines, Mr. Johnston emphasizes, is no encroachment on the prerogatives of management.

The author is President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

IT WOULD SEEM hardly necessary to prove the proposition that management and labor should cooperate, whether in wartime or in the years of peace that follow. It should be a self-evident truth that management and labor, whether in war or in peace, are engaged in a cooperative enterprise, that is, the operation of the nation's industry for the common good.

Indeed, I think no one advances the theory any more that enterprise is operated exclusively for those who supply its capital, the stockholders, nor is enterprise conducted solely to furnish employment to those who, by the skill of their hands, fashion its product. American enterprise inherently is a cooperative venture.

These facts are all too frequently lost sight of, even if they are not disputed, and if I accomplish nothing more, I do hope that the subject will be seen broadly in its proper perspective, rather than narrowly with the distortion that comes by looking at short range at the minutia of management-labor disagreements and at the means for their correction.

The basic consideration is worthy of further notice. When the very life of the nation is at stake, management and men work shoulder to shoulder to produce the most for the common objective—the total defeat of our enemies. Even so, differences of opinion do arise with respect to the employment relation, but the holding of honest opinions, however divergent, is not unpatriotic nor necessarily a deterrent to the accomplishment of the job we have to do.

Let me illustrate. All patriotic citizens abhor the effects of inflation; we are agreed that inflation is a very present danger to our economy and

thus to the successful prosecution of the war. But the accomplishment of a stabilized economy, no matter how desirable is the objective, is not easy of attainment and many views prevail with respect to the manner of its attainment.

The working man, for example, sees the cost of living going up; he thinks his wages should be advanced enough to counteract the increases in the costs of groceries, clothing, and the other necessities of life. He does not consider that he is unpatriotic in asking that the *relationship* between his wages and the cost of living be stabilized. But it is a foregone conclusion that if all wages go up, so must prices go up. Another general demand for wage increases will follow. Until there is universal recognition of the inevitability of this spiraling effect, there will be honest differences of opinion on the matter of general wage increases.

But there is another phase of the wage situation that must be considered. Even though management and labor must work together to stem the tide of inflation—to which general increases in wages contribute so directly—the fact must be faced that some working men honestly believe that, with respect to their own wages, they should be given increases “to keep them in line” with other working men in other industries and in other occupations. It is because we have such issues that we have willingly accepted in wartime a program of wage stabilization administered by a War Labor Board which investigates, weighs the issues, and reaches conclusions as to the propriety of wage increases in particular cases.

Contrary to the opinion held by some, the decisions of the National War Labor Board on wages do not always go in favor of labor; on the contrary, many wage demands are denied, and the labor members of the Board not infrequently join in the denials. The situation in itself is evidence of close cooperation between the management and the labor members on the Board, but of outstanding importance is the fact that when a decision is reached, whether it goes against labor or against management, all members of the Board are unanimous in their agreement that the decision shall prevail.

In wartime we accept the proposition that a federal agency to compose labor disputes and to stabilize wages is necessary, but in wartime we accept many other forms of regulation which in peacetime we abhor. In the years of peace to come we ought not to have to look to the agencies of government to compose our differences.

Before the war our management-labor disagreements were brought before agencies of the federal government for adjudication. This step was taken in the unhappy years of the world-wide economic depression when the National Labor Relations Law was enacted. That law was condemned, and I think properly condemned, as a one-sided piece of legislation. To that condition I attribute in large measure the difficulties of management and labor in the years immediately preceding the war. My opinion is not that of industrial managers alone, because throughout those years the internecine strife between unions for control led to the condemnation of the National Labor Relations Board by the leaders of organized labor as well as by the managers of industrial enterprises.

Now that we have had the experience of several years under this law, let us look at the legislation objectively and from a different point of view. I have noted from the most recent annual report of the National Labor Relations Board that in the year covered by the report there were 10,977 new cases brought to the Board, of which 6,010 were representation cases and 4,867 were unfair labor practice cases. The Board conducted and supervised 4,212 elections in industrial plants throughout the country in that year. In the execution of its functions the Board expended more than three millions. Is it not pertinent to ask this question: why is it necessary to go to any agency directed from Washington to compose the differences between management and labor, when they should be able to compose the differences for themselves?

I am not in favor of government in business—and I count labor as an integral part of business. Government has gone altogether too far, in my opinion, in regimenting the activities of its citizens. But I must add that, rightly or wrongly, the federal government will continue to inject itself into business, and into the affairs of labor, if there is not self-government in management-labor relations.

For specific example, why should government be a party to an election to determine for labor its bargaining agency with management in any factory, large or small, anywhere in the land? It seems to me that labor and management should see that it is to their mutual advantage to conduct their own affairs on the basis of mutual respect and trust without the intervention of government. I can see indications that such a situation is indeed coming about, and I think it is a happy omen for the years after hostilities cease.

Of course when the war is over, there will be serious domestic

economic problems in addition to the exceedingly difficult problems in the international field. That is all the more a reason why management and labor must take advanced positions on the solutions of their own problems by themselves without the intervention of government.

I have pointed out many times previously, in addresses and prepared articles, that I consider of paramount importance the matter of rapid re-conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy to insure continuance of the full employment of our people. But in holding out the prospect of that much-to-be-desired situation, we must recognize that if there is violent dissension between management and labor over matters of minor importance compared with the fundamental issues, we will not gain our objective—the rapid change-over from the making of ammunition to the production of automobiles, and from the building of wartime ships to the construction of peacetime homes.

I am hopeful that we will remember what happened during the years of depression before the war, when short-sightedness and selfishness interfered greatly with the job of stamping out unemployment and of bringing about a sound domestic economy.

Let me lay down a few simple propositions that I consider fundamental:

1. Practical cooperation does not imply an abnegation of the right of expression of an intelligent self-interest. Management must recognize the right of labor to seek to protect its economic status.

2. Labor must recognize that national prosperity will depend upon a prosperous free economy. Management must protect the interests of its stockholders, of whom so many are laboring men, widows, and philanthropic enterprises.

3. Management and labor mutually must recognize the vital importance of facing an issue squarely, of analyzing the problems honestly, and of reaching solutions that will be equitable to both parties.

4. Reliance upon government to solve government-labor problems is unsound. Lawsuits and appeals to federal administrative agencies, involving thousands of pages of testimony and heavy legal fees, are unnecessary extravagances.

Men of good will can compose their own differences in most cases. It seems to me that we have progressed sufficiently far along the road of sound labor-management cooperation so that we can go ahead under our own steam.

The days of "name-calling" should be behind us. In this connection I am reminded of the conditions that we all observed in the early days of the automobile. Have you not witnessed the profane sarcasm of an offended driver when some other driver, perhaps unwittingly, committed a breach of driving etiquette? No matter how serene and courteous the offended driver might be toward his fellow man when he was out of his automobile, he became abusive on the slightest provocation when he was in it.

So in the field of management-labor difficulties I hope we have arrived at the time when we no longer need hurl invectives before we look into the real situation, and treat as our enemies those who we would have as friends.

What have we learned of our wartime experiences that will serve us in the post-war period? I wish to refer particularly to the production-drive machinery that is operating to such great advantage in thousands of factories today. Where there is a labor-management production-drive committee in effective operation, every production problem, every deterrent to maximum output, is under the microscope for examination by the committee. To reach a sound solution of the problem is the genuine desire of every member of the committee, whether he be from management or from labor. Operations are speeded up by changes in machine layout, by the introduction of ingenious devices; scrap and defective parts are cut down by intelligent examination of the causes; and lost time from accidents is reduced by designing and installing safeguards.

In these efforts, labor does not take over the prerogatives of management. Indeed there is the recognition, freely accorded by many representatives of labor, that the job of management is the exclusive function of the managers. The production drive activity is solely the free expression of genuine cooperation by both sides.

I can envision the same result by an identical approach to the problems we shall face when hostilities are over. The problems themselves will be far different from those we face now, and indeed are likely to be more, far more challenging; but I am entirely confident that those problems can be solved by the wholehearted cooperation of management and labor.

POST-WAR OBJECTIVES IN LABOR RELATIONS

By PERCY S. BROWN

IN THE following article, Percy Brown examines the basic condition upon which sound labor-management relations must depend—a common goal for worker and management. Without planning on the national level for a peacetime economy such a goal cannot, in the opinion of the author, be developed. The national economy has been planned in wartime for wartime needs. Why not in peace-

time for peacetime needs? These are the questions the author sets himself.

Mr. Brown is President of the Society for the Advancement of Management, Executive Director of the Edward A. Filene Good Will Fund, and a past President of the Taylor Society. As deputy director of the International Management Institute of Geneva, he has also viewed industrial relations from an international standpoint.

IF WORKERS GENERALLY are working, if wages are high and factory conditions good, especially if there is collective bargaining and general good feeling between employers and employees, it is usually assumed that "labor relations" are ideal.

In time of war, we know better. In war we all want to know not merely how workers are related to their employers, but to what all this effort is related. And we all *care*. It must, we insist, be related to the war effort, or else.

Well, in peace our labor must be related to the peace effort, or else. That is the whole story. The rest of this article is mere detail.

In this I am not saying anything that all of us do not know. All must agree, for instance, that if there is a job to do, it must be planned. Can we not all agree that whether or not we shall have over-all planning depends on whether or not we have any over-all job?

In 1918, to be sure, most of us grasped this principle, and we tried, under the leadership of Bernard Baruch and others, to organize our efforts in accordance with our national aim. The moment the Armistice was signed, however, we reverted to national aimlessness. It seemed to be assumed that we must have national aimlessness if individual initiative were to be released. One result, after a few years, was the *smothering of individual initiative*. One great industry after another lost its market and had to close down. Unemployment swept through the country like a plague; the resulting loss of buying power caused more shut-downs and more unemployment, leaving eager, ambitious, creative workers

about as helpless as the drifters, and leaving our great masters of finance and industry dazed and stunned and quite incapable of initiating any movement for the recovery of business.

There was no mystery about that depression. We can have another, if we want it, by following the same recipe—by failing to coordinate our efforts in accordance with our over-all job.

Our over-all job in 1918 was the making of peace and prosperity; but instead of attending to it, each of us concentrated on his own job, assuming that the over-all job would just naturally attend to itself. It didn't. Because we neglected our collective task, moreover, our economic mechanism soon got so out of gear that we could no longer work even at our personal jobs.

Then, as now, our over-all job was a world job, but we did not realize in those days that we were a part of the world. Americans, we boasted, stood on their own feet and no American was a part of anything else. The American way of doing things was for each of us to express himself as he saw fit. We all hated war, for instance; if each of us hated it hard enough, it would naturally follow that there would be no war—not any, that is, which would concern us. Similarly, if each of us worked hard and saved his money, all of us would be prosperous.

But it didn't turn out that way. For the machine with which we were trying to express our individual egos was anything but individualistic. Its character was definitely social. Our efforts to run it for our personal ends, without social responsibility, simply threw it out of gear. Its different parts, freed from all social controls, worked at cross purposes and jammed. It could no more produce peace and prosperity than our factories today, minus any over-all planning, could wage successful war.

What we shall do after this war depends mainly on how much we have learned since the last war and its aftermath. *If we have learned that there can be no real liberty without social controls*, we can preserve free enterprise. If we have not learned that lesson—and there is little evidence that we have learned it yet—we may have another boom, another bull market, another grand orgy of social irresponsibility and, inevitably, another and even more complete collapse leading to a Third World War.

I know that our point of view has changed considerably since 1918, and particularly since Pearl Harbor. But the same minds which championed Individualism in the Twenties and Isolationism in the Thirties

are again refusing, in the name of Liberty and Free Enterprise, to look realistically at the world in which we live and to discover the real nature of modern industry. Most of us, to be sure, already understand why all our efforts must be coordinated for Total War; but to a large section of America—for all I know, a majority—the idea of coordinating our efforts (that is, our labor) for Total Peace is still either a vague, idealistic dream or else a horrid nightmare about a monster called "Bureaucracy."

To a management engineer this situation presents something of a quandary. To him it is obvious that modern industry is social, that if we do not use it for social purposes, it cannot be made to serve our individual purposes for any considerable period of time. Mass production must produce things for the masses; and the masses must be able to absorb the product, or mass production must stop. Also, we know, production must be balanced. If we employ too much of our labor and resources in the production and distribution of luxuries, we will not have sufficient labor and resources left to attend to the production and distribution of necessities. In other words, we may enjoy an era of seemingly unprecedented prosperity for, say, two-thirds of the nation, and still be anything but prosperous.

One cannot be in good health, surely, if a third of his body is sick; nor would any American call himself prosperous if one-third of his children could not get the necessities of life. Well, are we one America, or are we just one hundred and thirty million separate and distinct Americans, each quite independent of all the others? That is the big question which we must answer, and answer much more definitely than we have answered it yet, if we hope to make our machine function well enough to preserve free enterprise.

In war, of course, we all recognize the principle of unity and the necessity, therefore, of acting as if we were one. In war we readily recognize the principle of priorities and the necessity for attending to first things first. But in peace, even if we admit that modern industry has made us interdependent, we do not see the necessity for acting as if we were interdependent. No matter how interdependent we may actually have become, we have not as yet recognized any such necessity. And yet, we must recognize this necessity if any real freedom is to be achieved.

Though I seem to be quoting Engels—"Liberty is the recognition of necessity"—I am neither a socialist nor a communist, and I am opposed

to any more regimentation than is necessary in any given circumstance. My personal preference is all for free enterprise—for freedom to act on one's individual initiative, wherever and whenever such action does not interfere with doing the things which most need to be done. Socialism and communism, it seems to me, are makeshifts. They are the makeshifts to which societies resort when the things which most need doing are being left undone—when great masses of people, for instance, are not being fed; or when people who want to work cannot find work; or when the rights and liberties to which the human soul aspires are denied to sections of the population.

The way to avoid socialism and communism, it seems to me, is to establish economic order by the planning and execution of every social responsibility. To oppose such planning in the name of irresponsible liberty is to take the path which leads to the very irritations which we hope to avoid. When parents neglect their children, the police have to interfere; when those directing our economic processes do not measure up to their social responsibilities, the State will interfere. In neither case will the interference be welcomed, but it cannot be avoided merely by shrieking that parents can raise children better than policemen can, or that private business can operate more efficiently than political bureaucracy.

This war, it must now be clear, is a war against the domination of human life by irresponsible power. To hope that it may end in freedom from responsibility in the exercise of such powers as may be in *our* hands, is to indulge in day-dreaming at the very moment when we can least afford to nod. Though I wish with all my heart that we were not doing just that, I cannot escape the conclusion that we are. We lack the vital over-all integration of our economy, wherein all groups strive for common goals.

And this observation is directed not merely at business leaders, for it seems to be measurably true of organized labor and organized agriculture. None of these groups, for instance, ever wanted our country to experience inflation, but all have persisted in a course well calculated to bring it on. All might understand that a nation devoting the bulk of its resources and labor to the war effort could not maintain as high a plane of living as it could if it were not confronted by any such necessity. Our farmers, however, have demanded higher prices for farm goods than they had been able to get in their most prosperous years of peace;

our labor unions, as a rule, have demanded that wages should go up with every increase in the cost of living; and our business leaders, not to be outdone, have expressed their sense of outrage that anyone should suggest a ceiling on business incomes. All, or practically all, I think, were patriotic. All wanted to win the war, and all seemed to understand, in a vague sort of way, that to win would require sacrifices all around. All, nevertheless, continued to act in terms of power politics. No over-all program was ever even discussed in any all-American Labor-Agriculture-Business council. I am not aware, in fact, that there ever was such a council, and I cannot be confident that there will be one to consider our common problems when this war is ended.

All these groups are coming into more and more power. If the war should end soon, therefore, there is danger that post-war years will be given over to a rather blind and often pointless struggle for domination, rather than to a program of finding out what they have in common and making an effort, at least, to devise a program to gain these common ends. There are, as we all know, so many jobs which urgently need doing, but which, nevertheless, will continue to be neglected unless we can agree on some over-all plan. In spite of the outcry that was recently raised against Vice President Wallace, I have not yet become acquainted with any American who objects to children having enough milk. The out-criers, I think, were merely people who have not yet achieved any world vision and supposed, therefore, that Wallace wanted *them* to furnish the milk. I am sure he didn't. Wallace wanted the *world* to furnish it—probably the world's cows and goats; then he wanted the world, by world planning, to see that the children got it. And just why Hottentot children should be excluded, I have never been able to see.

In America we have thirteen million Negroes whose children often are unable to secure an adequate diet, to say nothing of their having to live, for the most part, in shacks and slums unfit for human residence. As these children grow up, if they do grow up, they seldom have anything approaching adequate health care, and when they reach school age, very few of them are able to get really good schooling. There were some whites who even objected recently to Negro war workers being taught the trade of riveting, although the nation was desperately in need of their services if they should prove able to master the technique.

So long as Americans generally are able to tolerate such a social sore as this, even in wartime, I can see little hope for either peaceful or

profitable labor relations after the war is over. They tolerate it, of course, because there is no coordinated plan to do away with it. Few, if any, Americans really want the condition which has inevitably followed our policy of trying "to keep the Negro in his place." We never really meant to keep so large a part of our population ignorant and diseased and incompetent and blazing with hatred against us who made them so. Surely we don't want race riots, or even window-smashing orgies by the slum-dwellers of Harlem, although we shall surely have them in more and more violent forms unless, by some well-planned national effort, we eliminate the causes of such disturbances.

Business, thinking merely of profits, isn't going to tackle such problems, although it would manifestly be a boon to business if it had thirteen million more skilled and well-paid customers. And organized labor, if it thinks mainly of raising wages, isn't going to contribute much. Nor will the farmers, if their attention is concentrated on the high prices which they hope to get. Raising the status of the Negro—physically, mentally, and morally—is an all-American task. Only by over-all planning, by an all-American recognition of the need for such planning, can we hope to accomplish it.

Definitely, we can do it if we will. Due to the tremendous acceleration of discovery and invention, under the impetus of war necessity, the post-war world will find us with sufficient power in our hands to do almost anything we seriously want to do. If we want to abolish poverty, we can do it. If we want to make certain that every American child is amply supplied with food, housing, schooling, and medical care, we can do that. We cannot, of course, be isolationists, for we are living in One World now and must unite with other nations in freeing all the nations from want and fear. These tasks, nevertheless, are not too great for us, if we approach them with the same understanding that we brought to the task of war.

But have we any national aim yet—beyond military victory—to match our national power? Is there anything which we all want, and want so seriously that we shall be willing to work together on the task? Today there is; we are just about unanimous in wanting to smash the Axis. But after the Axis is smashed, what then? The whole problem of labor relations after the war lies in the answer to that question.

If there is an over-all job to do, and we Americans once recognize it as our over-all job, we shall not have to worry about our labor rela-

tions. We shall want to work together, and we shall work happily, looking for our reward in the achievement itself.

Our goal might be, for example, to raise the national income to some level found practical by actual survey of our power and resources, instead of by comparison with what it has been in the past. Heretofore, we have never tried concertedly to do anything of the sort. We have never tried, for instance, to determine how high a wage could be paid, although it has long been obvious that wages are buying-power, that lower-than-necessary wages spell ruin to business generally.

There is no question that organized labor would cooperate heartily in such an all-American drive; if organized business were to cooperate as heartily, all the suspicions and reservations which have traditionally hindered cooperation would soon be dispelled; and with such labor relations obtaining generally, there would be little need for any political "bureaucracy."

There would, however, be a basic need for the doing of first things first. And the problem of *what* we were doing—of how our effort was actually contributing to the common good—would become of first importance in every labor council. In the past, excepting in war years, this problem has never come up. Neither the labor union nor the individual worker in America has either known or cared whether or not their labor was adding to the general peace and prosperity or merely adding to some speculator's profits.

This does not mean that labor has not been conscientious. Workers generally, I think, have tried to be honest with their employer's time. Yet, trying to do "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay," they have still not cared whether the product of their collective efforts actually added to the common wealth or not. The product might indeed be some harmful patent medicine, which would tend to keep people from getting scientific medical care and, therefore, keep them sick. Even such a fraudulent business, however, needs to employ honest typists and secretaries, printers and engravers, carpenters, painters and plumbers, and has to pay them out of wealth which useful labor creates. It inescapably follows, therefore, that these useful workers cannot be paid as much as they could be paid if all workers were employed in more useful work.

Every day I see glowing advertisements telling me of wonderful gadgets which I shall be able to buy as soon as "peace" arrives. I want lots of those gadgets. I want a car that will run umpty miles per gallon

on tires that will last forever. I want an unbreakable glass house, air-conditioned with perfectly filtered air, guaranteed to keep itself clean, and with one-way glass so I can look out while nobody on the outside can possibly look in. Of course I'll want television and a helicopter—or maybe two helicopters—in my garage. American business, they tell me, is all ready. Everything has been “planned.” There will be no limit, seemingly, to glamorous toys for all of us who happen to have the price; and it is hoped that so many workers will be employed in the production of these toys that they too will have the price.

Without planning, there is real danger that we shall head into just such a business boom, and of our being fooled once more into calling it prosperity. We may even be so charmed by the illusion that we shall put an end to all this “government interference,” including minimum wage laws and even social security. With employment at a peak and wages high, and with everybody free to invest all the money he can borrow in any enterprise which looks good to him, we may all become so busy and dizzy that we can't be bothered with mere social problems.

We may be sure, however, that we shall not get rid of labor unions. The unions will see to that, with or without government assistance. For the unions too have come into power. How they shall use this new power of theirs depends on whether we do go wild once more, or decide seriously to plan for peace and prosperity. If business generally is unrestrained, the unions also are likely to become so. That is, they will go after the big money—the highest possible wages which the highest possible pressure can wring from their employers—which is not a good prospect for industrial peace.

And the farmers, likewise, will go after prices. Prices at any price. In an era of general unrestraint, we cannot expect them to be too deeply interested in supplying food to those who need to be fed. Only if labor, agriculture, business, and government decide to work together for a common cause, only then can we expect any special group to exercise restraint.

I do not want to be too pessimistic. There is a chance that we shall come to our senses in time; we may decide to plan for peace and prosperity as seriously as we are now planning for war. It will, of course, be a very different kind of planning. It will not be grim. It should be gay—planning not to destroy, but to build; planning not to kill, but to help; and planning not to regiment ourselves under one High Command,

but to liberate ourselves for the fullest possible expression of our very different lives. Then, incidentally, we could have gadgets without depriving any child of anything that children need. Then, also, farmers could get prices determined on an understanding of the services they give; and workers could receive buying-power not only adequate for their needs as workers, but enough to enable them to play their full part in our social and cultural life. Then, in short, we could have "free enterprise." I, at least, can see no reason why private capital should not be risked occasionally in the hope of big profits by those who are interested in taking such chances. But we cannot devote our whole economic machine to such speculation. When we gamble, we must be certain that we are not gambling with the baby's milk tickets.

With such an understanding of our common problem—a problem which necessitates all-around coordination—we should not have to worry about labor relations, for they could and would be exactly what we all want them to be. Labor wants peace and prosperity; but organized labor cannot produce them by its own unaided efforts. That is a job for all of us. If we all decide to work with labor toward this common goal, there is no doubt whatever that labor will be found working cheerfully and loyally with all of us. The crux of the matter lies there—in the common goal.

LABOR—WORK PLUS IDEAS

By WENDELL LUND

MR. LUND, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the War Production Board, assesses the place of labor in American war production. The story is an exciting one—a tribute to free labor in a democracy. Labor has contributed in mills and factories; but it has also contributed in the high councils of Government. The structure and spirit of our war production effort which have made that contribution possible are here discussed. That the lessons we

have learned in war are applicable in peace needs hardly be said.

The author, as Director of the Labor Production Division of WPB during 1942 and part of 1943, has been in an ideal position to observe and evaluate labor's role. During that year and a half, the work of the Labor Production Division did much to make that role possible.

I

THIS IS A PEOPLE'S WAR. And American labor is playing a major role in the fighting of it because American labor knows that it is a fight to the death to preserve the dignity of the common man.

What is that role, the role of labor? Well, first let's start by roughing in the picture of war production. We all know America has done and is doing a tremendous job. But just how tremendous it is, I don't think any of us adequately realize. So to keep the picture in front of us, let's cite just a few examples.

In 1939 steel production was 53,000,000 tons. Last year it was 86,000,000 tons. By the end of 1943 it is estimated that it will be around 90,000,000 tons—far more than all the Axis countries and the occupied countries combined can turn out. And steel, remember, is the mightiest of the sinews of war.

In the peace year of 1939 aluminum played a definite role, yes. We found it in our pots and pans and other places in our daily life and, to a limited extent, in transportation and the building industries. It was light and tough and heat-resistant. In that year we produced 327,000,000 pounds, quite a respectable quantity, enough to satisfy our needs. Last year, because aluminum is so vital in war planes, labor and management, with greatly expanded facilities, teamed up to turn out 1,042,000,000 pounds—more than three times the 1939 production. And by the end of this year the 1942 total will be doubled—six to seven times 1939 aluminum production.

Take copper, one of the most vital of war metals since the western

world picked up the Chinese invention of gunpowder and started using it in fighting its wars. In 1939 we produced less than a million short tons. Last year we produced more than two million tons. This year our production is expected to run about two and a half million tons.

Then there is magnesium, in some ways the most fabulous metal of them all. Lighter than aluminum, good for a hundred uses, its possibilities had been little explored until grim necessity of war urgency made substitute metals inevitable. Here's the production story of magnesium: 1939, 11,000,000 pounds; last year, 98,000,000 pounds—about nine times as much. The goal for 1943 is around 400,000,000 pounds, four times that of last year and nearly forty times the production in 1939.

That's what has happened in a few short years in our production and processing of raw materials. The story is the same for the actual tools of war, the shooting weapons that go to the fighting men, or help take them there—ordnance, aircraft, and ships.

Production of ground ordnance increased eight times last year over 1941. This figure is still going up commensurate with military needs.

The rapid growth of aircraft production illustrates the might of the combined effort of labor and industrial management. Today it is the biggest business in America. In 1939, when war broke over Europe, it was seventy-fifth in the list of American industries. From 6,000 planes in 1940—a good record, we thought then—production went to 48,000 planes last year. In the one month of August this year, we made over 7,600—or more than the 1940 total—and production is still rising. War planes, as everyone knows, are getting bigger and bigger, as the emphasis has swung to long range bombers. Aircraft production schedules call for an output of planes by next April well over six times greater, by weight, than the aircraft produced in April last year.

The production of ships is another example of America's capacity to produce. Secretary of the Navy Knox has said that at the end of 1943 the size of the Navy will be doubled over what it was at the beginning of this year. This year is going to be the "harvest year" for the Navy. Ships planned last year and the year before, now are joining their fighting sisters at sea.

As for merchant ships, the ships that now carry weapons and supplies to our fighting men on the battle lines, production this year will be close to twenty million tons—almost two and one-half times the production of 1942.

That, roughly, is the story of war production in the United States up to this time. It is a story that could have been written only in America. It could have been achieved only with the unstinting help of American labor.

II

When war came to this country, uninvited, it found labor ready to do its share in the factories, at the fighting front, in the transportation field. In fact, the evidence is pretty clear that the workers of America, for the most part, had been more keenly aware of the danger of Nazism to our national security than the country as a whole. During the late 1930's their leaders had uttered repeated warnings, urging us to prepare for the worst. With few exceptions the leaders of organized labor gave full support to the President's National Defense Program. So when war came, they were ready to lead their members into all-out participation in the struggle, on the battle line, on the assembly line, and in Government councils where over-all production policies were being formulated. A majority of the workers in war industries, furthermore, belong to labor unions. Of the more than 10,000,000 workers now estimated to be engaged in the munitions industry, probably more than a half are members of organized labor groups.

Labor unions in this country have grown apace since the beginning of the National Defense Program in 1939. Under the impetus of a favorable national policy, labor organizations had already grown rapidly from 1933 on; this growth continued during the national defense program and the first eighteen months after Pearl Harbor. The two large labor organizations, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, today lay claim to a combined membership of around eleven millions.

An indication of the rapid growth of these two organizations since Pearl Harbor is contained in the fact that within the last year alone nearly one and a half million workers have joined local unions which are part of Internationals affiliated with one of these two large bodies. Other national labor organizations, exclusive of so-called independent labor organizations, probably add another million and a half members to the pool of organized workers. Some people believe that when independent unions are included, the total of organized workers in America is today upwards of thirteen millions.

As would be expected, largest increases have been in aircraft and shipbuilding. The United Automobile Workers of America, C.I.O., in what was the automobile industry and in aircraft, is a good example of one of the fastest growing International unions. In the past two years it has grown from six hundred thousand members to a membership claimed to be over a million as of today. Another example is the International Association of Machinists, which has doubled its membership in the past two years. This organization has a large following in the aircraft industry.

It is natural that organizations with so many members in war industry should be keenly interested in the war production processes in a democracy. Labor unions generally feel that they are a powerful force in the war production program of this country. They feel that they are providing incentive and direction to their members to produce more. They feel that they are enforcing the sort of industrial discipline which holds down the number of work stoppages and other obstructions to production and that they are generally doing the things which promote greater production per man-day of work. They feel that they have made war workers more responsive to the needs of war production and more responsible in doing their full part to maintain output at its peak.

At the same time they say they are protecting the worker from preventable hardships injurious to morale, and, therefore, to production. They say they are helping him to maintain his rightful place in the wartime economy. At the same time they are calling on the worker to make sacrifices; but they are insisting that his sacrifices be matched by the sacrifices of other members in the community.

In a word, labor unions, say their proponents, are stimulating the worker to give everything he has to war production and at the same time are assuring him that his rightful individual and group interests will be adequately protected in a period of extreme economic and social dislocation.

In the opinion of the writer, who has had a first-hand opportunity to view the participation of a dynamic labor movement in war production, these claims appear to have a solid basis in fact. As Director of the Labor Production Division, he was in close personal touch with war workers and their unions during a period of fourteen months. During this time he saw countless examples of self-sacrifice and heroism on the production line. But more important still, he saw a labor movement that

was devoting itself to preventing work stoppages and to increasing the productivity of the workers.

There were, to be sure, instances where workers and their leaders must share the responsibility for interruptions to production. But the fact remains that such work stoppages have been few in number, and, with one major exception known to all of us, have not seriously affected the volume of goods produced.

As for other interferences with maximum production, the writer does not doubt that there are still restrictions on production in certain war plants. These restrictions, however, are the exception; the majority of them have been going out the window as fast as labor and management have been able to get together on fair and adequate wage rates for increased rates of production. In most cases where they still persist, it is because of the failure of labor and management to agree on fair and reasonable pay standards. There are still, unfortunately, a few members of management, labor, and the rest of the public who put personal gain ahead of winning the war.

The sharp increase in war production in the past eighteen months cannot be gainsaid. A large part of the increase, of course, is unquestionably due to the vast increase of workers in war plants during that period. Workers in munitions plants have increased from around six millions in early 1942 to close to ten millions at the present time. Given facilities and effective industrial management, war production was bound to rise as millions of additional workers flooded into war plants.

But that wasn't the only thing that happened. There are good reasons for believing that the productivity of the individual workers was stepped up too. Partly that result was due to short-cuts devised by management; partly it was due to the increased skill of workers at particular jobs; partly it was due to longer hours of work; partly it was due to innovations suggested by the workers themselves as a flood of thousands of their production ideas was released to become an integral part of production processes. But partly it was due also to just a lot of harder work by millions of American workers.

A few examples can be cited to show just how the productivity of the average worker has been stepped up under the pressure of war production requirements. Back in 1918, for example, in the heyday of the Hog Island Shipyards, it took 290 days to build a ship smaller than the present-day Liberty Ship. Liberty ships today are being turned out on an

average of less than two months apiece, and several shipyards are cutting that time in half or better.

Tonnage in aircraft was up 230 per cent between 1941 and 1942, while employment increased 130 per cent. True, the work week was increased, but here again a significant part of the answer is that the productivity of the individual worker was increased, and increased sharply. Partly due to improved methods of production, such an increase resulted also from improved skill and greater effort of the workers.

It used to take 110,000 man hours to make a Flying Fortress. Now it takes only 27,000. Corresponding increases in worker productivity have taken place pretty much all along the line, from raw materials to finished product. Where a man mined half a ton of iron ore in 1918, he is mining better than a ton today. The story is the same generally throughout the war industries.

There has been a coincidence between the increase in membership and influence of organized labor and the sharp increase in war production in the past two years. Labor leaders argue that an advancing unionization has contributed substantially to increasing war production and labor productivity. There is, in the opinion of the writer, a strong case to be made for the connection. Doubting Thomases, indeed, would be hard put to disprove it.

III

Ever since the start of the National Defense Program, labor has felt a heavy responsibility for contributing to war production at the Government policy-making level, as well as on the production line. Labor in the United States has been well aware of the prominent place British labor has occupied in the highest war production councils of its Government. Especially in recent years, the relationship between British and American labor has been close, and in more than one instance American labor has taken its cue from British labor.

But there is something more basic than that to American labor's role in our war production effort. Labor leadership in this country is acquiring a deepening sense of responsibility for exercising its growing economic and political power for the benefit of the mass of workers in wartime as well as in time of peace. The mass of American workers, above everything else, want the war to be run right. They want it to

be carried through to speedy and complete victory. They want this done with maximum efficiency and a minimum of needless dislocation. And the workers feel that the war will be run better if they have something to say about it in top policy-making councils, as well as in the shops and shipyards of the country. Production planning, manpower planning, wage and price planning—these are all government activities intimately affecting the individual worker. It is his notion of democracy that he help plan and not merely be planned for.

Formal labor participation in the war production program had its start in the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. This seven-man Commission, established May 29, 1940, constituted the beginning of the Federal War Agencies.

The seven advisors were assigned responsibility for "investigation, research, and coordination" in the following fields: industrial production, industrial materials, employment, consumer protection, farm products, price stabilization, and transportation.

Mr. Sidney Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, became the Advisor on Employment. Having grown up with the labor movement in this country, he was head of a large and successful International Union, and Vice-President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, one of the two big labor organizations. He had been active in public affairs in the State of New York and a trusted advisor of the National administration. Trusted as he was by a large segment of American labor, he brought to the Advisory Commission the seasoned viewpoint of an experienced labor leader of high stature.

The organization developed by the Advisor on Employment came to be known as the Labor Division, and as such was the forerunner of the War Manpower Commission and of the Labor Production Division of the War Production Board. No formal order was ever issued defining the functions of the Advisor on Employment. But the functions of the Labor Division, as they developed in the months following the creation of the position of Advisor on Employment, were these:

1. Determination of labor requirements, as a basis for planning the training program, advising on contract and facility placement, and determining the need for emergency housing.
2. Labor supply and training, which included the coordination of the efforts of recruiting and training agencies, direction of training

within industry itself, and full utilization of available labor supplies.

3. Labor relations, which consisted of preventing work stoppages, elimination of labor barriers to full production, protection of labor standards and defense production, wage stabilization in critical defense industries, and provision of a channel for presenting labor viewpoints on the defense program.

Mr. Hillman conceived it to be his job to "see to it that we have in this country a supply of labor sufficient to produce—swiftly and without stoppages—all the goods necessary for national defense."¹

The Labor Division of the Council of National Defense functioned primarily as a coordinating and advisory agency. It attempted to gain agreement on policy among the several Federal Agencies with operating responsibility in the field of labor and manpower. It also directed the attention of those agencies charged with obtaining defense production to problems of manpower utilization and labor relations. The actual operating functions in these fields remained in such independent agencies as the Federal Security Agency, Works Progress Administration, Civil Service Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, the War and Navy Departments, Maritime Commission, and the Treasury Department.

The increasing burden of defense activities led to the expansion of the offices of several members of the National Defense Advisory Commission into full-fledged administrative war agencies. Of these, the Office of Production Management, established January 7, 1941, was the most important. It embraced the functions of three of the former members of the Advisory Commission. The President appointed Mr. William S. Knudsen, Advisor on Industrial Production, to be Director General of the new office. At the same time the President appointed Mr. Sidney Hillman, Advisor on Employment, to be Associate Director.

Under the Associate Director of the O.P.M., the autonomous character of the Labor Division was preserved. Its functions continued along the same lines as under the National Defense Advisory Commission, with emphasis on providing an adequate and well-trained labor supply, maintaining labor standards, and preventing work stoppages. The operating agencies in these fields continued to be independent, being bound only by consent to the leadership of the Labor Division.

Most noteworthy exception to this generalization were the Train-

¹ Address by Sidney Hillman before the U.S. Conference of Mayors, September 21, 1940.

ing-Within-Industry program, the shipbuilding wage stabilization program, and the work on union relations and disputes done by labor union representatives on the staff of the Labor Division. These activities supplemented work being done by existing agencies of government.

The staff of the Labor Division was made up of specialists in the fields of labor supply, training, and labor relations. These specialists came from other agencies of government, from the staffs of leading universities, from industry, and from labor unions.

The Labor Division furthered labor participation in the war production program in still another way. Fourteen formal Labor Advisory Committees were created to present the views of labor on actions proposed by various industry branches. In addition, thirteen informal committees represented labor's viewpoint in those industries where unions were weak or where union jurisdiction was in dispute. Although it has been suggested that the advice these committees were permitted to give was limited to problems directly affecting the unions rather than to the broader questions affecting production, they nevertheless brought organized labor a good deal closer to what was going on in war production.

When the War Production Board superseded the Office of Production Management, on January 16, 1942, the Labor Division became part of the new organization. But the Director of the Labor Division was no longer Associate Director. He continued, however, to be a member of the War Production Board, top policy body of the new agency.

Toward the close of 1941 the reorganization of the labor supply and training functions of the Labor Division became a topic for general discussion, a discussion which culminated in the creation of the War Manpower Commission on April 18, 1942, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Paul V. McNutt, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency. Mr. McNutt was given general responsibility for the mobilization and use of the nation's manpower and directive authority over the various agencies of the Federal Government having functions in supplying and training manpower. This Executive Order transferred all labor supply functions and personnel of the Labor Division of the War Production Board to the War Manpower Commission and all training functions to the Federal Security Agency. Those activities of the Labor Division remaining in the War Production Board were placed in a reconstituted Labor Production Division. At the same time, the resignation of Mr.

Sidney Hillman as Director of the Labor Division was accepted, and he was appointed to the Advisory post of Special Assistant to the President on Labor Matters.

The writer became Director of the Labor Production Division on May 6, 1942, and, under the terms of the Executive Order creating the War Manpower Commission, a member of that Commission.

The Labor Production Division carried on those functions of the Labor Division having to do with labor relations and shipbuilding wage stabilization. It also continued the work of the Management Consultant Branch, which had been started in the Labor Division, the Building Trades Stabilization Board of Review, and participated in the War Production Drive, which had been initiated on March 1, 1942, by Mr. Nelson to stimulate worker output in war plants through Labor-Management Production Committees.

These joint committees had to be organized and serviced. During the fourteen months of its existence, the Labor Production Division helped establish and stimulate around 2300 Labor-Management Committees in war production plants throughout the country. Through these committees, workers have had an opportunity to make their ideas felt in war production. Tens of thousands of production ideas have been turned in, resulting in production shortcuts that have saved an inestimable number of man-hours and conserved untold critical materials. The committees have reduced absenteeism. Transportation problems have been untangled, problems of health and safety solved. The joint production committees, in short, have given workers an increased sense of participation in war production, and, by utilizing their energy and brain power, have speeded the output of war goods.

In its operations the Labor Production Division had the benefit of the views and advice of the Labor Policy Committee appointed by the Director. The members of this committee were Mr. Frank Fenton, Director of Organization, A.F.L.; Mr. John P. Frey, President of the Metals Trades Department, A.F.L.; Mr. George Masterton, General President of the United Association of Journeymen, Plumbers, and Steamfitters, A.F.L.; Mr. Clinton Golden, Assistant to the President, United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O.; Mr. Walter Reuther, Vice-President, United Automobile, Aircraft and Implement Workers, C.I.O.; and Mr. John Green, President, Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, C.I.O.

The Labor Production Division also increased labor participation in the Industry Divisions of W.P.B. Several of the Labor Advisory Committees established by the Labor Division became effective agencies for aiding the Industry Divisions in the solution of production and manpower problems. As part of this program, the Division placed well-qualified men from the ranks of labor on the staffs of the Directors of three Industry Divisions, Steel, Paper and Pulp, and Printing and Publishing.

On June 15, 1943, Mr. Nelson, with the warm concurrence of the writer, created two new Vice Chairmanships in the War Production Board and appointed two outstanding labor leaders to fill them. Mr. Clinton S. Golden, Assistant to the President of the United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., was appointed Vice Chairman for Manpower Requirements; and Mr. Joseph D. Keenan, formerly Secretary of the Chicago Federation of Labor, A.F.L., Vice Chairman for Labor Production. At the same time Mr. McNutt appointed Mr. Golden as Vice Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

During the past three months Mr. Golden and Mr. Keenan have been setting up their organizations. The Vice Chairman for Manpower Requirements has the job of assisting in striking a balance between the manpower required for the production of war goods and of essential civilian goods and services, and the supply of manpower available for such purposes. Mr. Golden is assisted by an inter-agency Labor Requirements Committee of which he is Chairman. It is the hope of the War Production Board that the Office of Manpower Requirements will meet the long-felt need for coordination of production and manpower.

Mr. Keenan will continue the functions of the Labor Production Division having to do with increasing labor productivity. These duties will include working through joint Labor-Management Committees in war plants and solving problems of industrial health and safety and of worker transportation and housing, as they affect labor productivity, in cooperation with labor, management, and government agencies.

Since early this Spring Mr. Nelson has been assisted by a Management-Labor Council composed of the Presidents of the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the United States Chamber of Commerce. The council, which meets periodically, affords the Chairman and Vice Chairmen of the War Production Board the opportunity of

consulting top leaders of American labor and industry on broad questions of policy. Labor's representation on this top council through Presidents William Green of the American Federation of Labor, and Philip Murray of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, gives it a voice where over-all policies of war production are discussed.

Thus it is clear that labor has served Government in war production in both advisory and operating capacities. The distinction between these two capacities has not, however, always been clear to everyone. There has been the feeling on the part of a few people that men from organized labor ought to represent labor even as Government officials. Fortunately, this has been very much of a minority view. It probably, moreover, has not been completely thought through by those who hold it. For if public officials may properly represent labor unions, why may they not just as properly represent business, industry, or any other group in the community?

As operating Government officials, men from labor are under the same injunction as men from other walks of life—to be open-minded, fair, and devoted only to the public interest. On the other hand, as members of advisory committees, men from labor have the same right as men from industry, business, and other backgrounds, the right to present frankly the views of the group from which they come. This is often as much of a duty as a right and contributes to good government.

In the opinion of the writer, it may fairly be said that most members of organized labor recognize the difference between these two capacities. It may also be said that, in the main, labor has served in both capacities with a minimum of confusion and with great benefit to Government.

IV

Such experience as this contains an important lesson for the challenge of the postwar period. The important role which labor organizations have played in the achievement of full production when our economy faced the supreme test of total war has, surely, some meaning for this challenge. This experience, gained by labor on the battlefield and on the production lines during these days of all-out war, should stand the nation in good stead in smoothing the stony path of the postwar period.

For where can labor make a more valuable contribution to the

future than in helping to plan a cooperative peace for the peoples of the world—a peace that will really stick? The common people of the world have come nearer to having common objectives for peace than any other segment of the population. They have been close to the realities of war. They have fought on the battlefronts and on the production lines which supply those battlefronts. The world over, their problems and aspirations are much the same. They know the value of joining hands with their neighbors to achieve common goals.

They know, too, the importance of preserving America's system of free enterprise, the system under which the United States has grown to its present economic stature, the system which has preserved for labor as in no other country the social gains that the machine age has brought about. And it seems to the writer that labor is conscious of the responsibility which such a system places on its shoulders, the responsibility of a free working man in a free world.

It is quite clear that the voice of labor should be heard and listened to in our councils when we are debating measures for full utilization of our resources for peace. And it seems equally clear that it should be heard when the nations sit down together to work out a blueprint of a world in which we can all live together in mutual justice and respect.

WHY WAGE INCENTIVES WORK

By JOHN W. NICKERSON

In this article Mr. Nickerson sets down some basic principles of wage incentives. How can wage-incentive plans be made to work efficiently and without the seemingly inevitable frictions so commonly associated with their operation? To that difficult question the author assays an answer.

Mr. Nickerson, Director of the Management Consultant Division of the War Production Board, brings to his task a broad background in industry as well as in Government. An industrial engineer by profession, he has been concerned with labor relations as industrial representative on various Government boards.

WITH THE DIMINISHING SUPPLY of new workers and the continued loss of present employees to the armed services, industry must make further utilization of the existing labor supply if it is to meet high war production quotas. Because war production quotas for 1944 will be higher than for 1943, individual productive efforts must reach or surpass the present accepted standards. To reach this goal, experience shows that a properly designed and operated wage incentive plan, mutually agreed upon, is a powerful factor in helping to attain the necessary increase.

The subject of incentives is a complex one—so broad, indeed, that industrial engineers will differ in relation to it, as will individual managements and individuals within the same management, and international unions from their own locals. This being the case, it is obvious that agreement is difficult to secure, except in the broadest and most innocuous way, among government agents whose past experience has been varied—some in management, some in labor, and some as students; and that it would be preposterous to consider what might emerge as an average consensus, to put it forth, that is, as a “plan” to be inflicted on American management and labor.

What follows should, therefore, be considered not as representing the position of government or of the War Production Board, but as personal conclusions drawn by the writer from many years' experience in industrial engineering, labor relations, and plant management, plus experience in the Management Consultant Division of WPB during the past year and a half. The subject of industrial incentives, it should be remembered, is not a static but an actively dynamic thing; it applies to man's contribution to the nation's economy with all the varying and changing motives occurring in human consciousness. Just as the con-

clusions of years ago do not apply today, so too today's thoughts may be improved tomorrow.

A glance at the history of wage incentive plans is nevertheless rewarding. Wages have always been considered remuneration for services performed. The ultimate object of these services is, in ordinary peace time, the production of some article of civilian use or consumption; at present, of course, it is largely the production of articles of war. It has also always been true that the phrase "services performed" has included the condition of being present on the job available for duty.

Earlier in the industrial era what is ordinarily known as day work was the prevalent method of wage payment. Although this system took care of presence on the job, it left unsettled the question of what constituted a fair day's work. With increased need for more production and lower costs, together with the willingness of many workers to produce and their desire for remuneration for extra ability and effort, there came, toward the beginning of the present century, an increase in the use of contract work or piece work.

Frederick W. Taylor in 1895 came forward with a theory of high wages and low labor cost in a wage incentive plan he proposed to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. His early outlined methods for measuring a "fair day's work" caused him to be called the father of what became known as Scientific Management. Taylor was soon followed by other engineers who proposed various combinations of the two fundamental elements of wage payment; that is, payment per unit of time and payment per unit of production. Henry L. Gantt, for example, over twenty-five years prior to the time when a foundation was placed under wages by the Fair Labor Standards Act, provided for a guaranteed hourly wage regardless of production plus a bonus for a specified task.

There have been developed, of course, many forms of non-financial incentives, such as recreational facilities, cafeterias, the publishing of quotas and performance, and so on. There are also various financial incentives, which include quality bonuses, foreman's bonus, profit sharing, and so on. All these are important. Here, however, we consider primarily the financial wage incentive plans for the purpose of increasing production.

In establishing such wage incentive plans two things are included: first, the method of determining the base, or standard, or 100% produc-

tion; and, second, the amount of payment which will be made for production below, at, and above the base. The base has sometimes been established by guess, sometimes from past records of performance, and sometimes by carefully worked-out time study backed up by a fundamental engineering research into methods, material, and equipment. Whatever the means of setting up the base production, they are an important factor in determining the type of incentive which may be chosen.

Wage payments may vary from ordinary day work or payment per unit of time to straight piece work or payment per unit of product. In the first instance, the employer takes all the gains or losses, and in the second instance the employee takes the gains or losses. Between these extremes there have been many plans whereby the employer and employees share the gains and losses. In earlier days, it must be remembered, the employee was entirely unprotected on straight piece work when conditions were bad; since the advent of the Fair Labor Standards Act there has been a guaranteed wage below which no employee may be paid. Ordinarily the payment of incentive wages begins at the accomplishment of the base or 100% production. Sometimes, however, in order to secure an early accomplishment, payment may begin at a point of less production. Many times, also, the rate of payment is not in direct proportion to the rate of increase in production; in some cases management may prefer straight day work, in some cases straight piece work or proportionate pay. It is equally true that at times labor prefers day work or no incentive and at time straight piece work. This being the case, it becomes clear that there may be circumstances in which, for local reasons, both parties may agree on a plan which is somewhere between these extremes.

Prior to Pearl Harbor the government had little interest in wage incentives in private industry except through its efforts to work out by mediation difficulties which arose in their use. The work of the Textile Work Assignment Board is a case in point.

The general textile strike in 1934 was largely based on what was termed by the unions a stretch-out, or an alleged attempt on the part of some mills to ask too large work assignments. A Textile Work Assignment Board, of which the writer was an employer member, was appointed by the Federal Government and studied the problem for about six months. The results clearly indicated that measurements of

work assignment or corresponding wage incentives must be worked out locally; broadly planned standards and methods to cover varying conditions could be entirely unjust and inappropriate.

Although the proposals of this Board for a permanent industry-wide Board of Mediation and Arbitration were never approved, the following statements are of interest as the recommendations of a government agency:

1. The work assignment is not merely a specification of the facilities for doing work—machines, equipment, and work places. Work assignment is a quantitative statement of the results desired of the worker; that is, the actual amount of work required or expected to be done in a specified period of time. In practice it must be expressed in terms of expected units of output per hour or per day, or in terms of machines to be operated at some standard rate of efficiency.

2. Work assignments should be based upon and measured by the actual amount of work required in their performance. No assignment should be such that a normal employee cannot handle it day after day and year after year without impairment of his health and energy.

3. Work assignments should be so regulated as eventually to remove this subject from the field of competition; mills should not be driven to seek removal of competitive disadvantage through any course which jeopardizes the well-being of their employees.

4. No barrier should be raised against the introduction of new machinery, nor against the improvement of processes. Such progressive steps, however, should be accompanied by measures which will minimize the hardships imposed upon the workers displaced.

Since that time, the Conciliation Service of the U.S. Department of Labor has done considerable work in assisting management and labor to solve work assignment and incentive difficulties through surveys.

Since Pearl Harbor, as different War Agencies have come into being, several have given close attention to wage incentive plans. The War Production Board has dealt with the subject because of its relation to increased production; the War Manpower Commission because of the need for manpower; and the War Labor Board because of its responsi-

bility for resolving disputes and for stabilizing wages. As Management and Labor Consultants of the Office of Production Management and the War Production Board worked on the problem of settling labor disputes, actual or potential, which threatened to interrupt war production, it became increasingly clear that questions relating to the amount of work which labor should accomplish and how much the laborer should receive in a day were at the bottom of most grievances. This condition prevails whether the payment is on the basis of day work or incentive.

Hence during recent years much emphasis has been placed upon job evaluation and wage classification; the result has been a more logical payment of workers, graded by skill, responsibility, working conditions, and other characteristics. Government agencies, particularly the War Labor Board, are engaged in such grading and in stabilizing wages within plants and within areas by the use of arbitration and mediation.

Going a step beyond this, however, many companies on a day work basis have set up methods of assigning different hourly rates to employees within the same job class, depending on their record of production, quality, seniority, etc. Regardless of all attempts to regulate the wage structure, there seem to be chronic difficulties concerning questions of production if the latter are not definitely tied to wages. After workers are assured of regular known earnings, it becomes management's function to secure the maximum production which can reasonably be expected. Such endeavors often result in allegations of aggressive speeding up, either by conveyor methods, or by individual goading. Yet, on the other hand—and particularly where management has not set up carefully determined standards of production—there come into being rates of production, set up often spontaneously by groups of employees, which peg production at a point beyond which, in one way or another, the group makes it clear to individuals that it would be best not to go. A hangover from the depression era, such a practice nevertheless stems from the old belief that restricting production will result in job security.

That the mere installation of a wage incentive plan is a sure cure for production restrictions should not, of course, be assumed. There are many dangers and pitfalls. The many months' experience of the Labor Consultants and Management Consultants in the War Production Board has shown us, indeed, that with good leadership from management and close cooperation between management and labor, a day-work

method of payment will result in greater productivity than crudely and arbitrarily applied incentives.

Never, furthermore, was the installation of incentives so difficult. Never was there such a relative scarcity of competent individuals to establish and maintain them. These are days of kaleidoscopic changes in specifications and of technological changes. Industrial engineers are at a premium and the burden of newly trained supervisors great. The determination of the proper number of machines for a worker to operate and of the amount of production he should accomplish per man-hour, is not something which can be safely guessed. Careful detailed study and a maximum of cooperation are necessary. Too often in the past, when the results of erroneously established standards have shown up in the possibility of earnings higher than anyone expected, managements have simply cut the rates, sometimes again and again. As a result, labor has become more and more suspicious, and, in many cases, firmly set against all incentives.

Today, to be sure, we find almost no managements who are not willing to guarantee tasks or rates of production per man-hour against change unless there is a change in materials, method, or equipment. However, when for one reason or another some rates in a shop are set so that workers can earn two, three, or four dollars an hour where it was agreed that one dollar an hour was the proper pay for a reasonable day's work, there is clearly trouble ahead. Harmony is not likely to exist in a shop where some are earning one dollar an hour and others on equivalent jobs twice as much. The natural and usual result is that production is pegged at some point which is felt reasonable, somewhat over the one dollar. Though such pegging is often participated in by some supervisory person who has been in error, just as often management never learns how much could readily be turned out.

Since this condition is unfortunately widely prevalent, there is no danger of exaggerating its importance. It is wrong and should be cured. Yet management can cure such a condition only by the use of great care and experience in the first place. Once a rate is set, management must accept it with its corresponding cost. If management alters the rate, then immediately it loses the workers' confidence and cooperation. In peace times such a situation is bad enough. In wartime, when every ounce of production and manpower is essential, its correction is a must.

Correction is, moreover, possible. There are records of situations

where union leadership has been broad enough so that these circumstances have been talked out with management and mutual adjustment made. Often workers dislike to see the savings due to the corrections of such errors go into increased profit. One possible means of meeting this objection is to set up a temporary fund for a specified purpose into which the savings may go. Inasmuch as in most cases negotiations of this sort are not easy for labor and management to work out alone, the War Production Board Management and Labor Consultants can often be most helpful.

One answer to the question is the labor-management committee. Realizing the great need of bringing labor and management into a greater degree of cooperative effort, Donald Nelson initiated the War Production Drive in the spring of 1942. Here, on an entirely voluntary and local basis, managements and labor groups were urged to select their respective members for joint labor-management committees whose function it was to get into as close agreement with each other as possible in the consideration of all means of increasing production. No prerogatives of management were to be usurped. No rights of collective bargaining were to be interfered with. There are now over 2300 such committees, considering such things as absenteeism, transportation, deferment, saving of scrap, and safety. Sub-committees have been formed to consider suggestions for proposed changes in methods of manufacture and for increasing production in general.

The consideration of wages and work assignment or incentives come ordinarily, of course, under the category of collective bargaining; still, the formation of labor-management committees to consider plant efficiency inevitably results in bringing up these very subjects, which are then referred back to the collective bargaining agencies. Thus labor-management committees have in themselves provided a sort of general incentive which has led to a consideration of the deeper and more difficult features involved in the relationship between money and effort.

It has often happened, indeed, that as labor and management consultants of the War Production Board have worked in the field in the attempt to increase production by bettering the understanding and relationship between management and labor, many instances have been found where both parties were desirous of going ahead with a wage incentive plan. Especially has this been true since the issuance of the various executive orders and regulations on wage stabilization. The con-

sultants bring no definite or specific plans or rules—merely advice. The prime object is to obtain real agreement in principle. The War Production Board's aim has been to assist managements and unions by presenting to them experiences obtained in other situations.

Since incentive plans affect wages, War Labor Board approval is necessary. Through July 1943 War Production Board management consultants have helped regional War Labor Board offices on over three hundred incentive cases, evaluating them as to the effect on production, costs, and wages. This collaboration has proved satisfactory; the War Production Board looks at incentives primarily from an engineering and production point of view, and the War Labor Board primarily from the point of view of wage stabilization and inflation. Like the War Production Board, the War Labor Board does not demand any fixed rules as to the relationship between wages and production. Its two chief criteria are these:

1. The plan must have the agreement of management and its collective bargaining agency, where there is one.
2. In accordance with the President's "hold-the-line" order, there must be no appreciable increase in unit labor cost.

Once a good incentive plan has been worked out, surprising results may appear. The possible effect of a good incentive plan can be illustrated by 900 workers of an aircraft control bearings plant, which showed a 28% increase in production for one week in June on incentive work, compared to a week in May when not on an incentive plan. The incentive in that particular case made use of a series of individual rates set up after time studies of the various operations.

In another plant which makes grinding wheels, an all-over incentive bonus increased production 39% during the first month of operation. In another WLB region in the Middle West an incentive in a large machine tool plant increased production 64%. An incentive for a plant of 150 workers making wood cargo bodies for ordnance shipments increased production 74% during a three months' period. In still another region, in an electrical parts company, production was increased from 6500 to 8500 units or 30.8% in two weeks when an incentive plan was put into effect.

An interesting case of labor and management cooperation in the working out of a revision and extension of an existing wage incentive

plan occurred at two western New York steel mills owned by a large corporation. Local plant and union officials with the help of WPB Management and Labor Consultants worked out solutions which have increased production 9% at one plant and 39% at another on the basis of pounds per man-hour for the month of June over May 1943.

All this is the result of incentive plans accurately conceived and skillfully carried out. In many instances, on the contrary, there have been obvious attempts simply to raise wages through the instrumentality of a so-called wage incentive plan. There have been other instances of seemingly frantic attempts to get increased production with little basic knowledge of the subject of incentives. In many such instances the WPB consultants have been able to meet with the parties and gain agreement to a plan which would be satisfactory.

There has been no agreement among the various government agencies as to an arbitrary plan to be adopted or not to be adopted by industry. There has been no official set of rules laid down which must be carried out.

The writer, however, after a number of years' experience in dealing with these matters (and speaking as a private citizen) believes the following principles are essential to a sound incentive plan:

1. A wage incentive plan releases forces acting on two of the most potent factors in labor relations, wages and effort expended. In establishing such a plan, therefore, all available scientific and engineering ability should be used, combined with a sympathetic attitude toward the human relations involved.

2. A wage incentive plan may be a dynamic and constructive force for increased production, or it may be a means of disrupting labor relations and actually lowering production. Management should realize, then, that incentive plans must have the continued attention of top executives.

3. If a company's employees are represented by a recognized union, their representatives should be fully and continually informed regarding the methods and procedures used and the objectives to be accomplished. Management and the bargaining agency should be in real agreement as to the adoption or modification of the plan.

4. The plan should be sufficiently simple to be thoroughly understood by those to whom it is applied. Though over-simplification may involve injustices, attempts to meet every exigency tends to over-compli-

cate. Workers should understand the effect of their own efforts on their earnings.

5. The plan should provide for the changing of production standards whenever changes in methods, material, equipment, or other controlling conditions are made in the operations represented by the standards. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the nature of such changes should be made clear to the union, which should have the opportunity to appeal through the grievance machinery.

6. The practice of setting a temporary standard in new plants or on new operations (because of the desire of both management and labor to have incentive work before the permanent standard can be set) should be kept at a minimum. It should in any event be clear to all that the standards are temporary, for a reasonably short period only.

7. Except for such changes as described in (5) and for temporary rates (6), production standards once established should not be altered except by mutual agreement between the company and the representatives of its employees. When these representatives have sufficient confidence in the management to offer the correction of errors made by management in setting rates, and when they can convince the employees of the wisdom of this step in the interest of unrestricted production, then advanced labor relations will have been achieved. Conversely, management should be willing to correct rates which are too severe.

8. Under ordinary circumstances, management should guarantee that the employees' basic hourly rates which existed prior to the plan should become guaranteed rates of pay under the plan.

9. The plan should definitely increase production as well as wages.

10. There should be no appreciable increase in the unit labor cost of operations performed by the workers to whom a plan is applied.

11. Production standards, where practicable, should be developed from detailed time studies. Clear and definite standards eliminate future difficulty and misunderstanding.

12. In general, the production standard should be established by management as the amount of work performed per unit of time by a normal, qualified operator under normal conditions.

13. When production standards are properly set as outlined in (11) and (12), good practice has demonstrated the desirability of adopting an incentive payment in which earnings above the established standard are in direct proportion to the increased production; that is, a 10% in-

crease in production over standard should call for 10% increased pay over the base rate. This statement should not, however, be universally applied. Often in order to increase immediately critical production, managements and unions have agreed to use crudely estimated standards before production has been reasonably stabilized. If, in all such cases, payment above low standards were paid in direct proportion to increase in production and not really accompanied by increases in effort, instances of doubled and trebled earnings would arise to plague both labor and managements. Actual inflated increases would disturb intra-plant and intra-community wage levels. Potential increases might be even more serious, on account of the tendency toward restricted production which would prevail. In order to guard against such a condition and still provide an incentive, managements and unions have often by agreement adopted a plan in which the reward of increased production is shared jointly.

14. In ordinary times and without the war motive it is generally conceded that incentives applied to individuals and small groups are more responsive than those applied to large groups. When a plant is divided into a number of large groups on incentives, it often happens that there is such unevenness between group payments that feelings of injustice creep in, and plant transfers are difficult to effect. This, of course, is not true of plant-wide incentives.

15. It is often felt desirable to include indirect workers in the incentive plan even when the measurement of their production is impracticable. If this is done and they are paid a bonus commensurate with the production of measured employees, the indirect man-hours should in some way be correlated to some measurable unit such as total production or direct employee hours, so that indirect labor overhead costs may be kept under control.

16. Today we need immediate increase in war production. There are plants where it is impracticable from the point of view of time to wait for scientifically established individual standards. In many such cases, incentives for the whole plant may be devised which will prove effective during the war. Though in peace-time the dilution of the individual's effort might be too great, today it is essential to put every effort back of plant teamwork. There are clear indications that with enthusiastic support of management and labor, standards for an entire plant may be set,

based on total production per man-hour, and incentives paid to all employees as a proper reward for the extra effort and accomplishment.

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The installation of an incentive plan entails acceptance by management of the responsibility for keeping the plan up to date. And this involves hard work. An incentive plan either poor in itself or poorly administered will cause many new unfavorable conditions; a sound plan, on the other hand, through increased productivity of our industrial system and through increased utilization of labor will benefit labor, management, and the nation. No management now engaged in war production to which an incentive program could properly be applied, should be discouraged by technical or apparent practical difficulties from considering such a program. The benefits of a sound incentive plan more than repay the difficulties of its installation.



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LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES SPEED PRODUCTION

By W. ELLISON CHALMERS AND HERMAN WOLF

LABOR-MANAGEMENT committees are a new departure—a departure stimulated by the pressure for fullest efficiency in the war production effort. Workers are being urged to take an interest in matters which, formerly, were not considered their responsibility. How make the plant efficient? Why not get the workers' view?

Some say that labor-management committees are usurping the prerogatives of management. Mr. Eric Johnston of the United States Chamber of Commerce, on another page of

this issue, denies that charge. Others point out that the work of the committees may be the means whereby workers will realize a fuller dignity and a greater sense of equity. That has yet to be denied.

W. Ellison Chalmers is Chief of Staff of the War Production Drive of the WPB, under the auspices of which work on labor-management committees has been conducted. Mr. Wolf, author of *Labor Defends America*, is head of the Drive's information work.

THE WAR PRODUCTION DRIVE has but one objective—to increase and improve production in order to win the war more quickly.

How? Through the simple method of having workers and employers sit down around the table in Labor-Management Committees jointly to plan for the most efficient production of the materiel needed to speed the victory which they both desire.

But such a simple idea has frequently been misunderstood. Perhaps this is not surprising, because it represents a major development in industrial relationships in the highly dynamic war period. Labor-Management Committees as a whole, moreover, have improved morale and increased production. While many committees have failed, the success stories from hundreds of others are overwhelming.

Yet the misunderstandings continue in some quarters. Some people loudly proclaim that Labor-Management Committees are a threat to free enterprise, or that they are a company union scheme, or a plan to take over industrial management, or a new form of the hated Bedaux speedup system, or labor's new-fangled grievance machinery, or industry's efficiency plot for securing more war profits, or the real or the fake solution to the "labor problem."

By October, 1943, a year and a half after the War Production Board first called for their establishment, committees had been set up in more than 2600 plants employing nearly 6,000,000 war workers. With plant

expansion completed and shortages of materials and manpower at hand, there appears but one way to secure the 30 per cent increase in war production still needed: through better utilization of existing plants, materials and manpower. This job, Labor-Management Committees have proved they can do. In one instance in a Buffalo plant the Army needed a 25 per cent increase in gun production. No new employees could be found—but a ten-point program put into effect upon recommendation of the Labor-Management Committee enabled the plant to meet the schedule.

In order to secure unanimous cooperation to extend the labor-management concept, the heads of the War Production Board and the respective presidents of the American Federation of Labor, National Association of Manufacturers, Congress of Industrial Organizations, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, jointly signed and issued the following statement:

The Labor-Management Committee Program now being promoted by the War Production Drive Division of WPB, under the direction of Mr. T. K. Quinn and endorsed by us, is designed to increase war production.

It is not a plan to promote company unions. It is not a device to increase the power or position of any union. It does not interfere with any bargaining machinery or undertake its functions. It is not designed to conform to any scheme that contemplates a measure of control of management by labor or labor by management. It does not put management in labor or labor in management. It is not a labor plan or a management plan.

It is the War Production Drive Plan to increase production by increasing efficiency through greater management and labor cooperation.

Establishment of a Labor-Management Committee is a voluntary affair—so voluntary, in fact, that although our Government officially urges them as a needed wartime measure, they were still being debated on a nationwide radio forum in the late summer of 1943.

Out of our experience of eighteen months, a few basic principles have emerged. First is this voluntary aspect of the War Production Drive. It must be voluntary because the heart of the Drive is the sincerity and determination of both labor and management to work to-

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gether. You can't impose such an attitude by government fiat. That, however, does not mean that the government is a disinterested bystander. Nor does it mean that the government accepts a mere formal gesture of committee formation as the real thing. It looks to labor and management for sincere participation in the formation, and even more in the effective development of committee work as a patriotic duty. This involves the greatest possible patience, skill, and ingenuity in finding ways to work more and more closely on the common job.

There is another aspect to the voluntary character of the Drive. Through War Production Drive Headquarters, established in the WPB, the government is prepared to service and assist both management and labor and their joint committees. In outlining the basic principles of the Drive, we are providing a common meeting ground for both groups. In making labor relations experts available through our own office and the WPB's Office of Labor Production and the Management Consultant Division, we are assisting management and labor to overcome both hesitations and frictions. In regular contacts between Headquarters and the committees, both in the field and through our weekly *Labor-Management News*, we attempt to help them meet difficult problems. By providing them with guides and plans, we seek to stimulate the expansion of their programs. By a constant flow of educational materials, we are providing them with material they can use in the plants to enlist all workers behind the Drive.

The second Drive principle is that it must be participated in by the true leaders of management and labor. For management, this means that on the top committee must be men who have the authority to deal directly with each problem that comes before it. And on each subcommittee must be the responsible company officials for those respective functions. For labor, it means that in a plant where a union is recognized, the union shall name the workers' representatives on the committee. These shall be leaders of the men prepared to put their capacities behind the cooperative effort. It means that the union shall assure to those leaders continuous support and contact with the rank and file of workers. It means also that international unions shall lend their efforts towards supporting and assisting the local union in the cooperative program. Where there is no recognized union, labor representatives shall

be chosen by the workers, have their support, and be free from company domination.

In defining the scope of committee activities, the third principle is that the committees are expected to keep clear of collective bargaining matters. Committees are not to consider wages, hours, working conditions, or grievances. If, in attempting to solve production problems, such subjects must be discussed by the Labor-Management Committee, their relation to production should be developed and then referred to the regular collective bargaining machinery for action.

The final principle is that the joint committee is expected to consider every problem that represents a limitation on all-out production in the plant. The committee's scope is just as wide as the possibilities of joint consideration and action on key problems. Thus, the first job of each committee is an analysis of all the problems facing the plant. From such a survey should come a common understanding of those problems on which it is most important for the committee to work. Note that this means there is no single pattern of activities for all effective committees. In plant A, absenteeism may be a problem; if so, it should be a real part of the committee program. In plant B, there may be no absenteeism, but a real job to be done on conservation or on scrap. And so on. But it is also important to note that this approach requires full and frank discussion by management of just what are its chief production problems. An honest statement of and sincere analysis of the facts as understood by both management and labor is the *sine qua non* of an effective committee program.

With these four basic principles go the three main objectives which are being accomplished by Labor-Management Committees. In the first place, they are improving production. Thousands of instances are recorded in our files of production increases which have resulted from committee recommendations and from workers' suggestions, brought forth in response to the joint L-M program.

The Drive has done more than "expand" production. It has also improved quality, cut down waste, reduced the use of critical materials, and salvaged scrap. It is particularly important to note these production accomplishments, for they demonstrate that a production committee has a job to do even when schedule changes or material shortages force a downward revision of output.

In the second place, the successful joint committees are making a

record of improved industrial relations. As the labor representatives discuss with management the production problems of the plant, they learn of the sincerity and skill of management and especially of its problems and the difficulties which it must overcome. It has been said by one of our labor friends that these committees provide a most realistic form of workers' education. And, while labor leaders and workers generally get a better understanding of management and its point of view, employers discover in the sincere efforts of labor leaders and workers to increase production, the kind of common interest about which so much has been said and written—and so little done. Management also gains an appreciation of what workers can and will contribute to war production when their thoughts and energies are truly unleashed. Plant executives can also make their own plans to enlist the greatest support and cooperation from their employees.

In the third place, the joint committees are building worker morale. This is a much-abused word. We are in constant danger of assuming that bad morale means workers are not patriotic and that the cure is elaborate exhortation to their patriotism. Nothing is further from the truth. Joint committees that have been most successful in improving morale have done a minimum of exhortation and have depended primarily on the solution of problems and the feeling of participation that workers and their leaders have shared.

II

"Starting a Labor-Management Committee is a lot like taking a cold shower before breakfast; it is hard to get into, but it feels fine afterwards."

Thus does the *Engineering and Mining Journal*, a McGraw-Hill publication, characterize this industrial experiment after a survey of thirty-nine mining companies, where most committees have "proved their worth, when properly set up."

"You get out of a committee just about what you put into it," says the magazine, which recommends a prescription of tact, sincerity, and hard work.

Who first took one of these "showers" we don't know. The honor is generally accredited to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which in the early twenties inaugurated the plan with some success in cooperation with the railroad unions. Many other instances of joint cooperation to

improve shop efficiency outside the regular accepted matters of collective bargaining developed before the war in steel, printing, clothing, and other industries. When the WPB labor-management program was first announced, it was confused with the CIO industrial council plan—a misconception which the latter's author, Philip Murray, would be the first to disclaim.

Once you have jumped into the Labor-Management Committee shower, what makes it feel fine? A survey of activities conducted by 1000 committees shows that:

- 945 committees work on publicity and education campaigns,
- 920 conduct suggestion systems,
- 863 plan material conservation programs,
- 862 work out safety campaigns,
- 849 solve transportation problems,
- 819 combat absenteeism,
- 734 tackle production problems, and
- 722 improve the care of tools and equipment.

About half of the committees take part in training programs, and 38 per cent conduct nutrition and health operations. Other committee activities include War Bond, Red Cross, and War Fund drives, blood donations, plant protection, recreation, and plant housekeeping.

Typical of the educational and publicity programs conducted by L-M Committees is the Anaconda Copper Mining Company joint effort at Butte, Montana, centered round an attractive fortnightly educational journal, *The Copper Commando*. This journal—whose policies are set by a committee consisting of company officials and representatives of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, CIO, and of a series of AFL craft organizations—carries news, educational and inspirational material on the production effort. Closely allied with it are classes, conducted on an informal basis, in miners' homes and at the editorial offices of the newly launched paper, an innovation in the field of industrial literature. Unlike many company house organs, it is completely impartial. Throughout the nation, as a result of the impetus of the Production Drive, some eighty or ninety joint labor-management journals have been established in key war plants.

One of the nation's best examples of joint suggestion systems, serving to unleash the energy and ingenuity of workers on the production

line, is the program at the Packard Motor Car Co. in Detroit, Mich., where a genuinely cooperative effort by the management and the United Auto Workers, CIO, has served to bring in a monthly quota of some 1500 suggestions. The majority of these ideas deal with production short-cuts, and a surprisingly large percentage have been put into operation, with successful results. By this midsummer, after a year's experience with the joint system, the committee had received 19,398 ideas from workers, of which 9,929 were designed to solve production difficulties. Of these, 2,610 were adopted and used. One of the chief reasons for the success of this joint committee is that six persons—three supervisory and three labor—are employed full-time on committee work.

One of the most troublesome problems which hitherto had defied solution was the matter of conserving materials. This problem, as the annual report of the Committee at Star Electric Corporation of Bloomfield, N.J., points out, depends for any sort of solution on complete cooperation and understanding between labor and management. With a joint approach, however, workers take willingly to training in methods of conserving materials and provide valuable suggestions for saving scrap for further use, declares the committee, which consists of management officials and representatives of the United Electrical Workers, CIO. Similarly, at Hagerstown, Md., the Fairchild Aircraft Corporation found that a joint program conducted by the management and the CIO Auto Workers, brought in a revenue of \$12,000 monthly in scrap from the suggestions of one worker alone. This man was a veteran of the first World War who had been hired to sweep up the floors and who resented the waste of metal dust which he figured he might be able to salvage by devices he fabricated of old cans and discarded tubing.

Through the Production Drive, an old theory that a joint approach was a basic requisite for a successful safety program was put into practice and proved itself over and over again—with a startling cut in the frequency of accidents in such hazardous occupations as shipbuilding, to take but one instance. Thus, as a result of a joint safety program conducted by the management of New York Shipbuilding Corporation in Camden, N.J., and the Marine and Shipbuilders' Union, CIO, the accident toll of the giant shipyard dropped to half the average for the nation's privately owned shipyards for the first six months of this year.

In the same way, hundreds of plants discovered that a cooperative effort with labor helped to solve such knotty problems as transporta-

tion difficulties. At the busy war plant of the A. O. Smith Corp. (AFL) in Milwaukee, Wis., for instance, the joint committee made a workmanlike survey of workers' homes in their relation to the plant and to facilities for reaching work. Then it went to work to promote car-sharing, and to obtain trolley and bus facilities from the City Fathers.

Faced with the problems of absenteeism and turnover, many a plant like the Symington-Gould Corporation of Buffalo, N.Y., has found a genuine labor-management effort the perfect solution. At this iron foundry, which was losing employees to newer war plants in the area, and which in addition had a problem of absenteeism, a cooperative program in which the United Steelworkers, CIO, plays a leading role, served to cut the rate of both-absences and separations to an irreducible minimum. A motion picture helped in the drive. Morale of the Symington-Gould workers has reached record heights, the management reports, as a direct product of the Committee's program.

Similarly, a recent press release of the RCA Victor Division of the Radio Corporation of America at Camden, N.J., credited the union shop stewards, foremen, and the Committee with working out measures enabling 54 ships to sail on time from 17 different American ports with vital radio equipment. The news, later verified by the Navy Department, concerned secret parts which were produced in record time by dint of intensive training for girl workers who were formed into a special "graveyard shift" for the rush assignment.

Characteristic of the Labor-Management Committee by-products has been an increasing awareness among workers of the necessity for saving tools and caring for equipment. Many companies have totaled up results of such programs and discovered savings of thousands of dollars in tools, not to mention the protection of irreplaceable tools. Among these companies, a group have issued special literature, prepared by their L-M Committees, on proper ways to use tools; an example is the excellent booklet prepared by the committee at the Plomb Tool Company of Los Angeles, Cal., with AFL and Machinists' Union representation.

III

The most exciting part of Labor-Management Committee operations for committee members and for us at Headquarters is the realiza-

tion that through this democratic process within industry, war-winning ideas are coming direct from the men and women on the job.

Public opinion within the factory is a vital force, one which is being channeled into constructive lines through joint production committees. The worker at the machine who wants to make a maximum contribution to the war effort is given an opportunity to express himself, to contribute his ideas for improving production practices.

What does a committee do to secure the confidence and all-out backing of workers in the plant?

Too often committees have attempted to put on a publicity campaign—a "hoopla show," if you please—with unfortunate results.

Successful committee publicity or educational programs are carried through in terms of the individual worker and his family. Such programs stem from the joint committee; they are part of the issues and programs on which the committee is really working, and which require action, not merely words, for their solution.

A part of this job is to bring home to the worker the urgent significance of his job for the war. Not to make him patriotic; that is unnecessary. But to make him see and feel what his work means to the boys at the front; to let him realize that progress in the war *does* depend upon him.

Thus, the educational program is built on the factory's "facts of life." It uses posters, streamers, pamphlets, leaflets, loudspeaker systems, transcriptions, movies, plant publications, bulletin boards, and other publicity media. In content, these releases are related to the actions of the joint committee. Through actual production of some of these publicity materials, and through general program recommendations, Drive Headquarters assists committees in this work.

Recently, Drive Headquarters asked committees to send in posters prepared under their direction for a national exhibit. To our amazement, more than 3,000 posters were received, of all sizes, shapes, and colors, ranging from the most professional to the most amateur, and prepared by every known kind of printing process. The ideas for these posters, and often the actual art, came directly from the workers themselves. This response proved conclusively that although committees might need outside stimulation in preparing informational materials, they could do a more effective job than we in Washington. Their leaf-

lets, bulletins, posters, and other materials stress their own individual problems and localize the issues.

The Labor-Management News came into existence in order to stimulate new committees and to provide a means whereby we could plow-back the success stories of a few committees to all committees. This weekly paper is a campaign organ, newsletter, press release, clipsheet, and government publication rolled into one. In policy, it must satisfy management and labor alike and not compete with the regular press. In content, it must carry the stories of committee activities, achieving a balance between industries, regions, large and small companies, and union and non-union plants.

Sample copies of *The Labor-Management News* are available on request. Its chief circulation is a minimum of ten copies to each committee, for distribution to committee members. Additional copies go to chambers of commerce, employers, labor unions, government officials, publicity and advertising executives, house organs, and the daily, trade, and labor press.

Every two weeks a special pin-up edition of the *News* is distributed to the committees for posting on bulletin boards, thus giving Headquarters a quick method of bringing the workers close to the war front while the war news is "hot." The first "pin-up" on invasion reached workers the very week our troops made their assault on Italy, and the second one stressing the long war ahead to reach our ultimate goals of Berlin and Tokyo, was in the plants when our soldiers were fighting stubborn Nazi resistance in central Italy.

Hundreds of Labor-Management Committees are speeding war production today, with their basic principles defined, the scope of their activities outlined, and supported by sound informational programs. On the homefront, they are helping to achieve victory. When the war is finally won, they and the workers they represent, can look our returning sailors and soldiers in the eye, proud of the job they did, secure in the knowledge that they helped make democracy function a little better and built a firmer foundation for postwar labor relations, even under the stress of war.

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JACK & HEINTZ: BLUEPRINT FOR LABOR RELATIONS

By WILLIAM S. JACK

A RECENT article in *Harper's* bore the title, "Jack & Heintz—Factory or Free-for-all?" That title is in itself significant. Many have wondered about the reason and rhyme behind Jack & Heintz labor policy. Is it a policy? What guides it?

In the pages which follow, William Saunders Jack outlines the basic principles upon which

his company's labor policy is based. The author needs little introduction. Erstwhile Business Agent of a labor union, he is now President of a corporation which, while setting new production records in the manufacture of war goods, is also providing food for thought to students of labor-management relations.

AT THE REQUEST of the editors of THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, I shall attempt to set down in this paper an exposition of what I conceive to be the reasons for good production at the plants of Jack & Heintz, Inc.

In our current organization I have not only been able to carry out management ideas which have worked successfully for me since 1917, but also some ideas which I could never work out previously. (The results have already been beyond my dreams.) In this organization I have at last a team-mate, Ralph Heintz, who has also worked with his hands, and who is as much interested in the men and women who actually produce the goods as I am myself.

What has been done in the past has been efficient and attractive to labor. It therefore seems reasonable to expect that similar attention to working conditions, when peace comes again, will prove efficient and profitable, as well as humanitarian. When peace comes, American industry will probably have to compete in the world markets with the products of cheap foreign labor. I believe we can do this successfully by increasing the efficiency of our factories through greater cooperation between labor and management—or greater teamwork, if you prefer that term. It is obvious that Americans cannot—and should not be expected to—work for wages as low as abroad. The only alternative is greater productivity on the part of the American working man. This can be attained in part by improving machines, but the best machines are limited by the performance of the operator—not merely his skill, but also his "will to do."

Those readers familiar with the management of some types of sales

organizations will more readily understand the following if they remember the genuine concern of the sales manager for the well being of his producing salesmen. Some of the same fundamental elements which result in greater production of sales, also result in greater production of machined parts in the shop. You seek to bolster the self-respect and initiative of the salesman, and to sell him on the organization. We seek to do the same thing to the man in the shop. If you treat the salesman like a schoolboy, he will act like a schoolboy, but if you treat him like a man, he will struggle to live up to your good opinion of him. The same applies to the man in the shop. (In our case some of our men *have been* salesmen before they joined Jack & Heintz, but the older machinists are no different.)

The techniques of plant layout, and machine design and operation are familiar to American industry, but these are useless without manpower. To get production today, the element most needed is co-operation of labor and management.

I. FEELING OF PERSONAL IMPORTANCE

The most important single factor in labor-management cooperation is the sincere recognition by the management of the importance of the individual man, and administration such that the individual man knows he is regarded as important.

All of us like to feel that we are doing something worth while in an enterprise that is worth while, whether it is working for a living or holding a place on a winning baseball team. (Incidentally that worthwhile angle explains why the very men who got their living from such WPA jobs as raking leaves were disgruntled; they felt that they were doing something which served little useful purpose, and that they were not *earning* the money. In the words of the well-known slogan, free and independent Americans want "not charity but a chance.")

Dictatorships regard the individual as the creature of the state, to be given mass treatment for the benefit of the clique in power. The American Way recognizes the importance of the individual, and permits him the freedom to do things in his own way.

We realize that the application of the basic idea will vary with the individual organization (that also being the American Way), and that governmental regulations may currently restrict what other companies may be able to do with respect to new policies in labor relations, but

there is nothing to prevent any concern from adopting the basic idea, which is as old—and as little used—as the Golden Rule.

The basic idea is this. I remember how I wanted to be treated when I was on a machine, and I try to treat the people in our business the same way. That is the basis of our cooperation between Labor and Management.

Consider how you or any other person feels upon entering the Jahco organization. First of all, you find that you are not an employee, but an Associate. There is no time clock to punch. The place is clean throughout, and well lighted. You are readily accepted by the people in the department where you start to work, and are given all the help you need. You find that everyone goes by his first name, even the foreman, the superintendent, and the president. The foreman isn't any Simon Legree driving you with the whip of piece-work; he actually tries to help you along. There aren't any "brass hats." You ask your neighbor who is that man talking affably to a machine hand in the next isle, and discover he is one of the top men in the organization. You note that everyone smokes at work when he pleases; you do not have to sneak out to the toilet for a smoke. You observe a coffee urn nearby and learn that everyone is free to help himself to coffee at any time.

Comes lunch time and you file into the cafeteria and receive a tasty, hot meal, without charge.

About three or four o'clock you begin to feel a little tired, perhaps, and you are grateful for the music. Ever since seven o'clock it has been coming over the public address system, at 15 minute intervals, but now the selections are livelier—marches, polkas, etc.

Presently the man at the next machine leaves for his appointment with the Jahco dentist, to have x-rays taken of his teeth.

Over a cup of coffee you learn that a man from the next machine line has an irritation starting in his throat and the foreman has excused him to go to the plant dispensary for a check-up by the registered nurse in charge there.

If you react like most people, you will feel by this time that the Jahco organization is a good place to work, and you will decide to do your best to qualify during your thirty-day probationary period so you can continue to work here.

After thirty days, the union committeeman comes around and invites you to join (if you do not already have a membership in the AFL

International Association of Machinists from some other shop where you worked).

Presently comes the time for your plant to have a banquet. You have never had such an experience. Banquets were for the top executives, or the sales department, or maybe for the foremen; but a banquet for the machine hands, sweepers, oilers, etc., as well as for the "big boys" is a novelty. You dress up in an informal manner befitting the occasion, and go to the downtown hotel ballroom where the affair is held. You see Bill Jack, Ralph Heintz, Russ Jack, and executives and supervisors from your own shop at the speakers' table. You enjoy a good meal, hear music by the Jahco Melody Boys (all of whom work in the organization), and are entertained by singers, dancers, musicians, etc., from the organization. You also hear how well you have done in the production for the past month and how much more must be done to meet the schedules for the next month. You enjoy yourself, you meet your friends, you feel yourself a part of an organization bending every effort to produce necessary war materiel, you feel satisfaction of achievement, and the determination not to let the gang down next month.

II. FAIRNESS

Another factor in good labor-management relations is the feeling that fair treatment is given to the men by the management. The fear of losing prestige—or losing the job itself—lurks in the mind of the working man or woman.

In the Jahco organization it is obvious to the Associates that everyone has a chance to improve his status, because every department has individuals who have worked up to the upper pay bracket of the job, or who have become set-up men, or foremen, or in some way have won recognition or promotion for their efforts. Whenever possible, we promote Jahco Associates; and if we must go outside, we prefer individuals who have worked in shops, and who have personal experience with adversity or humble living.

Membership in the union also assures the Associate of fair treatment, since a union member who is dismissed may demand a hearing by the union committee, and it is well known that we undertake to carry out their recommendations in such cases. Hence, if an Associate feels that unfair discrimination on the part of a foreman, or anyone else, has entered into his dismissal, he demands a hearing. The union committee

is composed of men who work in the various departments of the shop and who have been elected to be committeemen by their fellow workers. They are inclined to be charitable to the weaknesses of their fellows, but they are hard to fool, and if the dismissal is for a good cause, they are likely to back it up. On the other hand, if there is reasonable doubt, they may recommend that the offender be given another chance, say by transfer to another plant, and we do so. I am happy to say that we do not have many such cases, but in a number of instances the offender has made good in another plant, when given another chance.

The reader will note that operation of such a plant involves mutual confidence—management being confident that the union committee will judge fairly, and union members being confident that management will be square with them, will honestly undertake to carry out their recommendations.

The individual knows that personal prejudices will not cost him his job, and that he has a chance to protest against what he believes to be discrimination. Knowledge that there is a means of protesting effectively is in itself a factor in contentment.

But the union committee is a formal method, and in such activities tends to function only when the matter has reached a serious stage. It is much better to avoid having grievances develop to the point where formal action becomes necessary. In a family, for example—even a large one—no committee is needed to settle grievances. Anyone with a complaint concerning the group “gets it off his chest.”

In the Jahco organization I followed my old habit of going through the shops, greeting as many as possible by name, talking briefly about the work in hand, and being available for comments and complaints. Moreover, my office door is always open. As the organization grew, we installed a public address system. This not only made it possible to provide music to relieve monotony, but also enabled me to talk from the microphone on my desk to every Associate on a shift in each plant and department.

Then, to supplement my own personal contact I appointed “good will ambassadors,” told the Associates who these individuals were, and told them to regard these men the same as they would me, if I could be in the shop. These ambassadors spend all their time in the shops, walking around, making friends, and listening to complaints, suggestions, etc. If an Associate has anything on his mind, personal troubles, a com-

plaint about anything in the shop, or whatever, he does not have to wait very long before one of these men happens along and listens readily. This provides a ready means for the Associate to get an answer to whatever is on his mind, and grievances do not fester for want of an outlet. Moreover, the knowledge that the means of reaching the ear of the management is always readily available is a factor in peace of mind and contentment.

When a group of people are working together, there are always some who do things which the group frowns upon. Our people work twelve hours out of the twenty-four and spend some time going to and from their homes, so that most of their waking hours are spent in the shop environment. If that is unpleasant, life is pretty dull and unsatisfactory; so we try to make it pleasant, informal, and free from iron discipline. Those who offend the group suffer "ribbing" at the hands of their Associates, but they will take from each other in good part severe criticism which would be instantly resented if it came from anyone representing management. The Associates' now-famous disciplinary "wolf call" for late comers, for anyone excused early, for boy-meets-girl time wasters, and certain other offenders, is also a greeting to visitors and a means of letting off steam for our high-spirited group of Americans.

However, "ribbing" and the "wolf call" are sometimes felt by the Associates to be inadequate, and from time to time "kangaroo courts" spring up in various departments at lunch time to discipline fellow workers who have transgressed against the customs of the group. These are half fun, half earnest, but they may be too severe and they may develop into questionable practical jokes. Currently we are undertaking to formalize these kangaroo courts slightly, so that the Associates who want to operate them may avoid prejudice and horseplay, and dispense good-natured justice to those Associates haled before them.

Another element in the worker's confidence of fair treatment is frankness of management. Over the loud speaker system I told all Associates how much business we did during the last fiscal year (\$23,300,000), how much our expenses, including payroll were (\$15,500,000), how much profit we made before taxes (\$7,800,000), how much profit we had left after taxes (\$1,500,000), and what will be left if the renegotiators have their way (\$156,000).

Being engaged in war work, we have badge and pass identifications

for Associates, and a staff of guards. Our chief of the guard staff tells his men to be firm but courteous; and so well do they carry out his instructions that few, if any, Associates feel any resentment at the treatment they receive at the gates. On the contrary, our guard staff is highly regarded by most Associates, and a potential source of irritation becomes a factor in the Jahco spirit of good fellowship.

III. REASONABLE PAY

Since everyone must make a living, and everyone tries to have as good an income as possible, the return for the individual's effort is important. It is not true, as has been charged, that we pay enormous incomes. (Nor is it true that money will buy the kind of spirit we have in the Jahco organization; let those who think it will, try to buy that kind of spirit.)

The fact is that our hourly rates are right in line with rates for the same work in other shops in the Cleveland and Detroit areas. Many a man has come to us at a lower hourly rate than he was getting elsewhere. Why? Because we do not have piecework or other systems of driving the workers, and we *do permit* them to work eighty hours a week, forty hours of it at time-and-a-half. The resultant pay check is bigger, and the worker knows that he buys food and clothing with cash, not with a theoretical rate-per-hour. He is willing to do more work to get it.

The War Labor Board is quoted as saying that more pay is not inflationary if more work is done. More work is done in our plants, or we could not afford to pay the overtime, any more than some other plants which saw to it that nobody worked more than forty hours (in the past, or forty-eight hours now). Their trouble is that their efficiency is too low to permit paying time-and-a-half. If enough more work is turned out, as it is in our case, time-and-a-half is no obstacle.

Our men and women tend to move toward the top of the pay bracket for their respective jobs. This is because we strive to encourage individual initiative and self-improvement, and because the hourly rate of remuneration provides no penalty for increased production. (By contrast, piecework rates have commonly been revised downward as the worker increased his production, so that the effect was to force him to do more work for the same money. Being a capitalist at heart, the worker resented this, and since he could not get more money, he did less work.) Still another reason for individual progress is that the individual gets

eighty hours of shop experience each week, instead of the forty hours which have been customary.

IV. SECURITY

It is now widely recognized that life insurance for the worker is very desirable, and many companies have some plan in effect. At Jahco the individual gets a \$2500 Life Insurance policy, and health, industrial compensation, accident, surgical, and hospital insurance for himself, as well as hospital and surgical insurance for his dependents. This relieves him of several worries, and since we pay the entire cost, he is not burdened or worried about paying for it.

If any Associate needs money for reasonable purposes, he does not need to go to a loan shark because he can borrow from the Jahco Credit Union. This is an organization of the Associates duly operated under charter, which provides a ready means of regular savings. We make it easier to save, by making regular payroll deductions for the Credit Union when the individual gives written authorization for us to do so. Deposits are more than \$625,000. We also encourage the Credit Union by providing office space, etc., as is sometimes done in other companies.

V. FREEDOM FROM FEAR

As already indicated above, we are interested in freeing the worker from as many fears as possible, since fear exerts a negative and paralyzing influence on his efforts.

Fear of the boss is avoided by our democratic mode of operation. Fear of unjust dismissal is avoided by the union committee. Fear of discrimination is avoided by the medium of the goodwill ambassadors. Fear of illness, either self or family, is relieved by insurance coverage. Fear of toothache is avoided by having a dental department available for emergency care. (This department also routinely takes full mouth x-rays in order to discover abscesses and other incipient disorders and thus avoid further troubles. In order to conform to the custom of the dental profession, the individual is referred to his own dentist for his treatment, but the x-rays make it possible for that dentist to do a better job without putting the Associate to further expense.)

Fear of post-war layoff is covered by our repeated announcements over the public address system that we have made plans for post-war operation, on a forty-hour basis, and have developed several products to

the point where we could begin tooling up tomorrow if need be. Obviously circumstances will determine to some extent which products we push, when peace comes, but our plans are ready and we will proceed with them quickly, and as long as our financial resources permit us to do so. The program of renegotiation, unless changed, will limit very sharply our capacity to build up reserves for post-war operation, but we have already set aside for that purpose more than 98 per cent of what profit has been left to us.

Having avoided fear as much as possible, we go further and try to replace it with confidence. This leads to a positive, constructive attitude throughout the organization. Just as in a crack sales organization the management guides rather than drives the salesman, so too in this organization we do not have occasion to drive, but rather to guide the enthusiasm of the individual members. (As with a good sales organization, when the Associates meet socially on their own time, their interest expresses itself by talking shop. Wives and friends comment on this enthusiasm.)

The management has no corner on brains, and moreover is not so nearly omniscient as to see all the possibilities for improving production. The confident, progressive attitude of the individual Associate results in thousands of minds watching for legitimate shortcuts in production, and ways to make two parts "grow" where there was only one before.

VI. THE BAKER'S DOZEN

The old-fashioned custom of the baker's giving his customer thirteen to the dozen has much to recommend it. That thirteenth biscuit or roll was an extra, a "plus"—something which the customer had no right to expect but was nevertheless glad to get. It was a simple way for the baker to build good will, and in those simple days it was not regarded as reprehensible price cutting.

People are not so different today, and when management gives them something which they cannot reasonably expect, they are likely to be grateful. At least it is evidence of the management's good will, since obviously a management which is out to gouge the working man is not going to give him anything which it is not compelled to do.

The banquets are an example of a "plus" which no one could reasonably demand, so far as the Associate is concerned. From the management's standpoint they provide the opportunity for the indi-

vidual to feel that he is part of a "crowd," a "gang," a "group," a "club," an "organization"—an opportunity to feel that he belongs, that he is part of something bigger and greater than himself, something to which he can give the loyalty which he is aching to place somewhere. The banquets furnish a medium whereby top executives and workers of all ranks can meet and relax together in good fellowship. The entertainment is provided by fellow workers, and it is good enough so that they can feel genuine pride in their performances and a measure of reflected glory. "I work with that guy," says an Associate of a particular singer, dancer, or performer.

Furthermore, since no banquet is complete without speeches, we have the opportunity to tell the Associates briefly of schedules met, obstacles conquered, quotas to meet, problems to help us with, etc. We take them into our confidence, inform them about what is going on, and tell them what is expected—all this is an easy, natural, friendly way—without "preaching" or "talking down" to them. The effect on morale is excellent. Attendance is not compulsory, but most Associates choose to go to the banquets.

Another "plus" is the free daily luncheon. Everybody likes to get something "on the house," so the mental attitude is good. The Associate is free to carry a lunch if he is so minded, but few do. The lunch costs us sixty-seven cents, and you can judge for yourself how many working men and women would be willing to spend that much for themselves daily. As soon as you pay *anything* for a lunch, you demand variety of choice and reserve the right to criticize. This is the weakness of less-than-cost cafeterias in plants. Most people, furthermore, are not prepared to select a balanced meal. In our case the meal is planned by a dietitian and prepared by good cooks from the best quality foods available. The individual is likely to be better nourished under this plan than any other, and can usually work with less effort during the second part of his shift, or at least perform as much work as before lunch, avoiding a loss of efficiency. The cost figures out about ten cents an hour for the after-lunch working hours. A man making one dollar per hour, for example, can easily lose you ten cents or six minutes' worth of time per hour. Or if he *feels* like applying himself, he can do a little more production and cover that ten cents. In our case, we are convinced that he does work more efficiently.

How would *you* like to work eight hours consecutively without

any lunch period at all, as has been tried in some shops—where you must either go without lunch at all or eat an oily sandwich while operating your machine? How would *you* like to carry a lunch box full of “indigestion”? Do you think you could do your best work under such circumstances?

The vitamin capsules offered free at the cafeteria counters are another “plus.”

The climate of this locality is rather severe, especially in the winter. My physician advised me to use certain vitamin capsules one winter to build up resistance and to correct for possible dietary inadequacies. I took the capsules and felt better. Moreover, I observed that some Associates were taking vitamin capsules purchased with their own money on the advice of their physicians. Here, then, was something beneficial which was not yet widely recognized in our plants. Why not make it available to everyone? If we can help all our Associates to better general health for a few cents a day, they will feel better and be better. We did make vitamin capsules available thereafter, and I am sure they are a factor in maintaining our low rate of illness. Absences due to illness are less than 2 per cent of the man hours per month.

Coffee is another “plus.” Coffee urns are maintained throughout the plants, and everyone is free to relax with a cup of hot coffee whenever he wishes, which is to say at his own individual point of fatigue, that may be at different times from what it was yesterday, or will be tomorrow. There is nothing rigid about it.

Workers who can do so are likely to slip away for a candy bar or some other snack during working hours. In our plants doughnuts are distributed free once each shift. Isn't that a better way to handle the “snack” situation? The craving is there anyway, and satisfying it readily is a means of reducing fatigue for the worker. The cost of making and distributing the doughnuts must be compared with the cost of thousands of workers knocking off to get a snack some other way, or working less efficiently because of fatigue.

Then there are the shoes you may have heard about. I have been on my feet a lot in my lifetime, and by trial-and-error I found a make of shoe which is comfortable. Some time ago our masseurs found a high incidence of back, leg, and foot troubles, and it seemed likely that the basic trouble was standing in poor shoes for a twelve-hour shift. We bought shoes like mine for a test group, and sharply reduced the inci-

dence of these troubles. I defy anybody to do his best work while his feet hurt.

When I worked at a machine, I did just what shop men do today—wear an old pair of shoes to work all day, and buy a good pair to wear for a few hours on Sunday. Our buying the shoes was a “plus” for the worker, and his wearing them is a demonstration that a good pair of shoes feels better, and leaves him feeling better. I think he is smart enough to buy a good pair himself, the next time. Meanwhile, he feels better and works better because we bought the first pair.

Then there are those trips to Florida, and to nearby Cedar Point. Our union agreement calls for two weeks' vacation with pay annually. In the summer of 1942, we were trying so hard to build up production for the air force, and expanding our personnel so rapidly, that we did not feel we could spare a man. We explained this to the Associates, saying that we were quite willing to give the pay for the vacation, as agreed, but hoped those eligible for vacations would stay on their jobs. This they did.

By last December we had enough Associates to permit vacations—or furloughs, as we prefer to call them. Now, it is hard for a worker to save enough money for a vacation; and if he does, he may have such a strenuous good time that he is worn out when he returns to work.

We reasoned that almost everyone would like to go to Florida, so we paid the fare of those eligible, and arranged for restful vacations. The first to go were those who had been working twelve-hour shifts for two years!

Eventually transportation difficulties retarded the Florida furloughs, and during the summer of 1943 we used Cedar Point, an attractive beach resort near Cleveland.

The vacation arrangements have proven popular with Associates, and beneficial, and we think the plan is sound and helps maintain efficiency.

The business of living requires time in these days, and we relieve worries and avoid absences by giving assistance in regard to Selective Service, Housing, Share-the-Ride, gas rationing, annual Drivers License, Auto License and Title Transfers, Tire Inspection and Repair, etc.

As to the war effort, we make it more convenient for Associates to buy bonds by operating a payroll deduction plan. When an Associate

(of at least six months' service) enters the Armed Forces, we set aside fifty dollars a month in a trust fund for him until he returns. If his wife wants employment, we find a place for her in our organization.

VII. FORCE OF EXAMPLE

It seems to me that it is much easier to get the people in an organization to report on time, if the boss is on time, or, better still, ahead of time. Similarly, it is easier for them to work a full shift if they know that the head man works as long as they do, or preferably longer. That is not easy, but there is no royal road to production.

Example is a powerful force and does not require much explaining to the organization. Our people know that I am on the job early and late, because they see me in the plant from time to time on both shifts and hear me over the loud speaker system at intervals of two or three days. Unconsciously, the worker feels that he can do it if I can, and I remind them that the shifts are twenty-four hours long on the fighting fronts.

In the 1930's, when selling was the most important function of a business, the presidents of alert organizations were frequently to be found calling on customers to sell their products. If any one phase of business becomes most important, the president of the organization is likely to give it a good deal of his personal attention. At the present time, with war production needed so urgently and with labor-management cooperation so necessary for production, it seems to me that the president should devote a great deal of his personal attention to developing the necessary cooperation between labor and management, and I have tried to carry out this point of view.

My Associates in the Jahco organization know that I enjoy getting better acquainted with them and assisting them with their personal problems in any way possible. I try to meet them more than half way, and their response has been overwhelming. Others can do the same if they will.

VIII. LEADERSHIP

Confidence in each other is perhaps the greatest underlying need of labor and management today. There has been too much pressure and not enough leadership. Unwittingly we seem to have adopted dictatorial methods whereby management dictates for a time, and then the pendulum swings over and labor dictates. Neither has enough con-

fidence in the other, probably because there has been a tendency for labor and management to grow away from each other. Currently this nation is engaged in a struggle to preserve and improve the American way of life, which is inherently free, with *nobody* dictating. I believe the American way inherently requires the use of persuasion, rather than force, in relations with one another.

When management wants something in the Jahco organization we seek to persuade our Associates that it is desirable, and presently it becomes "the thing to do," and everybody conforms.

It is well to remember that the men who work in your shops are the same men you regard as customers when you set out to sell consumer merchandise. Business knows how to sell merchandise, and it goes without saying that sales methods are usually quite different from the methods used in handling labor. If business will put some of its salesmen in personnel work and give them enough authority to bring about the necessary changes, they can do a great deal to sell the management to the workers. Such a move must start at the top, and management must take the first step, and must be *sincerely* interested in the men. Moreover, management must not be cloistered in the front office, but must spend a little time getting acquainted with John Jones and Pete Grabowski and Tillie Murphy. The people who work in American factories are not robots or automatons, but are living, breathing, human beings with appetites and aches and pains very much like your own. They are cheered by a smile and depressed by a frown, even as you and I.

In short, I believe that the individuals in management should get acquainted with the individuals who produce the goods.

You may have excellent engineering, beautiful factories, the latest machinery, and a waiting market, but nothing can be produced until you have men to operate the machines to make the goods. They resist pressure, but they crave leadership. Give them half a chance and they will be loyal to you, and produce with you.

Now then, if you have read this far, you may be wondering why I am sounding off about management. I am no good at preaching, but I believe the Editors were interested in my point of view because I have been manufacturing precision products for more than twenty-five years. The methods which were satisfactory to the men, and profitable both for

men and management in peace time, have proved satisfactory in war time, and profitable before renegotiation.

In the Jahco organization we have produced aircraft engine starters, automatic pilots, aircraft instruments, energizers, generators, etc., which are at once lighter in weight, cheaper, and more accurate and reliable. We have sold these products on flat-rate contracts at prices from 10 per cent to 50 per cent below competition. On one item, in fifteen months of production, we were able to reduce the price to less than one-fourth of the price at the beginning. These things were done not only by good engineering and design, but also by making efficient use of turret lathes and other standard machines which our competitors also use. Our method of paying men by the hour, asking them to do an honest day's work for an honest day's pay, plus genuine interest in good working conditions, plus freedom, have resulted in relatively high efficiency. We believe we have the highest percentage of efficiency per man, and the highest percentage of efficiency per square foot of floor space in the country, if not in the world, on the basis of available figures.

Let me tell you an incident to illustrate this.

In the Spring of 1941, army engineers examined the production of the two Jack & Heintz plants then in operation. This was part of a survey by the army to determine how much the production of war materiel could be increased in existing plants. It was the opinion of these examiners, based on their familiarity with other manufacturing organizations, that Jack & Heintz was then producing the maximum that could be expected from that much floor space. Yet, six months later, three times as many units per month were being produced in the same plants. The difference between Jack & Heintz and the conventional plants was the cooperation between labor and management.

We get along with relatively few timekeepers, and we avoid the overhead which goes with the driving piecework methods. In the Jahco organization we operate with a low overhead for supervisory functions because of the atmosphere of freedom. Everyone is expected to do his best for the war effort without somebody standing at his elbow all the time to prod him.

You will recall the ancient tale about the Grecian king who did not have the customary wall about his city and explained that his army made a wall unnecessary, because, he said, "every man's a brick." In the

Jahco organization it might be said figuratively that every man's a boss!

These methods are undoubtedly an important factor in the growth of our organization in less than three years' time from 33 Associates to more than 7500 Associates, from one little run-down factory to seven large modern buildings, from \$4,000,000 gross sales to \$23,300,000 in one year.

The Jahco organization has consistently increased production 10 per cent or more per month for twenty-four consecutive months on certain products, meanwhile launching production on other products. Our Associates consistently run certain machines and operations at spindle speeds faster than is customary, without harm to themselves, to the work, or to the machine. They *want* to produce, because they feel that they are treated right, and not penalized for greater production.

In this business we cannot point to specific features which hiked production by a certain percentage, because our production has mounted swiftly from the beginning, and it is difficult to separate the parts from the whole. Most of the features at Jahco have been used satisfactorily by me in previous businesses. The Jahco organization was *started* right, on the basis of past experience. Incidentally, we value experience and have many Associates in their forties, many in their fifties, some in their sixties, and even some past seventy. The cumulative effect of their experience on our production is undoubtedly very great.

The nature of our products is such that military considerations have special weight, and we are therefore not able at this time to reveal more specific figures than are included in this article. It might be indicative, though, if I tell you that this company, which did a gross sales volume of only \$4,000,000 in the first fiscal year, ending in October 1941, has since then bought \$2,600,000 worth of war bonds, and the Associates themselves another \$2,600,000, for a total of \$5,200,000 (prior to the campaign in September 1943). In addition, the Associates have saved \$800,000 in the Credit Union, and Jahco Recreation Center (owned by Associates). More than that, the company and the Associates have jointly and severally made donations to various worthy causes amounting to another \$300,000.

The key to the expansion of the Jahco organization was the production of the quantities needed, on schedule, at low prices. These methods have produced precision parts for me in the automotive and

aircraft fields in peace time, and I see no reason why they will not do so again when peace returns. They are being tried by other companies with good results, and I am duly grateful. When the war ends, we must have customers. Unless other businesses succeed so that their workers can buy their consumer goods, domestic markets will stagnate and we will not be able to sell whatever we make. As to America's place in world trade, since we cannot compete with cheap foreign labor, our opportunity lies in more efficient production of men and machines which will result in cheap finished products.

Cooperation between management and labor results in more efficient production, and, until there is profit from efficient production, there is nothing to divide. When there is profit, the consumer benefits by reduced prices, labor benefits by increased wages, and capital benefits by increased dividends.

To sum up, I have tried to point out that cooperation between labor and management is essential to efficient production, and that the co-operation of labor has been secured by management by sincere attention to the following elements:

1. The feeling of personal importance
2. Fairness of treatment
3. Reasonable pay
4. Security
5. Freedom from fear
6. The baker's dozen
7. Force of example
8. Leadership

We do not believe that the Jahco organization is the last word, or that it has all the answers. Other organizations are making notable strides in labor relations. The Jahco methods work well for us and have worked well in my previous organizations. Until such time as the war is won, we shall be preoccupied with production for the war effort. Subsequently we may modify some of our methods to meet changing conditions, but the underlying principle of genuine interest in the welfare of the worker needs no modification.

I have faith in the American people and their future. Out of our heritage of freedom and independence there will come from the ranks

of workers new leaders. Americans are sound, but in every country the worker must have the opportunity to make a living.

I believe that in America the worker must not only be able to make a bare living, but to earn an income which will permit him to have a modest home of his own and a bank account. Treat the American workman right, pay him well, and he is happy to produce so efficiently that you can reduce prices, and still show profit satisfactory to your stockholders.



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SAILORS IN MUFTI: TEST CASE IN COOPERATION

By LEO HUBERMAN

THE National Maritime Union, in the estimation of both its friends and its enemies, is a militant labor union. Mr. Huberman's article tells the story of how a militant labor union has adapted itself to wartime conditions. The NMU is presented here as a case study in wartime cooperation. What lessons does it hold for the future?

Leo Huberman, the author, combines an academic and a labor-union background. Formerly Chairman of the Department of Social Science at New College, Columbia University, he is now Director of Public Relations and Education for the National Maritime Union, CIO. As a writer he is best known for his *America, Incorporated* and as erstwhile Labor Editor of PM.

IN THE FIRST YEAR of the war, casualties among the men who sail the merchant ships were four times greater, proportionately, than the combined losses of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Out of every thousand American seamen, 38 were reported dead or missing. Out of every thousand men in the armed services, only 7 were reported dead or missing.

These figures shout the story of the importance of our merchant marine. The seamen maintain a bridge of ships carrying war materials to the battlefronts all over the world. If they were unsuccessful in their task of delivering the men and materials where they are most needed, the cause of the United Nations would be lost.

The Nazis know the importance of the merchant marine. That is why they have made the seven seas the most dangerous battlefront of the war. It's a rare seaman who has not had his ship torpedoed at least once. Some have been hit as many as eleven times since Pearl Harbor. One crew sailing in the Caribbean last year, was torpedoed three times in twenty-four hours.

The survivors of these voyages have harrowing tales to tell. Some have spent days in lifeboats which had to be bailed out constantly because of holes made by Nazi machine guns; others have drifted for weeks and months in rafts inadequately provided with food and water; others have seen their shipmates caught in a 75-foot wall of flame and burned to a crisp before their eyes.

Yet, after a short stay on the beach, most of these men return to their union hiring halls to ship out again. Why do they do it?

There are three main reasons. Some ship again simply because seafaring is their trade. Having answered the call of the sea for years, they couldn't resist it even if they tried. They hear that they can make more money working in a shipyard, they intend to look into it some day, but they don't ever get around to lining up in the employment office.

Others sail for no other reason than that they want to help their country. In this group are many who have left shoreside industry to man the ships because that was the way to get into real action—fast.

Others face danger and death on the high seas because "Deliver The Goods—Keep 'Em Sailing" is the program of their union.

The maritime industry is over 85 per cent organized. That is true of both licensed and unlicensed personnel. Even the skipper and his mates on most ships are members of a trade union—The Masters, Mates and Pilots Association, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The Chief Engineer is a member of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, CIO. The radio operator probably belongs to the American Communications Association, CIO, though a small percentage are members of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL.

Among the unlicensed personnel there are five unions: The Seafarers International Union, and The Sailors Union of the Pacific, AFL; The Marine Cooks and Stewards, CIO; the Marine Firemen, Oilers, Watertenders and Wipers Association, independent; and the National Maritime Union of America, CIO.

By far the largest of these seamen's organizations is the National Maritime Union with a membership of 50,000. It has contracts with 123 shipping companies. It is an industrial union comprising the unlicensed personnel in the deck, engine, and stewards' departments on inland waters, Great Lakes, and deep sea vessels. It has branches in every major port of the United States. Wherever there is an important harbor and ships and men to sail them, you will find an NMU hall.

In the six short years of its existence the NMU has more than doubled the wages of its members, cut their hours, and improved their conditions to an extent that is probably unequalled in American labor history. Part of the reason for such phenomenally improved conditions lies, undoubtedly, in the fact that there was so much room for improvement to begin with. Witness the report of the United States Maritime Commission, of which Joseph P. Kennedy was chairman, and Admiral Emory S. Land, present head of the War Shipping Administration, was

a member. That report, transmitted to Congress on November 10, 1937, paints the truest picture of conditions as they were after the last war. It had this to say: "Wages fell and working conditions grew steadily worse until, at the depth of the depression, some American seamen were receiving as little as twenty-five dollars a month, living under wretched conditions, eating unpalatable food, and working twelve hours or more a day."

All that the union changed. Its first basic agreement, signed in October 1938 for a three-year period, raised wages in every category, higher than they ever had been in American merchant marine history. Working hours were reduced to eight per day with provision for overtime rates beyond that. Quarters and conditions were transformed from those beneath the dignity of animals to those fit for human beings. Shipping crimps and unsavory boarding houses as recruiting agencies for seamen were abolished. In their place, the union instituted a democratically operated hiring hall on a strict rotary basis that eliminated favoritism, "kickbacks," and the like. The latest basic union agreement, signed October 31, 1941, for another two-year period, raised wages ten dollars per month in every category and improved conditions still further.

The extent of the improvement in wages can best be shown by a glance at the wages provided in the agreement to one rating in each of the three departments on a ship. In the deck department, an AB (able-bodied seaman) today gets basic wages of \$82.50 per month plus \$17.50 emergency wages; an oiler in the engine department gets \$92.50 plus \$17.50; and a messman in the stewards' department gets \$70 plus \$17.50. In addition there is a special war-time bonus, for all hands, of 100 per cent or a minimum of \$100.

But a detailed recital of the economic and social gains won by the NMU is another story. What we are concerned with here is the role of the merchant marine in general, and of the NMU in particular, in the war.

It was a good thing for the United States that American seamen were organized when war came on December 7, 1941. Had there been no seamen's unions, it would not have been easy—it would not, in fact, have been possible—to gear the American merchant marine to wartime service. Fortunately the organizational set-up was already available. That meant that when convoys were being assembled in ports on the East or West coasts, they would not be delayed while hurry-up calls for

seamen were sent to gin mills and boarding houses on the waterfront. The men would be ready and waiting in their union hiring halls.

Immediately following Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt was notified that the maritime unions would do their part in delivering the war materials to the far-flung battlefronts of the world. The unions have kept their promise. They have met every demand for seamen to man the ships.

On December 9, 1941 Joseph Curran, President of the NMU, took the first step toward stabilization of the maritime industry in wartime. He sent the following wire to Admiral Land, Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission:

We feel that defense of our country and defeat of Axis aggressors make maritime industry most vital at this time and warrant your calling immediate conference maritime unions and shipping interests to work out effective program of stabilization of industry, movement of vessels, servicing, training and general conditions in industry. We recognize vital role of merchant marine in defense effort and feel this conference will make valuable contribution towards formulation of constructive policy for complete participation of marine unions, shipping interests, with Maritime Commission and other government agencies. May we hear from you as soon as possible?

On December 17, the conference was held. Representatives of government, shipowners and seamen were there.

The NMU made its position clear: "Our Union pledges the nation its manpower, its financial resources, and every possible thing we can do to insure and fulfill the nation's full effort. We feel that difficulties we have had in the past should be absolutely submerged, because not only one section of our industry has been attacked but the entire nation, and in order to carry out the Administration's war effort united action in all parts and from all parties is called for. To this end our organization pledges itself, and urges that these disputes go to an agency that can iron them out, some agency that will bring all seamen, all operators, and the Administration closer together to procure the fullest war effort."

And as long ago as that conference in December of 1941, the NMU came forward with concrete proposals concerning:

1. The arming of all merchant vessels.
2. Increase in the manning scale.
3. Proper inspection and servicing of lifeboats.
4. More efficient training program in Maritime Commission schools.
5. Training of seamen in gunnery and first aid.
6. Maintenance of collective bargaining contracts.
7. Adequate check-up of personnel.
8. Proper handling of foreign seamen question.

Not all the things the union wanted done were done. But a start was made. On the question of safety at sea the NMU went to town. Many of the men were being lost in torpedoings and collisions. In some cases, such catastrophes could not be helped. But in other cases, union officials learned from survivors, some loss of life could have been avoided if adequate safety precautions had been taken.

A questionnaire on wartime safety-at-sea was drawn up and given to survivors to be answered. The topics covered were these:

1. Name of ship . . . Date of torpedoing.
2. Type and condition of safety equipment.
3. What precautions were taken for safety of vessel?
4. Did you observe any air or sea patrols during course of voyage? State when and where.
5. State briefly, step by step, what occurred when vessel was torpedoed.
6. What practical measures could have been taken to prevent unnecessary loss of life?
7. What recommendations do you have that are not covered by above?

Within three days, ninety affidavits were obtained from rank and file members giving the information outlined above. Armed with these facts, NMU officials testified at a hearing before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, on March 26, 1942. In addition, the whole story was told to the Coast Guard, which had taken over the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation and was responsible for instituting measures affecting safety at sea.

The NMU won that fight. The Coast Guard, which has done a magnificent job in every way during this war, says so itself in a document called *A Brief Resume of the Steps Which Have Been Taken Since Hostilities Started*:

Representatives of the National Maritime Union urged more stringent regulations concerning life boat drills before vessels leave port and that regulations require additional equipment, such as

life-saving suits, emergency ladders, radio transmitters, knives and flashlights for all on board and a general improvement in the policing and inspection of lifesaving equipment by inspectors of this organization, as well as by masters and owners. Their organization urged that boats be carried swung out. Representatives of that Union as well as other seamen's organizations appeared on March 26 before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Congressman Bland of Virginia, Chairman, and presented evidence which they alleged made necessary more strict enforcement of the present regulations to raise the standard of seaworthiness and suitability of lifesaving equipment, as well as the ships themselves, and further showed the need for the promulgation of additional regulations.

Much inefficiency and waste would be avoided, as the seamen's unions have pointed out repeatedly, if there were representation by Labor on the policy-making Government agencies dealing with the maritime industry. Their requests for such representation—a privilege which the shipowners have always had—have gone unheeded. So the unions work, from the outside, for policies which should have been instituted by those in power.

The training program is a good example. Without consultation with the unions, WSA set up a training program for new seamen. In numbers to be trained, in content, and in the methods used, it was wrong from the beginning. The unions said so. They pointed particularly to the fact that thousands of new men were being trained for unskilled ratings such as ordinary seamen and wipers, of which there was no shortage, whereas not enough emphasis was being placed on training for skilled ratings, of which there was a serious shortage. For a long time, however, their warnings went unheeded.

Meanwhile the NMU went ahead with its own program of upgrading seamen to fill the jobs that were needed. It set up a school in the union hall. Here men with some months of sea time were taught by experienced seamen. Ordinary seamen learned rules of the road, marlin-spike seamanship, etc. Then they sat for their AB tickets.

The record tells the story of the school's success. From the day the school opened, on January 20, 1943, to April 30, 1943, 404 men took the course. Four hundred and three passed the government examination and

received their AB ticket. The man who failed did so for only one reason: he was color-blind! He got endorsement as a bos'n.

All the while the NMU continued its efforts to have the U.S. Maritime Service change its program to suit the needs of the industry. It offered to the Government its own established and proven facilities for upgrading seamen. Finally that offer was accepted, and today, the U.S. Maritime Service is speeding the upgrading of hundreds of seamen in the NMU hall in the school which it is running with the cooperation of the union.

Through the medium of its weekly paper, *The Pilot*, the NMU educates its members to the necessity for "Keeping 'Em Sailing." At membership meetings in every port the men are told where their duty lies. This constant educational campaign has been eminently successful. The underlying assumption in the union halls today is that the only correct thing to do is to stay on the firing line no matter how great the danger.

In peacetime men were permitted to choose their ships and stay ashore as long as they liked. Today, in wartime, that is no longer true. The union's wartime rules provide that: after a fifteen-day trip a man has no time ashore; after a thirty-day trip a man has seven days ashore; after a sixty-day trip a man has fourteen days ashore; after a longer trip a man has twenty-one days ashore. And even these rules contain a clause providing that in the event of a shortage of seamen on vessels ready to sail, those men on the beach who have not yet used up their allotted period of time ashore must either volunteer or be drafted to take out the ships.

It is a tribute to the educational and morale-building program of the NMU that the membership itself realized the necessity for these rules, formulated them, and then adopted them by vote at democratically run port meetings. Members of the NMU know what is at stake in this war and are aware of the tremendously important part they must play in the overthrow of fascism. The few who don't know these things are promptly disciplined. Let there be the slightest infraction of any rules, and charges are preferred against the offender, a trial committee is set up, and witnesses heard for and against. Punishment is swift.

That is what is in store for Brother Strumph, according to the

minutes of the union meeting aboard the SS Peter Minuit, reported in the *Pilot*, May 28, 1943:

The ship's committee recommendation that charges be brought against Bro. Strumph, Book No. 36811, as non-union and a bad element were approved. The captain complained to the ship's chairman about Strumph. The skipper asked what the union policy was on men who disobey orders, don't do their work and go ashore in foreign ports without permission and miss their watches. The captain was told that the union does not protect men who are detrimental to the war effort and to the proper functioning of the ship.

Strumph did not attend the meeting, claiming he was sick.

Punishment in disciplinary cases ranges from payment of a small fine (money goes to the Tobacco Fund for sick brothers in hospitals) to a Trial Committee recommendation "that his book be taken away and that he be suspended for 99 years."

The NMU has done more than build morale, educate its membership to the necessity for efficient wartime service, and maintain rigid discipline. It has made winning the war the No. 1 objective of the union; every other issue, important as it may be, is subordinate to victory. "Yes," the NMU says, "guard the economic gains won through hard struggles on the picket lines—but bear in mind that all victories will be lost—irretrievably lost—if we don't win in the biggest fight of all—the war against the Axis."

To learn this lesson is not easy for some of the men who have struck, bled, and died to improve their conditions. It requires repeated emphasis—the kind that President Joseph Curran gave some months ago at a membership meeting in the Port of New York. He had given a full report on his discussion with the heads of government agencies concerning union suggestions for the improvement of the merchant marine service. Throughout the latter part of his talk he was heckled by a brother in the front row, who kept repeating, "Get me pork chops!" The minutes of the meeting show how Curran handled the situation:

That just about completes my report, except to say that the subject that he's been talking about [pointing to a brother in the first row] which he's been repeating here for the last ten minutes, is to me today no longer funny. All he can repeat is, "Get me pork chops." I have this to say to you, brother. There are a lot of people

today who haven't any pork chops; a lot of people through the world are depending on us seamen to deliver the goods, to see that our part in this world war is played. We can't afford to think in terms of pork chops today because we may find ourselves sitting and eating our pork chops, and Herman Goering might come along and kick them right out of our hands. These are actual facts. There is only one thing today standing between Adolf Hitler and a clean sweep down through Europe and Asia, and that's Timoshenko's army on the Eastern Front. Even the newspapers admit that today. So let's make this pledge. We're going to try to keep the pork chops and the conditions, and the only way we can make sure that we keep them is to see that all the necessary war materials, all the guns and tanks, get to where they can knock Hitler's head off—this year.

This awareness of the character of fascism is not new to members of the NMU. They knew the score years ago. WSA Deputy Administrator Macauley made that clear in a speech he made on May 23 of this year:

The debt we owe our seamen will not be truly realized until the records are thrown open at some future date; but we do know certain basic facts. For one thing, these men of the sea realized long before many of us what the issues were in this fight and acted upon their convictions.

When scrap iron was being shipped to Japan, scrap that was later used against us from Pearl Harbor to the Solomon Islands, it was neither government nor industry that tried to stop those shipments, but the longshoremen and the merchant seamen.

Long before we entered the war, these fighting civilians, unarmed, braved the dangers of submarine-infested waters to carry the food and weapons needed to fight the Axis. Since Pearl Harbor, merchant seamen have unloaded the ships from Murmansk to Guadalcanal, and let me state authoritatively that the merchant seamen did unload the ships at Guadalcanal under fire.

They have been bombed sometimes every hour on the hour for 36 hours and carried on their work as long as their ships held together. High courage is the rule rather than the exception in the Merchant Service.

The Constitution of the NMU establishes that there shall be no dis-

crimination because of "race, color, or creed." In their early days on the picket line the seamen learned that discrimination against Negroes was used by employers to keep them apart. Accordingly, the NMU has been a militant champion of equal rights for Negroes.

The Union's most celebrated victory in this connection came as a result of its fight for a ship for Hugh Mulzac.

It didn't matter that this man had been going to sea on steam and sailing vessels for over thirty-five years. It didn't matter that he had sailed as AB, quartermaster, bos'n, third mate, second mate, and chief officer on British and American ships. It didn't matter that he was a graduate of the U.S. Shipping Board School and was awarded its certificate in 1918, that he held also a diploma in navigation and radio from the International Correspondence Nautical School, and a certificate from the Sperry Gyro Compass School. It didn't matter that as far back as 1922 he had passed his examination as Master of ocean-going steamers unlimited, and was, therefore, qualified to command any merchant ship of any tonnage on any ocean.

None of these things made any difference. He was a Negro. So for over twenty years he had to sail as a steward or cook. When he made application at the shipping lines for the position of Master to which he was rightfully entitled by training and experience, he was given a run-around. "Sorry, we're all filled up." . . . "Leave your name and address, and we'll see what we can do." . . . "We've got a lot of white men who will have to be shipped first." . . . We'll file your application. . . ."

The National Maritime Union devoted to this case all its strength. From every port in the country, from ships on every sea, resolutions and telegrams of protest went to the authorities in Washington. Then, in cooperation with the Negro Labor Victory Committee and other interested groups, the union organized delegations to Washington to argue the case in person.

The NMU had its way. On September 23, 1942, Captain Edward Macauley of the War Shipping Administration announced the appointment of Captain Hugh Mulzac to command the new Liberty freighter Booker T. Washington. And to make the victory over Jim Crow doubly significant, the ship was launched by the great Negro singer, Marian Anderson.

It is gratifying to note that Captain Mulzac and his ship, manned by a checkerboard crew of Negroes and whites who live and work to-

gether in complete harmony, have lived up to the union's expectations. In a letter to the Luckenbach Steamship Company, owners of the Booker T. Washington, Commander R. W. Clark, USNR, said recently:

It is a pleasure to report that on two recent voyages of the SS Booker T. Washington in convoys escorted by U.S. Naval ships, the Escort Commanders have commented most highly on the fine manner in which Captain H. Mulzac has handled his ship in convoy.

The commendations specifically cite excellence in stationkeeping, signaling, and seamanlike handling of his ship worthy of particular commendation.

The NMU is one of the most democratic organizations in the world. Every official is elected in secret ballot elections, with the boxes sealed, and the votes counted by the Honest Ballot Association. A financial report, signed by a certified public accountant is printed in the *Pilot* every month. A regular feature of the *Pilot* is the "Voice of the Membership," in which seamen on ships all over the world can—and do—air their "beefs" against union officials and union policies. At membership meetings, too, members are urged to take the mike and "blow their tops" on the subject under discussion.

This democracy in the NMU, this active participation in their union's affairs, has had a direct bearing on the war effort by bolstering seamen's morale. Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, made that point recently in a speech to psychiatrists discussing the problem of neuroses in seamen. Dr. Parran said:

Good morale is one of the best bulwarks against war neuroses. The maritime unions have been in the forefront in building up morale. They have explained to the men the meaning of this war, and the importance of their part in winning it.

The merchant seamen are cut off from many of the morale-building factors available to people on other sectors of the war front. It is harder to create *esprit de corps* among men constantly shifting from ship to ship than among soldiers with long periods of training in a single unit.

The labor union provides a splendid substitute for these lacks. It stimulates the average seamen's sense of loyalty and self-

sacrifice. It gives him the feeling of organization, of belonging, of being part of a team—all essential to good morale. It gives him status, prestige, pride. It provides various welfare services which strengthen the sense of security. By adopting rules of work and conduct on a basis of democratic self-government, it has greatly improved discipline both ashore and on sea.

Union efforts have been richly rewarded, for the men who sail the ships have distinguished themselves time and again "above and beyond the call of duty." In an article in the May 1943 number of the *American Marine Engineer* Admiral Land paid them a well-deserved tribute:

The heroism and gallantry with which the men of our merchant marine are meeting the challenge of Axis sea raiders are almost beyond description. Their courage is magnificent, their seamanship excellent. Their determination to get their ships through to where the cargoes are needed, played no small part in the rout of the enemy in North Africa. That same spirit is having its effect in the South Pacific and in Russia. It has brought aid to England and China. It will enable the United Nations eventually to destroy the forces that menace the free peoples of the world.

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AND THE WORKERS SAY...

By MARY HEATON VORSE

MARY HEATON VORSE has recently returned from a six-months tour of America's war production centers, gathering material for a book on the home front, *Here Are the People*. She went into factories, government housing projects, trailer camps, shack towns, lived in dormitories and workers' boarding places. She talked with hundreds of responsible workers in their homes and on the job. She visited

YWCA and industrial USO Clubs operated by the YWCA across the country, reporting her findings in a series of articles for the *New York Post* and *Harper's*. In the present article, Mrs. Vorse analyzes the major causes of labor's unrest. She needs little introduction. For many years she has been one of the outstanding writers on labor problems in the United States and abroad.

LAST SPRING labor was in a turmoil on the Pacific Coast. There had been great demonstrations at Boeing Aircraft in Seattle. The newspapers said the Boeing workers had struck. The workers maintained that only the swing and night shifts marched with bands down Seattle streets. In Los Angeles thousands of dissatisfied workers of the International Association of Machinists (Independent) gathered in the Shriners Temple to consider the tardy decision handed down by the War Labor Board on the subject of the wage scale. In three different localities the United Auto Workers CIO were meeting to consider the same questions. The advances accorded by the W.L.B. were unsatisfactory to the workers in the airplane industry. The A.F. of L. demanded parity with the shipyard workers. The CIO called attention to the fact that under the Little Steel Agreement of January 1, 1941, wages still could be reviewed.

Labor had made a bargain which was not being kept. It had renounced its right to strike with the understanding that prices were to be stabilized or that wages would be revised to meet the cost of living. Instead wages and jobs were frozen, and the OPA had failed to check the rise of prices. This was the taproot of the unrest which kept the Pacific Coast in a turmoil throughout the winter, later brought about the coal strike, caused a constant churning among the automobile workers, and led to a restless heave in the war industries from the North to the South, from the East to the West.

GOVERNMENTAL FACTORS

The reasons for the widespread general discomfort among workers can be divided into those stemming from government, those from the

plant and industry, and those for which the community is responsible. Those stemming from Congress were outlined in a recent editorial in the *CIO News*, organ of the CIO, as money taken from the pay envelope by inequable taxation, wage shrinkage due to crippling OPA price control, forbidding grade labeling and food standardization, resisting and restricting the administration's plan for rolling back living costs through food price subsidies, flouting the no-strike pledge and passing the Smith-Connally Act.

To examine further labor's chief grievance. The earning power of factory labor is three times that which it was in 1939, and there is no doubt that labor's earnings are an inflationary threat. To curb this threat labor entered into the Little Steel Agreement of 1941.

Yet labor's increased income is due not so much to a rise in hourly rates as to the greater number of the factory workers and the lengthening of the work week. Labor feels its share is spread pretty thin. The worker's average yearly income has increased 37% between 1939 and 1942, that of small businesses 50%, farmers 134%. One hundred major prime war contracts, after taxes have been deducted, have increased 66%. The average yearly income of industrial workers, excluding government and farm workers, rose from \$1,268.00 in 1939 to \$1,733.00 in 1942, before the deduction of taxes.¹

Meantime the cost of living has risen 24% according to the Department of Labor, though every housewife knows that the actual cost of living is much higher. Labor papers throughout the country, sensitive barometers of labor's opinion, ridicule the official figures, and cite local rises which amount often to 50%—"when you can get the food," they are sure to add. In the meantime no check has been put upon the profits of industry nor upon the farmers' earnings.

The workers echo the words of one of the research men of a CIO union, who says, "We don't see why we should be asked to make just enough to feed us and pay the rent while business, farmers, and everybody else puts money in the bank against hard times. We are tired of being the inflationary goat. We're in a moment of labor shortage when a strike threat would have brought us a wage increase overnight. Now we're held back from strikes by our own promise."

A special bitterness is felt at the enormous profits which industry is

¹ Labor's Monthly Survey (CIO), based on information from OPA and U.S. Commerce Department.

reaping. Pick up any labor paper at random, and you will see articles on this subject. The current issue of *Steel Labor*, for instance, with a Washington dateline, calls attention to a Congressional attack on war profits. *Advance*, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' paper, has a similar article, while the organ of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers from Butte, Montana, has a column on the gains of the great corporations.

The passing of the Smith-Connally Act climaxed a year in which labor was under legislative attack in almost every state in the Union. While some of the bills offered were in good faith and for the object of bettering the existing labor laws, a large number of bills presented in states in various parts of the country used the war emergency to undermine existing labor standards, to stop organized activity of unions and to put a meddling finger in their internal affairs.

Many of these bills had no other object than to destroy organized labor or to cripple its activity to a point that would render organization useless. This widespread drive against labor in state politics has resulted in anti-labor laws in Arkansas, in Texas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, and South Dakota.

These attacks on labor as expressed in Federal and State legislation link in directly with labor's difficulties in the shop and factory. The widespread anti-labor legislation is a sign that collective bargaining has not yet been incorporated into public thinking. Geared to the open shop, employers are still chafing under the restrictions put upon them by the Wagner Act. So individual employers everywhere, especially in those industries recently organized, are taking advantage of wartime conditions and labor's anti-strike pledge to carry on a guerilla warfare with labor.

Los Angeles, for instance, has been open shop ever since the dynamiting of the Los Angeles Times Building by the MacNamara Brothers. Industries settled there, secure that they would have no trouble with unions. Up to recently Los Angeles, in common with Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, the industrial South, and other recently organized centers, was a happy hunting ground of labor spies. There were two thousand in Los Angeles alone according to the investigation made by the LaFollette Committee.

The U.A.W. asserts that the outlaw strikes throughout the industry have had a common origin in management's taking advantage of labor's renunciation of the strike as a weapon, by chiseling on or ignoring

union contracts, practicing discrimination and trying to pit one group of workers against another, and actively indulging in favoritism in the shop. From the East to the West many employers are still sniping at the unions under cover, when they are not openly fighting unionism instead of the war.

THE SHOP CONTRIBUTES TO POOR MORALE

Beginning in 1940, industry all over the country exploded rather than expanded. In the Los Angeles area the aircraft industry alone grew from twenty thousand to how much over three hundred thousand it is impossible to tell. This increase was repeated throughout the country in all war industry centers until there were seventy per cent more industrial workers than there had been in 1939.

So great and so swift has been the expansion of industry that management has been baffled by its problems. There was not only no uniformity between plants, but none within plants themselves. The chaotic state of industry finds two people working with identical tools on the same job, one paid twenty cents an hour more than the other. Parts made at the Ford plant in San Diego at \$1.00 an hour minimum are shipped to Douglas in Los Angeles and paid 65c an hour in assembly. Multiply these instances by hundreds of thousands and add the many more complex upgrading and ingrading problems, and a situation of unimaginable confusion is created. Out of this lack of system grew the seeds of general dissatisfaction which flowed largely from inner-plant difficulties.

So the Wage Stabilization Agreement, in spite of its complexity and weaknesses does have the seeds of uniformity. The CIO, operating on the theory that the trouble lies in lack of planning and organization and that no directive conceived in words could of itself erase the chaotic condition, contends that the only way out is to get to the benches and hammer out uniformity. There must be rules to follow from the very bottom up. It is absolutely vital to get machinery going to set up labor management committees and collective bargaining procedures directed toward establishing uniform wage and salary schedules. To strike at the heart of the chaos, uniform job descriptions and classifications are necessary. Organization at the very bottom is, in the minds of the CIO leaders, the foundation stone to production.

The very expansion of industry has made sound organization difficult. Unions in hitherto unorganized areas have kept pace with the ex-

pansion of industry. Three years ago the CIO occupied three modest rooms in Los Angeles; now it owns a fine building with an auditorium that can seat hundreds. The A.F. of L. outnumbered the CIO three to one in California. Both organizations, however, have been diluted and swamped by a new labor force. There is a huge base of inexperienced labor, unused to the discipline of industry. This undigested mass is often irresponsible, causes huge turnover, and often is as uninterested in production as it is in the union, even when it pays dues.

White collar workers and women have flowed into industry, many of them hostile to organized labor. None of these new workers has had to fight for a union; they remain indifferent, while there are not enough good organizers for the enormous educational job confronting the unions.

As the lack of good organizers complicates the unions' tasks, so the lack of good sub-executives is management's plague. Management must rely on sub-executives, but it takes time to create a good sub-executive. A good foreman or leader man is years in the making.

"We have leader men and foremen who would be pushing brooms in ordinary times," I was told by the personnel manager in one of the biggest western airplane plants. "What is our principal bottleneck?" said an expeditor in a great eastern airplane plant. "Foremen. We lack foremen of experience."

The incompetent foreman, the bossy foreman, the foreman who hides his lack of knowledge behind an arrogant exterior, the foreman who plays favorites and passes the buck, all complicate management's program in creating a stable working force.

"Next to foremen one of our chief bugbears," the chief of the Manpower Commission in one of the Eastern Seaboard districts told me, "is the old-fashioned personnel manager who has grown old in the school which believed that a job was God's gift to a worker and who cannot adjust himself to wartime conditions when a worker becomes God's gift to a job." There are many plants throughout the country who have kept on their old personnel manager from the days when they employed a few hundred workers. Now, in a plant blown up to a big organization employing thousands, these men, the Manpower Commission finds, are totally unsuited to the complicated job before them, and are contributory to the great turnover in the first two weeks, especially in those plants which employ many women.

Nothing causes poor morale more quickly than lack of work, caused by shop conditions. A pamphlet issued by the Industrial Relations Research Department of Lockheed places this reason at the head of the list of shop causes of absenteeism. "Production schedules which allow employees to be idle from time to time tend to induce absenteeism. Departments which suffer from shortage of material, production bottlenecks or generally insufficient work can expect a consequent loss of time in the form of absenteeism," says this sensible, reasoned document.

The chief cause of such work lag is material shortages, for which the plants themselves are not to blame, but which are largely caused by faulty planning higher up. Other reasons for lack of work are overstaffing, labor hoarding and poor floor planning, almost inevitable with such swift expansion.

According to findings of the Manpower Commission in many areas, one of the great sources of manpower is in the war industries themselves. This is borne out by the unions which have made manpower studies—as in the figures released recently by Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers, who has protested against the lack of full manpower usage in his industry. That there is general overstaffing is borne out by the individual workers of all grades and in all industries who say, "There's not enough work." It is one of the constants that follows one down the Atlantic Seaboard, across the Continent, and up the Pacific Coast and back again.

The workers' unrest is intensified by being told by their leader man to "go slow but to look busy," whether this stems from lack of material or from poor floor management. Then when the bottleneck is broken, the workers are told to "get production humming."

I have heard this cry, "we want to work," repeated by primitive workers from Arkansas and Missouri, and by college girls who have come on to work in airplane plants to make their contribution to the war. Testimony gathered from workers in eight of the biggest airplane plants and from numerous subcontractors all tells the same story. The workers who have chafed under lack of work feel indignant at the fuss made over absenteeism. "Why don't they cure the bottlenecks?" they want to know.

Improper placement is always a cause for discontent. The Lockheed Industrial Relations Research points out that proper placement, promotion, and upgrading is the framework of industrial efficiency.

Anyone who examines transfers, employment grievances, and turnover figures can sense immediately the undercurrents of employee discontent and illwill; and absenteeism is only one way that an ill-placed worker expresses his job conflict. When experienced employees are classified as learners, this dissatisfaction is reflected in bad work habits and absenteeism, which often ends in the workers' quitting in disgust.

Factory conditions often leave much to be desired. Unnecessary fumes, overheating, poor ventilation are common. From Wisconsin a social worker writes, "I am rather nonplussed at the rubber factory conditions. The fumes are terrific, and there is a constant turnover because of illness; yet the girls want to work there to provide the raincoats, because soldiers need them."

In conversations with workers you will often hear things like, "They ran the ventilation plant for the first time in over a year last week when the Navy Inspectors went through." In other places there are terrific drafts, which a little plant engineering would overcome. Absence of showers, insufficient locker space, and even too few and filthy rest-rooms are found only too often.

Fatigue from excessive overtime is another cause of discontent. When workers get too tired, accidents happen. In a Buffalo plant accidents in the tool department jumped forty per cent after a seventy-hour week. This figure could be repeated nationwide wherever overtime is excessive. Both the English experience and our own have shown repeatedly that work beyond the forty-eight-hour week does not result in more production; yet plants, anxious to meet their quotas, continue to crowd their workers.

One of the imponderables which has made for a low barometer in workers' morale is that, while the barrage in the papers continues on absenteeism and strikes, every intelligent worker knows more man hours have been lost for the lack of a single master plan integrating each industry than have been lost by all absenteeism plus the man hours lost by strikes. There is no record kept of these lost man hours. The papers and radio do not shout to the armed forces that the failure to coordinate production has lost the time that would have made innumerable battleships, tanks, airplanes. Only labor's mistakes and labor's failures are magnified and broadcast to the four corners of the world.

Beside these concrete reasons for widespread unrest, labor feels that it has not been fairly treated and that its case has been consistently

misrepresented in the papers, as witness these recent uproars about absenteeism. This attitude can be illustrated by a worker I met during the presentation of an Army and Navy E at a big airplane plant in California. "We've reached the highest production ever known," he said. "The man hours per plane have been reduced twenty per cent; yet to read the papers you'd think we were a lot of bums who were spending their money getting drunk and staying away from work. How do they reconcile the production figures in this country with the idea that the workers are unpatriotic, foment strikes, and stay away from work for no reason?"

THE COMMUNITY SHARES THE BLAME

Government, shop, and community share the blame in failing to solve one of the most serious problems confronting the worker, that of food. The uncertainty of food prices, the difficulties in shopping, food shortages, the lack of meat, the poor eating facilities in plant and factory and community, are a constant drain on the health of the workers.

Workers everywhere feel that they are victims of food profiteers. "Leave your identification button behind you when you go to the store," they say. "They hist their prices when they see you coming."

The quotas for food everywhere are based upon the 1940 figures. In areas of industrial expansion the available food supply is therefore inadequate. Mobile, for instance, has a fifty-two per cent increase in population; yet its quota is based on its old population figure. This means that the shelves are swept bare of essential foods before the industrial workers can get to them. On the Pacific Coast in the State of Washington the loggers and lumbermen were put in the classification of tearooms and drugstore counters. In the port of Boston so small was their quota that the fishermen stayed home until it was increased.

In many places with a rising population restaurants are actually closing from lack of supplies and help. In the Los Angeles Harbor area sampling studies showed that fifteen per cent of the small outlets had closed in despair. Typical of what is happening throughout the country is the Los Angeles Harbor area, where many small neighborhood markets had no meat supplies at all two or three days a week. And to get meat there it was necessary to spend hours in line. Meantime the shipworkers weren't eating; not only because there wasn't food, but because there wasn't time. "Often the whistle blows before a man gets to the

canteen or wolfs down what he has. The food's all caked with grease, so the men throw it on the ground," was how one worker described the situation.

The conditions under which shipbuilders eat are as bad as the food; some canteens have four lines converging on them from different directions, and those lines barely move. The workers stand, shoulders hunched, rain dripping from them, waiting to get their turn at the canteen. Watching this at night is like seeing the most miserable bread-line of depression days.*

A recent survey made by the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor states that: Thousands of war workers have no hot food during working hours. Thousands of war workers must eat lunch in fifteen minutes. Thousands of workers eat in the open, exposed to all weather variations. Thousands of workers eat in unsanitary restrooms.

Life is one series of difficulties to the displaced industrial worker. Transportation is hard, workers go immense distances to their plants. In many places finding a doctor is almost impossible. The workers cannot even get their checks cashed. They find difficulties in getting ice or having laundry done. Towns are slow to increase their stocks for the new inhabitants, and services everywhere are steadily shrinking due to manpower shortage. Though many communities are trying to meet these needs, they have only made a beginning.

It seems hardly necessary to say anything about the overcrowding which has resulted from the displacement of literally millions of people to industrial areas. Workers all over this country are living uncomfortably by the thousands in trailers, in crowded quarters, in private homes. They are living in converted outhouses and chicken runs, in shacks and tents of every description. Thousands of them are heaped up on communities built by the Federal Public Housing Authority, projects which remain knee-deep in mud for weeks after the workers move in; and months elapse before adequate schools, stores, and other services can be provided. Many communities, wishing to avoid ghost towns after the war, have resisted the construction of public housing. Never have high wages bought less. In many places they cannot even buy amusement.

This discomfort is often intensified by the attitude of the old inhabitants toward the newcomers. Yet how the community receives the new workers has much to do with the stability of the working group. There

* A recent agreement with the Navy promises shelter before the rainy season.

are still many places from the East to the West, and from the North to the South, where even in the churches industrial workers will get no welcome. "I came from a little town just like this one," a trailer camp woman told me. "There we had a nice home, and my husband and I were respected members of the community. Here people turn their noses up at me as trailer trash, and I have stopped going to church."

I have heard similar stories from the Atlantic to the Pacific and throughout the middle west. The towns where workers are welcome are still spots of light in an unfriendly ocean of suspicion and dislike.

THE WOMAN WORKER

The case of the woman worker presents special problems both in the shop and in the community. The Department of Labor tells us that they are more subject to accumulative fatigue than men. Those who work on night shifts don't get their proper sleep. The long distances which many workers must travel contribute to this ever-mounting fatigue. I have known many technical workers among college girls in war work who have lost ten and fifteen pounds under the regime of getting up at 6:30, standing at a street corner for a bus, and not returning until six at night. Often women stand an hour or more coming and going to work. Poor food contributes to this vicious circle; then comes the day when the girl is so exhausted she takes the day off, or maybe quits altogether.

Many small exasperations tend to drain women's strength and enthusiasm. "I work in final assembly. When a plane is finished, there will be no work to do for an hour and a half. We'd all work better if we could sit down, but we have to stand there uselessly because the Army might come through," is the grim testimony of one girl. *Seats for Women* is one of the slogans of the CIO designed to save workers' strength. The Department of Labor is also advocating this measure. Unnecessary standing when there's no work is universal. It seems unbelievable that a department of government and a great union find it necessary to crusade for so simple a way of increasing workers' efficiency.

The attitude is exemplified by a large airplane plant, noted for the infelicity of its labor relations, which complained to the Manpower Commission on the large number of terminations among the newly hired women workers.

"What has been your analysis of the reasons for these terminations?" enquired the Manpower Commission.

"Reasons! We are not keeping records of women's whims! We are building Fortresses!" replied the company's representatives.

Procedures which were permissible for an industry employing a small number of women become a source of unbearable fatigue when numbers of new workers are constantly being hired. An ordnance plant in Elkton, Maryland, for example, brought girls from a great distance. They had sometimes been under way in crowded buses from twelve to eighteen hours. Yet there was no reception or rest place for them. They came immediately to the personnel office and often stood in the halls or waited in the bus that had brought them. There was no comfortable place to sit while they were waiting to go through the ordeal of fingerprinting, photographing, blood-typing, physical examination. The hurried personnel officials had no time to greet them or reassure them, and hundreds of girls made up their minds then and there to go back home as soon as they could.

Figures everywhere show that where women are employed, absenteeism increases. The absentee curve of Glenn Martin, Maryland, and that of Lockheed, California, are similar. After payday women's absenteeism bounces. It is undoubtedly true that a certain group of the younger women go shopping unnecessarily. There is the other kind of shopping, however, that keeps women from their work. Married women have a dual job. They must still look after their homes, see that the laundry is done, and accomplish the difficult task of providing food after the market shelves have been swept bare by earlier shoppers.

As I write, the radio and the newspapers are full of complaints that women are leaving the industries almost as rapidly as they are hired. The fact is that a magnificent job of selling war jobs to women has been done by high pressure advertising. The papers and the movies have drummed it into women that it is their duty to go to work, to take a war job if they can; yet comparatively little has been done to help women get food easily, take care of their children adequately or do their necessary shopping. Communities and the Federal Government alike have failed in the job of providing supervised playgrounds for the children of working mothers. Nowhere in this country is there any industrial community of any size where the program for war workers' children is a comprehensive one. It does not exist. There are cities like

Hartford which are making a splendid effort to solve their child care problem. There are cities, too, spotted throughout the country, such as Dayton, Ohio, whose shops stay open two nights a week and whose banks also stay open nights. The country is beginning to realize that industry which lives on three shifts cannot function efficiently in a one-shift world. Everyone knows that women must have time for shopping, keeping their families clean, but as yet there is no single plan that will make it possible for women to stay at work. And they are the one great remaining reservoir of manpower.

THE WORKER'S SENSE OF INJUSTICE

All these factors—the anti-labor legislation, the failure to roll back prices, a system of taxation which the workers consider unfair, the persistent undercover sniping at union standards, the anti-labor barrage in the papers, the uncomfortable shop and community factors—have led to a general low barometer among the workers. Workers all over the country talk about the same things and make the same complaints. They are very conscious of being the second line of defense. Their sons and brothers are the ones who are doing the fighting. When called on by their leaders to put out extra effort, as in the recent drive throughout the steel area for greater steel production, they respond with enthusiasm. The injustices they feel in the abuse of their anti-strike pledge and in legislation such as the Smith-Connally Bill, however, have drained labor's enthusiasm. It is small wonder that workers talk more about unjust taxation and the high cost of living than they do about the war. This sense of injustice is as cumulative as fatigue, and there is an angry stir among workers this fall that is finding its outlet in an unprecedented political activity.

There are banner headlines in every CIO labor paper, such as CIO OPENS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TO RID CONGRESS OF FOES OF ORGANIZED LABOR. A national political campaign of the CIO authorized by a special executive board meeting was launched in July. Its immediate object is the creation of national, state-wide, and local united labor leagues which were to include the CIO and A.F. of L. unions, the Railway Brotherhoods, and affiliated unions to "weld labor into a mighty political force which its strength, organizational ability and progress entitles it to play." Sidney Hillman, President of the Amal-

gamated Clothing Workers, is Chairman of the CIO political activity committee.

The CIO official journal has examined the record of each Congressman and Senator during the last session of Congress. In every local of the CIO the records are being discussed, the absence of labor at the polls last year commented on. Political leagues composed of the various labor groups are being formed rapidly throughout the country. "The hard core of the legislative program," says the CIO statement, "is the full support to the progressive and win-the-war policies of our Commander-in-Chief."

"This country is not yet at war," said one of the Presidents of a great CIO union. "It won't be at war until labor is accepted as a partner, until the men who are actually producing the war materials are represented adequately in Washington and on the various boards. One of the reasons for the failure of so many of the employment labor-management committees is the fear of management that labor's brains shall be used, labor's power felt."

One of the best means of heightening labor's morale and labor's production is not being given a fair chance. "Whenever Labor Management Committees have been set up with a proper program, the absentee rate has been held down and production has climbed," says a booklet published by the Man Power Commission. As far as one can find out, less than twenty per cent of the labor-management committees are functioning well. Management throughout the country has faint enthusiasm for these committees. Many employers talk of the labor management committees as one of the many new-fangled things imposed by the New Deal.

How to get maximum production in shop or factory is no secret. Workers who feel themselves partners in an enterprise work well. Several years ago General Electric conducted a series of experiments under laboratory conditions to see how increased production could be obtained. They found that while rest periods, extra food, and other incentives helped, nothing kept production up as did the interest of the girls in their work when it was once aroused. The labor-management committees already in operation long before the war in the steel industry provided another proof, if any were needed. There are individual industries throughout the country whose morale is always high, where workers are proud to work.

Morale stems from the top. In one of the airplane plants the very real interest which the President of the company takes in the workers has integrated the labor force. None of these things are mysteries; yet they will none of them be applied as long as a substantial part of management is carrying on a guerilla warfare with labor.

For labor to produce to capacity the government, management, and the community will ultimately have to follow the British pattern and do something about mass feeding. It will take all three agencies to bring about an adequate child program for the care of the children of working mothers.

As one goes around the country, one sees towns which have gone to war. Where that happens, the plant, the town, and the federal agencies and labor work together as a unit. Houses are open to workers, recreation is provided, workers are welcomed instead of being made to feel like pariahs.

Many communities, with the OCD and the USO, have realized that "War Workers' Welfare Is War Work," like the little town of Oxford, Pennsylvania, which made this its slogan.

There is no group of civilians more vitally interested in winning the war than are the workers. There is no other group making greater sacrifices, both voluntary and those imposed on them from without. All over the country workers are asking my friend's question, "How is it that if labor is an absentee who quits his work without provocation, we have a miracle of production in this country?" A public recognition of the part labor is playing, a let-up of the drum-fire of criticism, would go far to heighten labor's morale and relieve workers of the feeling of injustice which now fills them.

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INFORMING THE PUBLIC:

A TEST CASE

By GERARD B. LAMBERT and HADLEY CANTRIL

THIS article is not the first to charge that our information policy on the home front has been crippled by a lack of planning. Doubtless it will not be the last. But the authors do more than criticize. Here, in a typical American city, is a test case of what can be done to inform the public about the facts of wartime living. The issue is inflation, the strategy of information systematically planned. The results speak for themselves.

Mr. Lambert, former president of both the Lambert Pharmacal Company and the Gillette Company, is no newcomer to the field of information. At present he is Consultant to the Chairman of the War Production Board. Dr. Cantril, Director of the Office of Public Opinion Research of Princeton University, is a frequent contributor to these pages.

THE EXECUTIVE ORDER setting up the Office of War Information charged it, among other things, with the task of formulating and carrying out "information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities and aims of the government." And Elmer Davis has said that OWI "intends to give the people as much material as it can to enable them to understand what is going on." But so far, the significance of the measures necessary to put the country on to a war basis and the threats that problems created by the war hold for our domestic economy have not been carefully and adequately spelled out. Indeed, the steps taken by OWI and various other government agencies to educate the people of this country to the problems created by the war seem to be distinctly haphazard.

Roughly speaking, there are two ways to carry out an information program. One method is to find out where there is understanding and where there is ignorance, then on the basis of this evidence to design educational appeals, then to test the effectiveness of these appeals, and, finally, when good appeals have been discovered, to launch them in systematic campaigns. This method could be described as the planned, orderly, rifle-shot approach. It is the method used by any alert businessman interested in selling a new product where success or failure are highly tangible. It is the method used by the astute politician or the skilled teacher.

Opposed to it is what we might call the scattered, shot-gun approach. Here it is arbitrarily decided that people should be informed on this or that. Perhaps as a result of conferences, individual hunches, office gossip, columnists' criticisms, or the like, information is distributed as widely as possible, releases are prepared by well-intentioned writers, stories are created to attract attention. Success is likely to be measured in terms of output and the space or time the hand-outs receive in the press or radio. It is the method used by many organizations concerned more with publicity than effect, and, unfortunately, by many of the government information agencies created since the war.

These two approaches represent, essentially, two ways of thinking. It is our contention that the orderly way of thinking about the methods by which policy *can* be carried out must be introduced as part and parcel of the thinking on the policy level; and unless it is, any policy runs the likelihood of remaining merely a statement on paper or a jumble of directives issued as expediency dictates when the attempt is made to put policy into operation. A consistent educational program is something more than a matter of policy which responsible authorities attempt to carry out in all good faith.

Such an orderly way of thinking consists of a good deal more than the over-simplified formula of giving the people the truth. It is necessary to discover where explanation is needed and also to discover what kind of education has any hope of being effective.

This is not substituting "propaganda" for "the truth." It is utilizing a demonstrably workable, economical procedure in a democratic government shouldered with the obligation of enlightening its citizens on vital problems touching their own welfare.

The confusion and contradiction in directives that has become characteristic of certain government offices, must stem in large part from the fact that there is no clear and systematic informational policy carried out with any orderly thought. If such a policy were in existence and were being competently carried out, it could go far to *force* consistency in the various announcements and statements issued to the public.

TEST-TUBE STUDY

In order to furnish a small prototype of what might be done if policy were linked to an orderly way of thinking that involved planning on the basis of research, the study reported here was carried out.

This study attempted to answer essentially two questions. First, how much do people really understand about one of the important problems created for them by the war? And second, how much can that understanding be increased by means of a simple educational campaign?

The subject chosen for the study was that of inflation.* Since the problem of inflation is so complex, only one aspect of it was chosen for this test. That aspect was the *cause* of inflation. Obviously a complete campaign on inflation would include a study and portrayal of its consequences and the preventive steps necessary. We chose the *cause of inflation* because it gets at the root of understanding and is precisely the sort of explanation so glaringly lacking in government information programs. Certainly, if the cause of inflation is understood, then its consequences and the preventive measures necessary can more readily be explained to the public. If, on the other hand, an educational campaign consists entirely of a discussion of consequences and preventive measures, the average man, unsophisticated in economic matters, will have difficulty tying all the threads together and making sense out of what will probably seem to him to be a scattered opportunistic program. The average man seeks the meaning of the various regulations and appeals he is supposed to follow.

METHOD OF STUDY

Briefly, the method employed here consisted of three steps: first, discovering how much understanding of the cause of inflation existed in one community; second, conducting an educational campaign; and, third, determining the effectiveness of this campaign.

First Survey. This test-tube experiment was conducted in New Brunswick, New Jersey, during the first week of July, 1943. Altogether 899 people representative of the total adult population were interviewed. In addition to the usual controls of income, age, and sex, in order to make this first survey and the re-survey as precise as possible, the city was divided into seven districts, with interviewers given definite assignments in each district.

After considerable experimentation with the best type of question to use in getting at the understanding of the cause of inflation, a quiz

* A provocative discussion of the psychological factors involved in causing inflation and of the role of information in preventing it is found in George Katona's *War without inflation* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1942).

type of question was finally selected. Open-ended questions—where definitions of the cause of inflation were left up to respondents—were found to be unfruitful, and the answers too difficult to classify accurately for purposes of comparison. The question finally decided upon was as follows. Note the attempt in the wording of the question to stress cause. Two "causes," namely A and C below, were deliberately incorrect.

There is a good deal of talk these days about the danger of inflation. Here is a card giving three reasons often mentioned as causes of inflation. Please read these over carefully and tell me which one describes best what *you* think is the real cause of inflation. I'm not trying to find out what you think inflation *is*, but what you think *causes* it.

The card read as follows:

WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF INFLATION?

- A. Prices go up faster than wages are increased.
- B. There are fewer things for people to buy and at the same time people have more money to spend for those things.
- C. The government has to use so much food and material for war purposes here and abroad that there is very little left for us to buy.

The Educational Campaign. The attempt to increase an understanding of the cause of inflation was carried out through a newspaper campaign. The New Brunswick *Daily Home News*, the only general newspaper in the city, and which in our sample is read by approximately 90% of the people, gave its complete cooperation.*

The primary task faced in such a campaign is, of course, to attract attention to the message. For this purpose the educational campaign was couched in the context of a prize contest where an award of a \$50 first prize, a \$25 second prize, a \$10 third prize, and 23 \$5 prizes were offered to those who submitted the best letters to the *Daily Home News*, describing in their own words the cause of inflation. The contest was officially sponsored by the paper. The page that appeared in the paper is reproduced below. It was run three times in one week (July 12th, 14th, and 16th). Every attempt was made in the lay-out of the page to point up the basic message we were trying to get across—the cause of inflation.

Re-Survey. The week following the newspaper announcement, a re-survey was made. Nine hundred thirty-three people were interviewed. In order to make the second population interviewed just as comparable

* The writers wish to thank Mr. John Quad, Managing Editor of the *Daily Home News*, and Mr. Elmer Boyd, Publisher, for the free use of their facilities and their help.

THE DAILY HOME NEWS IS OFFERING 26 CASH PRIZES IN AN IMPORTANT CONTEST

First Prize \$50; Second Prize \$25; Third Prize \$10 And Twenty-three \$5 Prizes

Read Every Word of This Page Carefully and Learn How You May Win One of These Prizes

The Daily Home News has decided, by means of a contest, to help increase the public understanding of one of the most vicious and dangerous economic possibilities a nation can face. That possibility is uncontrolled inflation.

To control inflation successfully, it is necessary that every citizen understand clearly its major cause, its disastrous consequences, and the methods for its control. It is our hope that this contest will undo many misconceptions about the real cause of inflation. Even for those who do not wish to enter the contest, we urge that each citizen read this page carefully as a patriotic duty.

This contest has no strings—no tips—no hints—nothing to buy.

On this page the major cause of inflation is explained. The explanation is confined entirely to the cause of inflation. If this contest can start a movement to make the cause of inflation clear, we will have won the first round in the battle against this monster. With other common-sense following our example, a national understanding of the true cause of inflation would go far to ward off disaster.

TO WIN A PRIZE, DO THIS:

Read below, over and over, the major cause of inflation under present conditions. When you understand the explanation clearly, write a letter (100 words or less) to the Contest Editor of The Daily Home News, stating in your own words the major cause of inflation. DO NOT REPEAT OUR WORDING. Express the same thing differently in your own way.

REMEMBER THIS—This contest is NOT concerned with the description of what inflation is. NOR is it concerned with the cures for inflation. That is something for the future. Stick to a description of the major cause.

The contest jury will award a cash prize of \$50 for the best letter, a prize of \$25 for the next best letter, and a prize of \$10 for the third best letter. In addition to these three prizes, the judges will select the 23 next best letters and will award \$5 for each. The decision of the jury shall be final, and the letters shall be the property of The Daily Home News. No letter will be considered that is mailed after midnight, Sunday, July 16th.

Now we will give you in our own words this major cause of inflation. Be sure to read it carefully

In the United States, as a result of the war, there are two existing conditions which could cause inflation now. These conditions which provide the MAJOR CAUSE OF INFLATION are:

- 1.—There Is More Money to Spend—But**
- 2.—There Are Fewer Things to Buy**

In these 13 words we have explained to you the real cause of inflation. There are of course many incidental causes but the conditions we have described in those few words are the basic conditions which make inflation inevitable unless some controls are put into effect.

Here's a Rough Example of What We Mean

A rough example of a set of conditions which would cause inflation (unless we had some controls) is as follows: If the salaries and wages received in New Brunswick as a whole, were to double and at the same time the number of things we could buy were cut in half, we would have the major cause of inflation.

Our shift to enormous war production has resulted in having fewer things for civilians to buy and at the same time a tremendous increase in total wages and salaries.

The understanding of the real cause of inflation is the first step necessary for our people if they are to cooperate fully with the various measures needed to ward off ruinous inflation. If we know in advance the things that will cause a disaster, we can act intelligently to prevent that disaster. None of us wants to see the time when we must pay \$100 for a pair of shoes, \$1 for a loaf of bread, or \$50 for a newspaper.

A Tip and a Warning

The aim of this page will start a lot of discussion about the major cause of inflation. You'll find that many of your friends—being honest—will want to share their knowledge by asking if you know the answer. Be prepared. Read every word of this page carefully so people won't find you mistaken.

NO CATCH!

There is no catch in this contest—no expense but a postage stamp. It is open to everyone but the employees of The Daily Home News. The contest is conducted as a public and national service. The citizens of New Brunswick, along with the rest of the nation, will suffer if disastrous inflation occurs. Understanding the major cause is the first step in prevention. This newspaper considers it a duty to spread that understanding. This contest is our method of doing so.

ADDRESS YOUR LETTER TO:

CONTEST EDITOR
Daily Home News
NEW BRUNSWICK, N. J.

For convenience, we are offering cash prizes. But we hope that all winners will award the money to our funds or charities.

as possible to the first, interviewers were given precise assignments at the end of each day's work. They were told in what district to interview and just what types of people to locate.

In addition to the question on inflation, questions asking whether or not people saw the announcement and whether or not they read it carefully were included.


National Survey. At the same time the first New Brunswick survey was under way, a nation-wide poll was made on the same question getting at the cause of inflation.

RESULTS

The first New Brunswick survey indicated that only 30% of a representative adult population in that city was able to select the correct alternative describing the cause of inflation. (Figure 1.)


That ignorance about inflation is not confined to New Brunswick

FIGURE 1



is indicated from the results of the national survey, which found only 41% of the adult population able to select the correct alternative. (Figure 2.) The discrepancy between the New Brunswick and the national figure is due chiefly to the large concentration of foreign-born industrial workers in New Brunswick.

FIGURE 2



In the second New Brunswick survey 43% reported that they had seen the full-page announcement: 10% had read it carefully, while 33% had only glanced at it.


To test the effectiveness of the announcement, then, it was necessary to compare this 10% of the sample population to equivalent groups drawn from the first survey, or from those in the second survey who had not noticed the announcement at all, or who saw it but only glanced at it. In order to construct groups as nearly alike as possible for comparative purposes, each person who indicated he had read the announcement carefully was matched with respect to education, income, sex, age, and readership of the *Daily Home News*, with another person in each of three groups: (1) a group chosen from the first survey; (2) a group from the second survey who had not read the announcement; and (3) a group from the second survey who had only glanced at the announcement.

When the understanding of the cause of inflation is compared among these four groups, we find that the number who understood the cause of inflation was almost doubled among those who had read the announcement carefully when compared to the group taken from the first survey, or a similar group taken from the second survey who said they had not seen the announcement. (Figure 3.) Whereas 63% of those who had read the announcement carefully were able to choose the cor-

rect alternative, only 33% of a comparable group in the first survey could make the right choice. This difference is significant according to rigid statistical tests. A difference of only 17% would be likely to occur by chance but once in 100 times.

FIGURE 3

Percent Understanding Cause of Inflation



The fact that only 10% of the population (90% of which said they read the paper regularly) actually read the page carefully indicates that even with the announcement of the prize contest, the campaign did not enjoy any widespread coverage of the total population. The result was that the over-all shift (3%) in the direction of a better understanding of the cause of inflation in the total representative population was small and statistically insignificant. This is a problem of appeal, however, which could easily be solved if the facilities of radio, motion pictures, cartoonists, etc., were brought into play. The discovery that only 10% of the population read the page carefully in no way detracts from the significant finding that the understanding of the cause of inflation—among those who *did* read the announcement carefully—was nearly doubled.

INTERPRETATION

(1) The fact that only 41% of a representative national population understood the cause of inflation, after a year and a half of this country's participation in the war and a year and a half's operation of various government information services, indicates that these services have not done a satisfactory job.

(2) There is a definite need for a clear, planned, precise educational program. This is lacking now. The sort of planning urged here is not at all a matter of dollars and cents, of getting out pamphlets and releases. It is a matter of projecting into the government information services a way of thinking, one that is old and simple, that consists of gathering relevant information, working out effective educational methods, testing results, and then—when sound methods have been demonstrated by experimentation—launching national campaigns.

(3) This does not need to be either an expensive or a long drawn-out process. As a matter of fact, millions of dollars might be saved if the requirement were introduced that the effectiveness of results had to be checked. Official Washington should demand such checks before, during, and after any important campaign.

(4) It is not too late to do something. If in one week, by running an announcement only three times in one newspaper, the understanding of the cause of inflation could be increased as demonstrated, it is obvious that if a planned, nation-wide campaign, using the facilities of motion pictures, radio, cartoons, press conferences, etc., were competently handled, an increased understanding of at least one important domestic problem would be achieved throughout the country.

(5) And, incidentally, the domestic problems created by the war are actually neither too numerous nor too complex to be presented clearly to the people. From the citizen's point of view, the major domestic problems that come to mind, in addition to inflation, are rationing and manpower—not dozens and dozens of bewildering topics. Few characteristics of these problems could be much more complicated to explain than the cause of inflation, which, as we have seen, can be put into thirteen words.

THE "FREE MOVEMENTS" OF HORTHY'S ECKHARDT AND AUSTRIA'S OTTO

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

In the conduct of the war the Allies are fast approaching the problem of dealing effectively with occupied or liberated countries. With which groups shall they work in the practical teamwork of administering justice, policing the country, re-establishing civilian life? Italy has been our first venture; doubtless southeastern Europe will follow. Already, to handle the problems there, various groups are setting themselves up in this country as "Committees

in Exile," "Provisional Governments," etc. The present article deals with two such bodies—one Austrian, the other Hungarian.

Dr. Roucek, now Chairman of the Department of Political Science and Sociology at Hofstra College, is the author of articles and books relating to contemporary world politics and especially to the problem of racial and national minorities.

WHEN THE INTER-ALLIED PACT—the anti-Axis pact—was drawn up during Roosevelt's and Churchill's talks in Washington in 1942, it was announced that in addition to the original 26 signing nations, the United Nations would welcome statements of adherence from "appropriate authorities which are not governments." No sooner did the word go out than free groups old and new, so-called and genuine, hurried to Washington. Along with their eagerness to declare their adherence to the pact, they revealed the lively competition which exists between organizations representing different tendencies in the various national groups, and at the same time the desire of each one to be among those present "when the roll is called up yonder at the Peace Conference."

As evidence multiplied to suggest that several of these so-called "free" groups were far from democratic in character, closer supervision and regulation of such movements within the United States was soon urged on the State Department. Although the United States has had a long and consistent tradition of hospitality towards governments and groups-in-exile, it was pointed out that such hospitality should not be carried to the point of harboring groups which might some day attempt to sabotage America's suggestions for European peace.

The United States has had a foretaste of such difficulties in recent disputes over the activities of the "Free Hungary" movement, headed

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by Tibor Eckhardt, and the activities of Archduke Otto of Hapsburg and his numerous family relations throughout the new world. While the State Department did not give its official blessing to either of these groups, it nevertheless permitted them to operate as they saw fit. These two instances, then, merit a detailed review.

HORTHY'S PROPAGANDA PARATROOPER IN AMERICA

The furor created by the propaganda activities of Admiral Horthy's representative in America can be gathered from the correspondence between Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Chairman of the Union for Democratic Action, and Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. Welles, in a letter made public on April 1, 1942, advised Niebuhr that the State Department had not given Eckhardt "any form of recognition." This was in reply to a communication from Niebuhr urging that the State Department investigate Eckhardt, "lest we willingly give aid to a potential fifth column disguised as a free movement."

The problem can be understood only within the framework of the international situation. Hungary, more than any other country in Europe, has benefited by Hitler's "New Order." Its territorial aggrandizements—from the first partition of Czechoslovakia to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia—have been realized to the disadvantage of two members of the United Nations. Its armies have fought Russia alongside of Hitler's armies, and in addition it has declared war on Great Britain and the United States.

Budapest, however, well aware that the Allies, if they win, will not confirm the grants of Hitler and Mussolini, has tried its utmost to secure its territorial gains in case of an Allied victory. Its propaganda has adopted the line of self-preservation; Hungary had to yield to Germany because its open frontiers and poorly-equipped army could not have resisted the onslaught of Nazi aggression. The impression is that the present rulers of Hungary always have been secretly pro-British and democratic. As Vambéry puts it, "Hungarian revisionist propaganda has had an undeniable success not only in Hitler's Germany but in England and America as well. This was due partly to the ignorance abroad of specific Hungarian conditions, partly to some superficial resemblance of the Magyar to the English 'gentleman,' but principally to the deadly fear of Bolshevism at the time when the propaganda set in."¹

¹ Rustem Vambéry, *The Hungarian Problem*, New York: The Nation, 1942, p. 34.

In America since Munich, this propaganda has stressed the point that Hungarians utterly dislike German Nazism (as indeed they do), and that Horthy's government disapproves its collaboration with the Axis. Thus until the Axis had declared war on the United States, a Hungarian pro-government paper in America was able to exculpate the Regent and his Premier by stating that the participation of the Hungarian army in the campaign against Russia had been arranged behind their backs by the chiefs of the Hungarian and German General Staffs. At the same time, the Budapest propaganda declared its ardent love for democracy, wholeheartedly subscribed to the eight points of the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration, and declared that the Horthy regime was in full accord with the war aims of a victorious Britain.

This complex background, naturally enough, produced much confusion among American Hungarians. The Hungarian *Egyetertes*, published in Bridgeport, Connecticut, a supporter of the pro-Axis regime now ruling Hungary, is a case in point. When the United States declared war on Hungary in the spring of 1942, *Egyetertes* ran a perfunctory editorial urging its readers to help the American war effort. And in another column of the same page it remarked that "the situation is no different from before, except that unnaturalized Hungarians must be more careful of what they say."

The same kind of confusion was—and is—exhibited by the American Hungarian Federation, representing some 600,000 American Hungarians; anti-Nazi, it is at the same time "revisionist"—that is, it favors claiming all the territories Horthy has occupied as accessory to Hitler. Unlike other population movements for freedom in the United States, most of which have sprung up under our national emergency, the Federation was organized in the comparatively calm atmosphere of 1937. Important, also, is the fact that it was organized by Count Teleki who came to this country for a "lecture-tour" peculiarly timed to precede immediately his appointment to the Premiership. As a "visitor" and lecturer to many American organizations under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Teleki also acted on behalf of the forthcoming International Convention at Budapest of the Hungarian World Federation.

Teleki united a few intellectuals and the rank-and-file of American Hungarians in mills, mines, and factories; all those, in short, whose "political views" depend on an emotional reaction based on their love

of the Hungary they left—an emotion nurtured and exploited for the last twenty years by a chauvinistic and revisionist Hungarian press in the United States. Although there are violent disagreements among the American Hungarians, just as among all American minorities, Teleki's mission was not difficult of accomplishment. After all, "among Americans of Hungarian descent or Magyars residing in the United States 'revisionism' is the result of an assiduous, relentless propaganda carried on for twenty years by emissaries and American agents of the Hungarian government, by its various organizations, and by newspapers until recently subsidized by the Hungarian counter-revolutionary regime."² There has for years been no American Hungarian picnic or social gathering without its period devoted to the reiteration of the need for "revisionism." Paul Nadányi describes one of such innumerable occasions:³

September 7, 1940, was a great day for the Greek Catholic Hungarians in New York City. The Holy Cross Church, 323 East 82nd Street, in Yorkville, celebrated the unveiling of a beautiful altar picture. Father Constantin Roskovics, who within a short time succeeded in building up a large parish, invited to this celebration all the Greek Catholic Hungarian pastors of the Eastern states. Bishop Basil Takacs of Homestead, Pa., also attended, giving the celebration the utmost importance. After the church services, a festival took place, during which the speakers happily announced that at that very time the Hungarian army was marching into the northern part of Transylvania, awarded to Hungary by Hitler and Mussolini in the Second Vienna Pact.

The announcement caused great rejoicing. Several hundred people heartily applauded every word spoken about this award. These people were not Nazis. They never were contaminated with the Fascist germs, they never had any use for Nazi agitators who tried to stir up racial hatred. . . . These people are ardent believers in American democracy. . . . These people always believed that the treaty after the first World War, the so-called Trianon Treaty was unjust to Hungary. . . .

The Federation held a convention in Pittsburgh on November 27, 1941, as the representative of the three greatest and oldest Hungarian

² Vambéry, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³ Paul Nadányi, *The "Free Hungary" Movement*, New York: The Amerikai Magyar Népszava, Inc., 1942, pp. 4-5.

societies, numbering about 100,000 members and about 100 religious communities. When it came to a showdown between Nazis and anti-Nazis at the convention, the majority decided in favor of whole-hearted acceptance of the official policy of the American Government. But, again paradoxically enough, this same Federation sponsored the strange "Free Hungary" movement of Tibor Eckhardt, whose last visit of the United States in August, 1941, created a furor among the pro-democratic and pro-Allied forces in the United States, and who earned for himself such names as the "Hungarian Hess," and "the first of Horthy's Paratroops in America."

It was the contention of the critics of Eckhardt that he was a Hungarian Nazi, a German Nazi, or both; that he had been identified with the worst reactionary element of Hungary, with the White Terror and the establishment of the Horthy regime; that, as one-time President of the "Awakening Hungarians," perhaps the most dangerous of all White Terrorist groups, he represented the extreme anti-Semitic element; that his mission here was of a suspicious nature; and that in no way could he be identified with the course of freedom and democracy—Hungarian or otherwise.

Among the reasons for the antagonism created by Eckhardt's movement were the publications of the American-Hungarian Federation, the principal backer of Eckhardt in America. Its two pamphlets contained such virulent and abusive attacks upon the Czech people in general, and upon Dr. Edward Beneš, head of the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile, in particular, that the critics saw a remarkable resemblance to certain Nazi statements. The Governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were referred to as "paper Governments of non-existent states," despite the fact that Washington and London numbered these governments among their allies and despite the fact that the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs were members of the United Nations. Articles were published in the Hungarian-American press implying the President's approval of Eckhardt's movement, since Eckhardt was introduced to Roosevelt on his first trip to this country in March 1940. This fiction was further exploited at the Federation Convention in Pittsburgh by one of the chief speakers, Dr. John S. Sebestyen, President of the Hungarian Society of Pittsburgh, when he said: "Having received recognition from members of the Washington Government, and having made friends in the circle of statesmen, now, when it is possible,

the American-Hungarian Federation will be able to take a stand officially in the interests of our brethren in the old country. Does the American Government know of the independent movement? Yes. A special division of the State Department has been assigned to maintain steady contact with the executive secretary of the American Hungarian Federation."

The propaganda technique of Eckhardt is worth noting. Eckhardt managed to get his first manifesto—September 27, 1941—released through the Fight for Freedom, Inc. By this master stroke he secured for his movement the implied blessing of the American Freedom forces. The fact that Eckhardt had been introduced to President Roosevelt by John Pelenyi, then Minister of Hungary to the United States in 1940, was in addition exploited by articles implying the President's approval of Eckhardt's movement. Thus the *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* (New York), wrote in its editorial on September 27, 1941, as follows: "The publication of the manifesto means the successful conclusion of the negotiations carried on by Eckhardt abroad, particularly in Washington." Eckhardt was, in addition, presented by Professor Francis Deák (at one time an authorized agent of the Hungarian Government registered with the State Department as the American editor of the *Hungarian Quarterly*) in a letter to the New York *Herald Tribune* as a "Liberal."

Eckhardt was able to maintain his paradoxical situation by representing all different cross-currents at the same time. Thus he confused his Hungarian followers by supporting Horthy's regime (which declared war by Hitler's orders against the United States) "as a constitutional factor which must not be attacked. Standing upon a lawful basis, we cannot proclaim a fight against him" (October 10, 1941); at the same time he declared that Hungary was a "perpetual kingdom" and had talks with the pretender to Hungary's throne, Archduke Otto, the son of Ex-Emperor Charles the Last of Hungary, whom Horthy had twice prevented (the second time by armed force) from regaining the throne. Yet a considerable portion of the American Hungarian press ranked Eckhardt beside Rákóczi and Kossuth, Hungary's great heroes, as the third great "exiled patriot," whitewashing him by propounding "what a blessed philo-Semite he was even as leader of the Awakening Hungarians." One hypothesis for his contradictory behavior was that Eckhardt might hope "one day to play a part

in helping to bring Admiral Horthy into the United Nations' camp. He has established contacts with Archduke Otto because he does not want to neglect an opportunity to assure for Hungary an advantageous place in a Danubian federation should Otto's plans be realized."⁴

The re-examination of the Hungarian and Austrian movements by the Department of State by April, 1942, toned down the excitement over Eckhardt's case. There can be, however, no question but that his plans are developed by the Hungarian-American Federation, which "despite all the protests of its leaders, is known to be subsidiary of the 'Hungarian World Congress,' organized by Admiral Horthy for the defense of Hungarian interests." Thus he serves the Regent of Hungary, whose Foreign Minister, General Joseph Gombos, was the first European statesman to visit Hitler—the term *Axis*, incidentally, was coined in Budapest—and his present Propaganda Minister, Istvan Antal.

THE CASE OF THE AUSTRIAN "FOREIGN LEGION"

Austria is not a member of the United Nations. As Hitler's first victim, it has, however, at least a theoretical chance of becoming some day an associate, if not a member. Archduke Otto of the Hapsburgs considers himself the main champion of the Austrian cause in the United States; most of his enthusiasm is due to his hope that he will return some day to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which his father vacated in 1918.

His first important success in this direction occurred when he helped to obtain the status of "non-enemy aliens" for Austrians in America. His second, much more important, success was his creation of an Austrian Legion in the United States army—a step which resulted in bitter arguments among the United States officials and even more bitter discussions among America's minorities from the former Empire. The uncertain policy of the United States authorities in regard to "Free Movements" was, however, a direct cause of the strange episode of the Austrian Legion. "As material for a librettist it is superb; as material for some future White Paper it is embarrassing," reported *Fortune* magazine.⁵

In February, 1942, the War Department formed a Filipino Infantry

⁴ Andre Visson, "Hungary's War-Weariness Poses Question of a Danubian Darlan," *New York Herald Tribune*, January 31, 1943.

⁵ "Prepare to Occupy," *Fortune*, 27, February, 1943, pp. 91ff.

Battalion, to provide "those Filipinos who are now residing in the United States . . . the eventual opportunity of fighting on the soil of their homeland." The idea had great appeal. In July a battalion for expatriate Norwegians was created, in December a Greek battalion, and others were in process of formation. Austro-Americans, feeling that their homeland was in the same category as the others, were among the first to petition for a battalion. The State Department turned them down. In the fall of 1942 Otto Hapsburg put his shoulder to the wheel—Otto, the man who is pretender to the throne of an empire that collapsed at the end of World War I, who is confidently addressed as "Your Imperial Highness" by a loyal entourage which ignores the lack of throne or empire, and who, as the oldest son of the late Emperor of Austria, Apostolic King of Hungary, has been trained by his mother, the Ex-Empress Zita, always to remember that he is the son of an emperor, has seventeen christian names, and will one day rule over Austria. His action caused high alarm among the Czechs, Serbs, and other nationalities to whom the Hapsburgs are anathema; but they were calmed when the State Department assured them again that no Austrian unit would be allowed, that if it were, Otto would have no part in it.

From there, according to *Fortune*, the story takes various apocryphal turns. One version has it that Otto and some of his friends went to a White House tea, where they tactfully broached the subject to the President. The President said that he saw no objection to having an Austrian battalion of some sort; whereupon Otto sought out Sumner Welles and confided that the President had given his approval. Welles then passed the word along to Secretary Stimson.

Whatever the circumstances, the upshot was that Otto Hapsburg wrote to Stimson offering to head a "Military Committee for the Liberation of Austria." On the same day that he received the letter, Secretary Stimson accepted, addressing his reply to "Otto of Austria." This fortunate combination of events enabled Otto to announce his success at the birthday party that His Apostolic Majesty's followers gave for him in New York the next night.

The Czechs, Serbs, and all the so-called "liberated" nationalities which had formerly been ruled by the Hapsburgs, were naturally outraged. Beyond this discomfiture of America's allies, however, the episode showed an egregious failure to understand the implications of such policies on America's minorities and on the governments-in-exile,

bitterly opposed as they were to the possibility of having Otto return to Austria as a ruler of any kind. In 1918 the United States had helped to break up the Hapsburg Empire by the Wilsonian recognition of the right to self-determination by the Slavic peoples. Twenty-five years later these same United States, once again an ally of all Slavic peoples (with the exception of the Bulgarians and, technically, of the Croats and the Slovaks, whose puppet leaders have declared war on the United States), is urged by some influential groups to play a leading part in the restoration of the Hapsburg Monarchy. That would be, indeed, one of the greatest paradoxes of our time.

From the standpoint of two United Nations, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the possibility of a Hapsburg restoration would mean extinction. For another member, Poland, such a restoration would create only a partial danger—it might constitute a threat to the once-Austrian province of Galicia; but it might seem the less of two evils. Although the Poles have no special sympathies for the Hapsburgs, they remember that those who lived under Austro-Hungarian rule fared better than those who lived under German or Czarist Russian rule; furthermore, the Hapsburg administration gave to the Poles a much better status than to the Ukrainians. There are, too, many Poles who fear that after this war Soviet Russia will be for Poland a much more redoubtable enemy than Germany. Hence some of these Poles would accept, if not welcome, a Hapsburg-headed “federation” (because “empire” is an outdated term) as a valuable ally in a power-politics combination against both Germany and Russia.

All this has had its repercussions in the United States. While many American-Polish communities and American-Polish papers, including the violently anti-Soviet *Nowy Swiat* in New York, added their voices to the loud protests of other Slavic groups against Otto's semi-official connection with the projected Austrian legion, the Polish officials preferred to ignore the whole affair. But the voices of the many different foreign-language papers in the United States were for once surprisingly harmonious.

The Serb, the Croat, and the Slovene papers, on this one occasion, took the same line; all became really “Yugoslav” in their opposition to the Hapsburgs. The Serbian nationalist *Srbobran* and the Serbian Communist *Slobodna Rec* forgot their bitter fights about General Draga Mihailovich and the Partisans in order to agree against the Hapsburgs.

The Slovak papers with few exceptions, as that of the pro-Fascist *Slovak v Amerike*, fully agreed with the Czech papers on the Otto problem. The Ukrainian papers laid aside for a moment their complaints against the Russians and used the same words of protest as the Russian papers.

Italian papers (*Nazioni Unite*, *La Stella di Pittsburgh*, and others) and many German papers (*Chicago Abendpost*, *Anzeiger und Post*, *Baltimore Correspondent*, *Detroit Abendpost*) voiced, for different reasons, the same protests as the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Ukrainian press.

The policy of Washington on the Austrian problem appears, however, to have been greatly misunderstood. The United States, which in 1938 had to accept the Anschluss as a *fait accompli*, never recognized the Anschluss *de jure*. The Administration wanted to mark the difference between the status of the Germans and that of the Austrians in the United States. This desire led directly to the affair of the Austrian Legion, which was at first viewed without regard for the implications of a Hapsburg restoration and without any realization of the immediate consequences of the measure.

The resulting confusion, however, was so great that many Slavic groups in Chicago and Detroit gave credit to the ridiculous rumor that Otto was sponsored by "a few Jews in Washington."

In a letter to *The Nation*, H. Felix Kraus made the following points in regard to Otto's aims:^a

Now we cannot loathe the war any more. The United States has taken on a recruiting officer whose name alone is irresistible. Now men will stream to the colors of Uncle Sam like wild bees to a honey tree—or will they now?

Is the flag of the United States, or the democracy it stands for, not good enough? Since when does this republic need the services of the descendant of St. Stephen and Charles V—Archduke Francis Joseph Otto, Prince of Hamburg and Lorraine, pretender to the (non-existing) throne of Austria and Hungary?

We do not yet know whether the action of the War Department in accepting the services of Otto as recruiter of an "Austrian battalion" will finally be viewed as a shattering blow to democracy throughout Europe, as an invitation for a giant civil war in Europe,

^a *The Nation*, December 12, 1942, p. 662.

or only as a joke history will laugh tears about. We do know that the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, and Free Italians have protested vigorously against it and that all Austrians, wherever they are, feel as if they had been hit on the head. While Darlan is supposed to be only a temporary expedient, Otto's shadow now falls on the future of Central Europe. We can hardly expect any Austrian, Pole, or Yugoslav to risk his life against Hitler when we promise him Otto in exchange.

If the two brothers, Otto and Felix, are merely refugees, as Secretary of State Hull declared, why are they not in the army? They are not married, and they support only their claims. Perhaps this is another "Riddle of the State Department."

President Roosevelt tried to close the discussion of the "Otto-Austrian legion" by stressing that Otto of Hapsburg's committee had no exclusive connection whatever with the Austrian legion under formation and that Otto's committee was only one of many recruiting agencies (which was news); and the War Department announced that the battalion would not even be used in occupying Austria.

The so-called Austrian Battalion got off to an inauspicious start when Otto managed to buttonhole exactly 29 volunteers. As soon as it became apparent that Otto's recruiting powers were low, the War Department shipped several hundred draftees, former nationals of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, into the Legion, and the well-padded outfit was sent to train out in Atterbury, Indiana, with "Archdukes" Felix and Carl Ludwig shuffling along with the others.

The result was another storm of protest. In March, 1943, reversal of the original policy was announced by Secretary Henry L. Stimson in a letter to Representative Emanuel Celler (Democrat, New York). Victor H. Bernstein's editorial in the New York *PM* (March 12, 1943), analyzed the situation as follows:

Congratulations to liberals, American and Austrian alike, for their victory in the case of the Austrian Battalion. Congratulations to the War Dept. and to Secretary Stimson for having acted courageously to right a great wrong. But, most of all, congratulations to the young men in Camp Atterbury, Ind., who now are pledged opportunity to forget Otto and fix their minds on Uncle Sam.

We would like, however, to set down two reservations.

The first is that we have not lost our distaste for the Austrian Battalion, even though it has been changed to a "voluntary" organization. We don't like Otto of Hapsburg as an unofficial recruiting sergeant for the U.S. Army any more than we would like him as an Emperor.

The second is the possibility that Camp Atterbury's officers may not cling as closely to the spirit of Secretary Stimson's ruling as they must to its letter. Battalion members must present a written request for transfer. And the first thing a jeep learns in the Army is to be properly discouraged about asking for anything he has reason to think his commanding officer disapproves.

We will wait in hope that Otto's will prove the "Lost Battalion" of World War II.

On May 23, 1943, the War Department announced its plans to abandon the organization of the Austrian battalion. It had not been possible, a spokesman explained, "to obtain sufficient personnel of the qualifications necessary" for organizing a battalion of soldiers of Austrian extraction.⁷

And what is the import of all this—of the activities of Eckhardt and Otto? Simply that a policy of do-nothing is both useless and vicious. The United States, by saying nothing, by granting its official sanction to the United Nations group but dealing politely and noncommittally with all, leaves the situation unstructured and confused. The sentimental attachment of former Hungarians and Austrians—and the nationals of other countries—for their native lands thus, in the absence of a clear governmental policy, leaves them prey to conflicting propaganda. Until the United States makes up its mind where it stands on these matters and says so in clear-cut action, such men as Eckhardt and Otto will continue to benefit from our hesitation.

⁷ "Army to Drop Plan for an Austrian Unit," *New York Times*, May 24, 1943.

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

This section contains a compilation, topically arranged, of poll results released by the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), by *Fortune* (FOR.), by the British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO), by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO), by the Australian Public Opinion Poll (APOP), and by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).

Questions recorded below cover the period from May through August 1943. Date lines after each question indicate the date of release and not necessarily the date on which questions were asked.

In considering these poll data, the reader

should bear in mind certain salient points of reference set forth on pages 75 and 76 of the March 1940 issue of the *QUARTERLY*. The *QUARTERLY* wishes to express its appreciation to George Gallup and the American, Canadian, Swedish, and British Institutes of Public Opinion, to the Australian Public Opinion Poll, to the Editors of *Fortune* and Elmo Roper, and to Harry H. Field of the National Opinion Research Center for their cooperation in making these survey results available in convenient form to other students of public opinion.

For the compilation of these results the *QUARTERLY* wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mabel Rugg.

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Part One: Domestic Issues

1. POLITICAL

ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL ADMINISTRATION

If the war is still on by election day next year, would you favor or oppose the reelection of Roosevelt for another term? (June '43—FOR.)

	Total	High	Economic level		Low	Negro
			Upper middle	Lower middle		
Favor	64.8%	42.1%	52.8%	67.3%	74.5%	78.9%
Oppose	27.8	50.3	38.0	26.5	19.1	10.9
Don't know	7.4	7.6	9.2	6.2	6.4	10.2

If the war is over and President Roosevelt runs for a fourth term next year, do you think you will vote for him or against him? (June 5, '43—AIPO)

For 31% Against 69%

If the war is still going on and Roosevelt runs for a fourth term next year, do you think you will vote for him or against him? (June 5, '43—AIPO)

For 56% Against 44%

If the war is not entirely over next year but looks as though it might be over soon, do you think you will vote for or against Roosevelt for a fourth term? (June 5, '43—AIPD)

For 51% Against 49%

If the war is over by election day next year, would you favor or oppose the reelection of Roosevelt for another term? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Economic level</i>		<i>Low</i>	<i>Negro</i>
			<i>Upper middle</i>	<i>Lower middle</i>		
Favor	33.3%	12.6%	18.9%	31.9%	47.1%	61.2%
Oppose	59.2	84.0	74.6	60.7	44.7	25.9
Don't know	7.5	3.4	6.5	7.4	8.2	12.9

Apart from home problems connected with the war, do you rate the job President Roosevelt has done in running the war good, fair, or poor? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Well-informed</i>	<i>Poorly informed</i>	<i>Uninformed</i>
Good	70.4%	71.4%	69.4%	70.3%
Fair	21.2	21.5	23.1	19.6
Poor	4.1	5.3	4.7	2.5
Don't know	4.3	1.8	2.8	7.6

After the war, do you think the aims and programs of the New Deal will be entirely done away with, partly done away with, continued along the same lines, or made stronger than ever? (Unless "don't know" to that question) Do you think this will be a good thing or a bad thing? (June '43—FOR.)

Entirely done away with	8.2%	{ Good thing	83.7%
		{ Bad thing	8.7
		{ Don't know	7.6
Partly done away with	41.6	{ Good thing	87.1%
		{ Bad thing	5.6
		{ Don't know	7.3
Continued along same lines	17.8	{ Good thing	80.6%
		{ Bad thing	10.0
		{ Don't know	9.4
Made stronger than ever	14.1	{ Good thing	76.3%
		{ Bad thing	16.2
		{ Don't know	7.5
Don't know	18.3		

On the whole, do you rate the job President Roosevelt has done on home problems connected with the war as good, fair, or poor? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Well-informed</i>	<i>Poorly informed</i>	<i>Uninformed</i>
Good	56.2%	43.4%	58.6%	66.4%
Fair	30.8	36.9	31.0	25.0
Poor	11.1	18.9	9.5	4.9
Don't know	1.9	.8	.9	3.7

Would you rate as good, fair, or poor the job that has been done so far on putting into effect the rationing of foodstuffs? On giving out news about the war? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>Good</i>	<i>Fair</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Rationing foodstuffs	44.8%	36.9%	13.0%	5.3%
Giving out war news	42.7	35.9	11.5	9.9

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Roosevelt is handling our foreign policy—that is, our relations with other nations? (July 10, '43—AIPO)

Approve 73% Disapprove 14% Undecided 13%

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Roosevelt is handling our domestic problems—that is, our problems here at home? (July 10, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	49%	42%	9%
New Eng. and Mid. Atlantic	53	37	10
East Central	48	42	10
West Central	47	47	6
South	48	42	10
Far West	44	47	9
Professional and Business	34	59	7
Farmers	39	53	8
White Collar	44	47	9
Skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled	62	28	10

Each voter who said he disapproved of the President's handling of domestic problems was asked what specific criticism he had in mind.

The chief items named were as follows:

1. Poor handling of the labor union situation.
2. Inefficient and sloppy administration; failure to pick the right men to be bureau and department heads; insufficient delegation of authority by the President.
3. Too much politics in the administration of home affairs; too much thinking about the next election and not enough about handling wartime problems.

Asked of Southerners:

What do you like least about the Roosevelt Administration? (July 6, '43—AIPO)

Poor handling of labor unions	22%
Extravagance, waste of public funds, paying people who don't work as hard as they should	11
Inefficiency, bureaucracy, red tape	11
Sponsoring too much equality of negroes	5
Unfair treatment of Southern farmers	5
Stimulating liquor trade by repeal of prohibition	2
Failure to curb inflation	1
Too high taxes	1
Unpreparedness for war	1

Asked of Southern white voters:

Do you think the present administration in Washington has done a good job, a fair job, or a poor job in dealing with the Negro problem? (Aug. 27, '43—AIPO)

Good job 13% Fair job 27% Poor job 35% No opinion 25%

LOOKING TOWARD 1944

Party preference of labor-union members and farmers. (June 12, '43—AIPO)

	Labor-Union Members		Farmers (outside South)	
	Democratic	Republican	Democratic	Republican
1936 Election	80%	20%	51%	49%
1940 Election	72	28	46	54
1944 Party Preference	69	31	41	59

Asked of Republicans:

Which one of these men would you prefer as the Republican candidate for President next year? (June 26, '43—AIPO)

Dewey	37%	Stassen	7
Willkie	28	Saltonstall	2
MacArthur	15	Warren	1
Bricker	10		

The results of a poll taken among Republican members of the House of Representatives by Representative Low E. Allen of Illinois are as follows:

Dewey	51 votes	Martin	9
MacArthur	33	Stassen	6
Bricker	32	Hoover	5
Willkie	13	Vandenberg	4
Taft	11		

By sections (outside of the normally Democratic South):

	N. Eng. & Mid. Atl.	E. Cent.	W. Cent.	Rocky Mt. & Pac. Coast
Dewey	43%	37%	40%	29%
Willkie	32	16	28	30
MacArthur	13	15	15	17
Bricker	5	24	6	7
Stassen	4	7	11	11
Saltonstall	3	1	0	2
Warren	*	*	*	4

* Less than one per cent.

Do you think businessmen will be better off if the Republicans or the Democrats win the Presidential election next year? (July 2, '43—AIPO)

	Better under Republicans	Better under Democrats
Businessmen (outside South)	78%	22%
Workers	59	41

Do you think skilled and unskilled workers will be better off if the Republicans or the Democrats win the Presidential election next year? (July 2, '43—AIPO)

	Better under Republicans	Better under Democrats
Businessmen (outside South)	49%	51%
Workers	27	73

Asked of Southern Democrats:

Which ONE of these men would you prefer as the Democratic candidate for President next year? (July 1, '43—AIPO)

Roosevelt	80%	McNutt	2
Byrnes	8	Douglas	1
Wallace	6	Winant	•
Farley	3		

* Less than one per cent.

How 40,000,000 estimated voters for 1944 divide today: (July 17, '43—AIPO)

	National	Farmers outside solid South	Workers outside solid South
Definitely Republican	9,000,000	32%	19%
Leaning Republican	5,000,000	14	10
Undecided	9,000,000	22	22
Leaning Democratic	6,000,000	14	15
Definitely Democratic	11,000,000	18	34

Attitude of various groups in the electorate toward Republican presidential possibilities:
(July 20, '43—AIPO)

Voters now Republican who say there is no chance they will shift parties:

Dewey	39%	Stassen	6
Willkie	28	Warren	1
Bricker	15	Saltonstall	1
MacArthur	10		

Voters now Republican but who say they might decide to vote Democratic:

Dewey	35%	Stassen	8
Willkie	34	Warren	2
Bricker	11	Saltonstall	1
MacArthur	9		

Voters unable at present to decide between the two parties:

Willkie	39%	Bricker	5
Dewey	29	Warren	2
MacArthur	17	Saltonstall	2
Stassen	6		

Voters now Democratic but who say they might decide to vote Republican:

Willkie	45%	Bricker	5
Dewey	22	Warren	2
MacArthur	17	Saltonstall	2
Stassen	7		

If the Presidential election were being held TODAY, and Roosevelt were running for President on the Democratic ticket against Wendell Willkie on the Republican ticket, how do you think you would vote? (July 29, July 30, & Aug. 1, '43—AIPO)

	1940		Today	
	Roosevelt	Willkie	Roosevelt	Willkie
National	55%	45%	59%	41%
All Workers	66	34	65	35
Union members	72	28	71	29
Farmers	54	46	50	50
Farmers outside South	48	52
Upper income	28	72	39	61
Middle income	53	47	53	47
Lower income	69	31	66	34
New England	53	47	57	43

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

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Middle Atlantic	53%	47%	61%	39%
East Central	51	49	56	44
West Central	49	51	53	47
South	73	27	71	29
Rocky Mountain	56	44	54	46
Pacific Coast	58	42	59	41
Age 21-29	60	40	67	33
Age 30-49	56	44	58	42
Age 50 and over	51	49	55	45

If the Presidential election were being held TODAY, and Roosevelt were running for President on the Democratic ticket against Thomas E. Dewey on the Republican ticket, how do you think you would vote? (Aug. 7, '43—AIPO)

	Roosevelt	Dewey		Roosevelt	Dewey
National	55%	45%	Age 30-49	54	46
Farmers	45	55	Age 50 and over	51	49
Farmers outside South	39	61	New England	52	48
Upper income	43	57	Middle Atlantic	57	43
Middle income	50	50	East Central	50	50
Lower income	61	39	West Central	47	53
All workers	59	41	South	72	28
Union members	67	33	Rocky Mountain	51	49
Age 21-29	64	36	Pacific Coast	60	40

Asked of Democratic voters in the five largest states:

Which one of these men would you prefer as Democratic candidate for President next year? (Aug. 14, '43—AIPO)

New York: Roosevelt 88%, Wallace 5%, McNutt 2%, Farley 2%, Douglas 1%, Winant 1%, Byrnes 1%.

Pennsylvania: Roosevelt 91%, Wallace 5%, Farley 2%, McNutt 1%, Winant 1%, Douglas and Byrnes, less than 1% each.

Illinois: Roosevelt 87%, Wallace 5%, Farley 4%, Byrnes 2%, McNutt 1%, Douglas 1%, Winant less than 1%.

Ohio: Roosevelt 91%, Farley 3%, Byrnes 3%, Wallace 2%, Douglas 1%, Winant and McNutt less than 1%.

California: Roosevelt 86%, Wallace 6%, Farley 4%, McNutt 1%, Douglas 1%, Byrnes 1%, Winant 1%.

Asked of Republicans:

Which one of these men would you prefer as the Republican candidate for President next year? (Aug. 3, '43—AIPO)

	Ohio	New York	Pennsylvania	Illinois
Bricker	54%	5%	9%	11%
Dewey	19	53	38	19
MacArthur	12	8	14	18
Saltonstall	*	2	*	1
Stassen	4	4	5	10
Warren	*	1	1	*
Willkie	11	27	33	19

Asked of Republicans:

Which one of these men would you prefer as the Republican candidate for President next year? (July 13, '43—AIPO)

	<i>New York</i>	<i>Pennsylvania</i>	<i>Illinois</i>
Dewey	53%	38%	41%
Willkie	27	33	19
MacArthur	8	14	18
Bricker	5	9	11
Stassen	4	5	10
Saltonstall	2	*	1
Warren	1	1	*

NEW SOUTHERN PARTY

Do you think the South would be better off, in general, if there were two political parties of about equal strength instead of one strong party as there is at present? (Aug. 5, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
1939	57%	43%	Today	59%	41%

Asked of Southern Democrats:

Each was asked whether he might leave the Democratic Party and vote for a new party if one were formed (Aug. 6, '43—AIPO):

Would definitely remain in Democratic Party	47%
Would definitely vote for new party	2
Undecided or it would depend on nature of new party and its leadership	51

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Do you think labor unions should or should not be allowed to give money to campaign funds of political parties? (Aug. 19, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Should</i>	<i>Should not</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	17%	65%	18%
Republicans	14	70	16
Democrats	20	61	19
Union members	24	58	18

Do you think business corporations should or should not be allowed to give money to campaign funds of political parties? (Aug. 19, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Should</i>	<i>Should not</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	23%	59%	18%
Republicans	23	60	17
Democrats	24	57	19

POLL TAX

Asked of eligible voters in poll-tax states:

Do you think the people in your state should have to continue paying a poll tax in order to vote? (Aug. 24, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
Today	53%	37%	10%
1941	53	35	12

2. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

FOOD

The idea of having a Baruch committee to investigate food is approved by two out of every three voters, as the following survey results show (July 24, '43—AIPO):

Believe there is need for investigation	67%
Believe it is not necessary	22
Undecided	11

Would you be for or against having Herbert Hoover take over the entire food problem in the United States? (July 24, '43—AIPO)

About one voter in every seven (15 per cent) had no opinion on the subject. The vote of those with opinions is:

	For 59%	Against 41%
	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>
For	36%	74%
Against	48	16
Undecided	16	10

In general, do you think most people you know would be healthier if they ate less? (July 24, '43—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
National	64%	21%	15%
Men	61	22	17
Women	67	20	13
Age 21-29	56	25	19
30-49	65	21	14
50 & over	68	18	14
Upper & middle-income group	70	19	11
Lower-income group	59	23	18

Have you lost weight or gained weight since food rationing began? (July 24, '43—AIPO)

Lost 19%	Gained 12%	Remained same 69%
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Number of victory gardens grown last year as compared to the number which have been planted this year (June 12, '43—AIPO):

	Last year	Gardens now
New England and Middle Atlantic	3,500,000	4,000,000
East Central	3,000,000	3,500,000
West Central	2,500,000	3,000,000
South	5,500,000	6,500,000
Mountain and Far West	2,000,000	2,800,000

LABOR

What is your opinion of John L. Lewis? (June 17, '43—AIPO)

9% had favorable opinions
87% had unfavorable opinions
4% had no opinion

If there is a shortage of men and workers for war industries, should the government draft persons to fill these jobs? (Aug. 28, '43—AIPO)

Yes 79%	No 14%	Undecided 7%
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In general, are you for or against the Connally-Smith Act? (July 22, '43—AIPO)
Of those with opinions:

For 67% Against 24% Undecided 9%

Attitude of voters with opinions in 12 states whose Senators and Congressmen voted by a majority to sustain veto:

For 62% Against 29% Undecided 9%

Attitude of voters with opinions in 36 states whose Senators and Representatives voted by a majority to override veto:

For 71% Against 21% Undecided 8%

Most people believe the Government should not be controlled by any one group. However, if you HAD to choose which would you prefer to have control of the Government—big business or labor unions? (Aug. 20, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Big business</i>	<i>Labor unions</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	45%	26%	29%
Republicans	58	17	25
Democrats	35	34	31
Upper income	72	9	19
Middle	55	19	26
Lower	33	34	33

Some labor unions make jobs for their members by requiring employers to hire more men than are actually needed to do a particular job. The unions say this is necessary in order to give work to all their members. Do you think a law should be passed prohibiting this practice? (July 8, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	69%	19%	12%
Union members	57	31	12

Do you think all labor unions should be required to register with the Federal government and report the amount of money they take in and spend each year? (June 1, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
General public	85%	7%	8%
Labor-union members	80	12	8

Asked of workers in war plants:

Would you like to see labor unions change their way of handling things? (May 29, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total vote	53%	23%	24%
Union members	45	38	17

The 53 per cent of workers who replied in the affirmative were asked to state in what way they thought unions should change. The results follow:

1. Abolish graft and racketeering, remove secrecy surrounding use of union funds, reduce personal profits of union management. 18%
2. Cut out wartime strikes. 15
3. Show more interest in the men, give members more say in policy, run unions more democratically. 6
4. Relax restrictions on how much a man can produce and how fast he may work. 3
5. Eliminate radical and communist influence. 2
6. Stop jurisdictional disputes and trivial quarrels. 2
7. Miscellaneous. 7

Would you approve or disapprove of making it a crime for anyone to urge workers to strike in companies taken over by the government? (May 27, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	78%	14%	8%
Union members	67	22	11

If you ran the government, what would you do about strikes among war workers? (July 11, '43—NORC)

About 75 out of each 100 gave answers advocating some type of disciplinary action. The most frequent suggestion, advocated by about one-fourth of the entire cross-section, was "work or fight."

About sixteen persons in each one hundred specifically suggested the passage of an anti-strike law, then on the President's desk, or other legislative action.

About ten in a hundred wanted administrative action such as declaration of martial law and the government's taking over the plants.

Among the minority who favored some sort of compromise with the strikers' demands, about half suggested conferences, arbitration, letting the War Labor Board handle it, etc.

Some seven in each hundred favored improvement of hours and living conditions for strikers and cutting down the cost of living.

Only one American in a hundred approved granting all demands.

Do you feel that as a whole the workers in the factories are doing all they could do right now to help win the war? How about the labor leaders? (Aug. 22, '43—NORC)

Percentage of those with opinions answering "Yes":

	<i>Factory workers</i>	<i>Labor leaders</i>
March 1942	64%	31%
July 1942	72	37
January 1943	73	41
Today	71	29

PRICE CONTROL

Do you think the government is doing all it can to control rising prices, or do you think it could do a better job? (July 18, '43—NORC)

All it can 47% Could do better 48%
Undecided 5%

PROHIBITION

If the question of national prohibition should come up again, would you vote wet, or dry? (Aug. 26, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Dry</i>	<i>Wet</i>
Feb., 1942	36%	64%
Sept., 1942	38	62
Dec., 1942	36	64
Today	34	66
Farmers	51%	49%
Towns under 10,000	45	55
10,000-100,000	30	70
100,000 and over	19	81

SEX EDUCATION

It has been suggested that a course in sex education be given to students in high schools. Do you approve or disapprove of this plan? (June 3, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	68%	16%	16%
New Eng. & Mid. Atl.	72	16	12
East Cent.	72	15	13
West Cent.	65	17	18
South	61	16	23
Far West	71	14	15
Age 20-29	77	13	10
30-49	69	15	16
50 & over	61	20	19

Some people say that sex problems should be scientifically and frankly discussed by medical authorities in daily newspapers. Do you approve or disapprove of this? (July 16, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	40%	44%	16%
Men	43	38	19
Women	38	49	13
Age 20-29	49	38	13
30-49	41	43	16
50 & over	35	48	17
College trained	51	41	8
High school only	45	44	11
Grade school only	35	44	21

SOCIAL SECURITY

At present the Social Security program provides benefits for old age, death and unemployment. Would you favor changing the program to include payment of benefits for sickness, disability, doctor and hospital bills? (Aug. 13, '43—AIPO)

Yes 59% No 29% Undecided 12%

(If "Yes") Would you be willing to pay (or have your husband pay) 6% of your salary or wages in order to make this program possible? (Aug. 13, '43—AIPO)

Yes 44% No 11% Undecided 4%

At present farmers, domestic servants, government employees, and professional persons are not included under Social Security. Do you think the Social Security program should be changed to include these groups? (Aug. 13, '43—AIPO)

Yes 64% No 19% Undecided 17%

WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

Have you been able to buy any war bonds or stamps since January 1, 1943? (July 3, '43—AIPO)

	Yes	No
National	60%	40%
Farmers	50	50
Towns under 10,000	57	43
10,000 to 100,000	69	31
100,000 and over	65	35

Would you be willing to have your employer take 15 cents out of every dollar of your wages or salary each pay day to buy defense bonds for you? (May 25, '43—AIPO)

	Willing	Unwilling	Undecided
National	52%	43%	5%
Upper- & middle-income groups	54	41	5
Lower-income group	49	45	6

3. ATTITUDES AMONG WOMEN

(Based on a Special Survey among Women Aged 20-35)

VOCATIONAL

If you had your choice, what kind of work would you like to do? (Aug. '43—For.)

	All women	Grammar school only	Business or trade school	Attended college
Office or clerical	25.0%	15.1%	43.7%	14.5%
Factory	12.2	37.4	2.8	0.6
Nursing	9.5	8.2	8.8	4.2
Civil service	9.4	5.3	12.6	7.5
Professional or executive	9.0	1.6	7.7	21.1
Arts (theatre, music, etc.)	7.0	0.6	5.2	13.4
Teaching	6.8	1.3	2.8	17.8
Sales	3.9	5.3	1.7	0.9
Personal service	3.5	13.2	0.3	0.5
Other	14.2	12.6	14.4	19.5

Here are three different kinds of jobs. If you had your choice, which would you pick? (Aug. '43—For.)

A job which pays quite a low income, but which you were quite sure of keeping	54.7%
A job which pays a good income but which you have a 50-50 chance of losing	25.3
A job which pays an extremely high income if you make the grade but in which you lose almost everything if you don't make it	17.6
Don't know	2.4

LIFE

So far as you personally are concerned, do you think the chances are that the next ten years of your life will be exciting ones, just average, or rather dull? (Aug. '43—For.)

	<i>All women</i>	<i>Single age 20-24</i>	<i>Unattractive</i>
Exciting	43.3%	53.8%	26.1%
Average	43.6	35.0	44.9
Dull	9.3	6.5	21.7
Don't know	3.8	4.7	7.3

MEN VERSUS WOMEN

Which kind of friends do you think you can usually count on more—men or women? (Aug. '43—For.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Attractive</i>	<i>Unattractive</i>
Men	36.6%	40.6%	27.6%
Women	26.4	24.5	30.5
Same, depends, or don't know	37.0	34.9	41.9

Would you rather work for a man or for a woman, or wouldn't it make any difference to you? (Aug. '43—For.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Attractive</i>	<i>Unattractive</i>
Man	49.6%	56.5%	31.4%
Woman	6.9	4.4	13.7
No difference, or don't know	43.5	39.1	54.9

MARRIAGE, MORALS, AND BIRTH CONTROL

Which would you rather do if you had your choice? (Aug. '43—For.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Married</i>	<i>Single</i>	<i>Employed</i>	<i>Unemployed</i>
Be unmarried and have a successful career	6.2%	3.6%	10.5%	6.9%	5.8%
Be married and have a successful career besides	17.8	15.6	22.1	20.5	14.1
Be married and run a home	74.0	79.5	64.4	69.9	79.6
Don't know	2.0	1.3	3.0	2.7	0.5

Number of children wanted:

One
Two
Three
Four
Five or more
None
Don't know

By this percentage of women:

5.2%
38.9
24.3
18.1
6.1
4.4
3.0

Which marriage do you think is usually most successful—one where the husband is a few years older, where he is a little younger, or where he is about the same age as his wife? (Aug. '43—For.)

Husband a few years older	61.7%	Husband about same age	30.6%
Husband a little younger	1.4	No difference or don't know	6.3

In which case do you think the average marriage is happier—if the woman is completely honest with her husband, or if she sometimes tells little lies to make things smooth? (Aug. '43—For.)

	<i>Married</i>	<i>Single</i>	<i>Widowed or divorced</i>
Completely honest	56.4%	53.7%	47.2%
Little lies	37.4	35.8	47.2
Depends or don't know	6.2	10.5	5.6

Do you think that during the past ten years women in general have become more strict in their morals, less strict, or stayed about the same? (Aug. '43—For.)

More strict 11.1% Less strict 51.4% No change 32.3% Don't know 5.2%

Do you think that women generally should have more strict morals, less strict, or about the same as they are now? (Aug. '43—For.)

More strict 66.3% Less strict 1.3% The same 27.8% Don't know 4.6%

Do you feel women's morals should be more strict, less strict, or about the same as men's? (Aug. '43—For.)

More strict than men's 60.0% Less strict than men's 2.0%
Same as men's 34.2% Don't know 3.8%

Do you think that most men require virginity in a girl for marriage? (Aug. '43—For.)

Yes 59.1% No 31.3% Don't know 9.6%

Do you think women should require virginity in men? (Aug. '43—For.)

Yes 45.1% No 45.0% Don't know 9.9%

By and large, do you think that many, only a few, or practically no married men are untrue to their wives at some time or another? (Aug. '43—For.)

Many husbands are untrue 47.8% Practically none are untrue 4.6
Only a few are untrue 43.2 Don't know 4.4

The same question asked about married women produced these results:

Many wives are untrue 28.3% Practically none are untrue 11.0
Only a few are untrue 56.1 Don't know 4.6

Do you believe that knowledge about birth control should or should not be made available to all married women? (Aug. '43—For.)

	<i>All women</i>	<i>College women</i>	<i>Grammar school only</i>	<i>Catholic women</i>
Should be available	84.9%	92.6%	70.2%	69.0%
Should not	10.0	4.9	18.2	24.4
Don't know	5.1	2.5	11.6	6.6

(If "should" above) Do you believe that knowledge about birth control should or should not be kept away from unmarried women? (Aug. '43—For.)

	<i>All women</i>	<i>College women</i>	<i>Grammar school only</i>	<i>Catholic women</i>
Should be withheld	23.3%	15.5%	33.6%	33.6%
Should not be	69.8	78.5	55.3	58.9
Don't know	6.9	6.0	11.1	7.5

4. IN CANADA

DAYLIGHT SAVING

Do you think we should have daylight saving time all the year round, as at present, or just in the summer months, or not at all? (July 28, '43—C.I.R.O.)

	<i>All year</i>	<i>Just summer</i>	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	36%	36%	25%	3%
Farm	21	32	45	2
Non-farm	41	38	17	4

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

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Those who voted approval as a year-round measure were asked:

Would you like to see it continued after the war, or just for the duration? (July 28, '43—CIPQ)

After the war 28% Duration only 7% Undecided 1%

FLAG

Should Canada have a national flag of its own, or do you think we should continue to use the Union Jack? (July 21, '43—CIPQ)

	National flag	Union Jack	Undecided
National	51%	42%	7%
20-29 years	60	35	5
30-39 years	57	36	7
40-49 years	49	44	7
50 and over	43	49	8
British origin	37	58	5
French origin	82	9	9
Other origin	42	48	10

LABOR

Do you think that workers in war industries who stay away from their work without a good reason should be fined in addition to losing their pay? (June 16, '43—CIPQ)

	Fine	No fine	Undecided
National	58%	33%	9%
Farm	70	23	7
Business and prof.	53	38	9
White collar	57	34	9
Labor	55	36	9

Do you think that a worker in a war industry who stays away from work without good reason should be punished as severely as a soldier who is absent without leave? (June 16, '43—CIPQ)

Yes 68% No 23% Undecided 9%

Who do you think is most responsible for strikes in war industries—the labor leaders, the workers themselves, the management, or the government? (Aug. 18, '43—CIPQ)

	Labor leaders	Workers themselves	Management	Government	Others	Undecided
National	38%	8%	17%	15%	6%	16%
Union	22	9	28	24	6	11
Non-union	41	7	15	13	7	17
Quebec	23	10	24	22	3	18

LIQUOR

Would you favor or oppose a law to prohibit the sale of all alcoholic beverage (including wine and beer) in Canada? (June 9, '43—CIPQ)

	Dry	Wet	Undecided
Feb. '42	20%	72%	8%
Sept. '42	29	65	6
Dec. '42	37	57	6
March '43	30	65	5

April '43	27%	68%	5%
Today	23	68	9
Total abstainers	42	45	13
Liquor users	7	87	6

In your opinion, what is the main reason for the regulations cutting down the amount of beer (hard liquor) that is sold in your province? (Aug. 11, '43—CIPQ)

	Beer	Liquor
Shortages of ingredients and manpower	27%	40%
Diversion of public spending	20	16
Prohibition sentiment	15	16
"Politics"	8	5
Needs of armed forces	8	2
Miscellaneous	5	6
Don't know	17	15

DIVORCE

In your opinion, is it too easy to get a divorce in this country, or not easy enough? (July 14, '43—CIPQ)

	Too easy	Too hard	About right	Undecided
National	27%	24%	32%	17%
Catholic	42	17	25	16
Non-Catholic	20	27	36	17
French Canadian	42	18	25	15
English Canadian	23	26	34	17

OLD AGE INSURANCE

If it were your job to decide how much money old age pensioners with no other means of support should receive from the government each month, what amount would you set? (May 29, '43—CIPQ)

\$20 or less	7%	\$36-\$40	19
\$21-\$25	12	\$40 or over	23
\$26-\$30	26	No opinion	2
\$31-\$35	11		

	<i>21-29 years</i>	<i>30-49 years</i>	<i>50 years & over</i>
\$25 or less	16%	19%	20%
\$26-\$30	22	25	29
\$31-\$40	27	31	30
Over \$40	31	23	19
No opinion	4	2	2

POLITICS

Results of successive polls on the popular strength of political parties in Canada: (June 5, '43—CIPQ)

	Lib.	Pro-Cons.	C.C.F.	New Dem.	Bloc Pop.	Others
1940	55%	31%	8%	3%	*	3%
Jan. '42	55	30	10	*	*	5
Sept. '42	39	23	21	6	*	11
Dec. '42	36	24	23	7	*	10

Feb. '43
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TAXES

Do you
war—say
(July 7, '43)

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No a

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

493

Feb. '43	32%	27%	23%	7%	7%	4%
May '43	36	28	21	4	10	1
Today	35	31	21	4	8	1

* Not polled as separate party, any support being included under "Others."

Ontario only:

	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Pro-Cons.</i>	<i>C.C.F.</i>	<i>Others</i>
Federal support	32%	38%	27%	3%
Provincial support	32	37	28	3

If a provincial election were held in this province today, would you vote for the candidate of the Progressive-Conservatives, Liberals, C.C.F. or other party? (July 10, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Pro-Cons.</i>	<i>C.C.F.</i>	<i>Others</i>
1937	52%	40%	5%	3%
Today	34	37	26	3
By age:				
21-29 years	38%	31%	26%	5%
30-39	35	33	29	3
40-49	35	35	27	3
50 plus	31	45	21	3

Division of Ontario voters' party sentiment eleven days before the province's first election since 1937: (July 24, '43—CIPQ)

Progressive-Conservative 35% Liberal 33% C.C.F. 32%

Quebec political party poll: (Aug. '43—CIPQ)

	<i>1940 vote</i>	<i>Feb. 1943</i>	<i>Apr. 1943</i>	<i>Today</i>
Liberal	74%	39%	40%	36%
Bloc Pop.	26	37	36
Pro-Cons.	20	14	13	14
C.C.F.	1	8	4	7
Others	5	13	6	7

Report on Ontario election: (Aug. 5, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>The Poll's Forecast of the Popular Vote</i>	<i>Election Results</i>	<i>Degree of Accuracy</i>
Pro-Cons.	33%	36.7%	3.7%
C.C.F.	36	32.4	3.6
Liberal	31	30.9	0.1
Average error			2.5%

TAXES

Do you expect to be paying about the same amount of income taxes for a period after the war—say five years—or do you think that income taxes will come down a lot after the war? (July 7, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>National</i>	<i>Upper-income</i>	<i>Middle</i>	<i>Lower</i>
Expect to pay same amount	49%	54%	52%	43%
Will come down a little	26	28	26	26
Will come down a lot	18	15	17	21
No opinion	7	3	5	10

Part Two: The War

1. IN THE UNITED STATES

DURATION

Regardless of what you hope, about how long from now do you think the war in Europe will last? How long in Asia? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>In Europe</i>	<i>In Asia</i>		<i>In Europe</i>	<i>In Asia</i>
Less than 6 months	1.5%	.7%	2 years to 3	26.7%	24.7%
6 months to a year	15.2	6.5	3 years or more	12.4	27.2
1 year to 2	33.1	19.2	Don't know	11.1	21.7

About how much longer do you think the war with Japan (Germany) will last from now? Just your own best guess. (Aug. 8, '43—NORC)

	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>
Up to 6 months	4% } 19%	16% } 59%	69%
6 months—1 year	15	43	16
1 to 2 years	35	25
2 to 3 years	19	4
Over 3 years	15	4
No opinion	12	8

How much longer do you think the war with Germany (Japan) will last? (Aug. 12, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Japan</i>		<i>Germany</i>	<i>Japan</i>
Will end this year	8%	1%	Last half of 1945	12%	27%
First half of 1944	31	6	During 1946	3	19
Last half of 1944	34	17	Later than 1946	2	16
First half of 1945	6	9	Unwilling to guess	4	5

AIR FORCE

Would you approve or disapprove of a separate air force for the United States? (Aug. 10, '43—AIPO)

Approve 59% Disapprove 41%

WOMAN POWER

Do you favor drafting single women between the ages of 21 and 35 to serve in the WACS, WAVES or other similar branches of the armed services? (Aug. 17, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	45%	48%	7%
Men	39	54	7
Women	51	42	7
Women aged 21-35	58	36	6
N. Eng. and M. Atl.	45	49	6
East Central	46	48	6
West Central	42	51	7
South	44	46	10
Far West	47	46	7

RUSSIA

Do you think we should or should not try to work with Russia as an equal partner in fighting the war? As an equal partner in working out the peace? (June '43—FOR.)

	Total	Well-informed	Poorly informed	Uninformed
<i>In fighting the war:</i>				
Should	80.7%	88.5%	84.2%	70.9%
Should not	9.4	8.3	10.1	9.9
Don't know	9.9	3.2	5.7	19.2
<i>In working out the peace:</i>				
Should	80.9	87.7	84.0	72.4
Should not	9.2	9.1	9.5	9.0
Don't know	9.9	3.2	6.5	18.6

Do you expect that Russia will stay in the war until Hitler is completely defeated, or that she is likely to make a separate peace with him as soon as she finds it to her advantage? (June '43—FOR.)

	Total	Executives	Well-informed	Poorly informed	Uninformed
Stay	56.8%	75.0%	67.1%	58.0%	46.2%
Separate peace	27.3	20.3	26.2	31.2	25.4
Don't know	15.9	4.7	6.7	10.8	28.4

WAR EFFORT

Do you feel that as a whole the *people in charge* of factories—the executives—are doing all they could do right now to help win the war? How about the *workers* in the factories? How about the *leaders of labor unions*? How about *farmers*? (Aug. 29, '43—NORC)

Percentage of those with opinions who think:

	March 1942	Today
<i>Farmers</i> are doing all they can	83%	91%
<i>Executives</i> are doing all they can	69	75
<i>Factory workers</i> are doing all they can	64	71
<i>Labor union leaders</i> are doing all they can	31	29
	<i>Factory and Construction Workers think:</i>	<i>Professional, Business, and White-Collar Workers think:</i>
<i>Farmers</i> are doing all they can	95%	89%
<i>Executives</i> are doing all they can	74	74
<i>Factory workers</i> are doing all they can	70	68
<i>Labor union leaders</i> are doing all they can	26	21

2. IN AUSTRALIA

During the war should the coal mines be operated by the government, or should the owners be left in charge? (July 19, '43—CIPQ)

Operated by government 62% Owners in charge 24% Undecided 14%

3. IN GREAT BRITAIN

How long do you think the war will last from now? (May 31, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Dec. poll</i>	<i>Today</i>		<i>Dec. poll</i>	<i>Today</i>
6 mos.	14%	7%	3 years	5%	9%
1 year	35	27	Longer	3	6
18 mos.	21	22	Uncertain	3	3
2 years	19	26			

Which country, so far, has made the greatest contribution to winning the war? (May 31, '43—CIPQ)

Russia 50% Britain 42% China 5% U.S.A. 3%

What do you think is the most important war problem the government must solve during the next few months? (May 31, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Feb. 1943</i>	<i>Today</i>		<i>Feb. 1943</i>	<i>Today</i>
Invasion of the Continent	15%	29%	Production	5%	2%
Shipping losses	30	21	Reconstruction	4	3
Maintaining food rations	6	7	North Africa	5	—
Speedy victory	6	5	Miscellaneous	13	29
Manpower	6	3	Undecided	10	1

In general, do you approve or disapprove of Churchill as Prime Minister? (July 5, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
January, 1942	89%	7%	4%
March (after Singapore)	82	11	7
July (after Tobruk)	78	15	7
November (African drive)	91	7	2
Jan. 1943 (African successes)	93	5	2
Today	93	4	3

In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's conduct of the war? (July 5, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Satisfied</i>	<i>Dissatisfied</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Oct. 1942	49%	35%	16%
Today	75	13	12

4. IN CANADA

How much longer do you think the war with Japan (Germany) will last? (June 26, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Japan</i>		<i>Germany</i>	
	<i>Canada</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Canada</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
This year	3%	1%	9%	7%
First half of 1944	17	25	38	59
Last half of 1944	9	13	11	10
1945 or later	61	56	34	20
No opinion	10	5	8	4

Canadian opinion:

Average for war with Germany	19 months
Average for war with Japan	27 months

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

497

Some air experts have said that Germany can be beaten by bombing attacks alone. Do you agree or disagree? (July 3, '43—CIPQ)

Agree 23% Disagree 64% Undecided 13%

If it were your job to sentence the following men for their past actions, would you imprison, execute, or exile them? (June 30, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Hitler</i>	<i>Mussolini</i>	<i>Hirohito</i>
Execute	63%	53%	61%
Exile	13	21	14
Imprison	11	14	11
Other	4	3	4
Undecided	9	9	10

If it were your job to sentence the following men for their past actions, what would you have done with them? (June 30, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Hitler</i>	<i>Mussolini</i>	<i>Hirohito</i>
Execute	51%	47%	51%
Exile	8	9	8
Imprison	11	13	10
Torture	8	7	9
Other	15	16	14
Undecided	7	8	8

Should men conscripted for military service be sent overseas, or kept in Canada as at present? (Aug. 14, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>National</i>	<i>Quebec</i>	<i>Rest of Canada</i>
Sent overseas	46%	15%	56%
Some sent overseas	15	15	15
Kept in Canada	32	66	21
Undecided	7	4	8

If these men are not sent overseas, do you think they should be put to work on farms, or should they be kept for military work only? (Aug. 14, '43—CIPQ)

Work on farms	28%	Military work only	18%
Some to work on farms	37	Undecided	17

5. IN SWEDEN

Do you think Sweden will remain out of the war, or will be brought into the war? (May 27, '43—AIPQ)

	<i>Oct. 1942</i>	<i>Today</i>
Remain out	58%	58%
Will enter war	11	12
Unwilling to guess	31	30

When the Swedish Institute asked a cross-section of the population what war agencies, if any, they were dissatisfied with, the replies were (June 28, '43—CIPQ):

Food Commission 62% Fuel Commission 14% Other agencies 24%

Part Three: Post-War Prospects

1. IN THE UNITED STATES

THE PEACE

Which one of these statements comes closest to what you would like to see us do when the war is over? (June '43—FOR.)

	Total	Well-informed	Poorly informed	Uninformed
Stay on our side of the oceans and have as little as possible to do with Europe and Asia	13.0%	5.4%	10.7%	22.0%
Try to keep the world at peace, but make no definite agreements with other countries	25.2	15.5	26.0	33.5
Take an active part in some sort of international organization with a court and police force strong enough to enforce its decisions	56.6	77.7	61.4	33.3
Don't know	5.2	1.4	1.9	11.2

After the war do you think we should or should not plan to help other nations get on their feet by sending them money and materials? (June '43—FOR.)

	Should	Should not	Don't know
Totals	72.8%	19.1%	8.1%
<i>In terms of current information:</i>			
Well-informed	82.7	12.8	4.5
Poorly informed	74.8	18.4	6.8
Uninformed	62.0	25.6	12.4

In terms of occupation:

Executives	86.4	10.6	3.0
Farm proprietors	74.5	16.9	8.6
Factory wage-earners	69.8	22.3	7.9

If we do send money and materials do you think this will result in a lower standard of living here, or that it will so increase trade that this country will be more prosperous than ever? (June '43—FOR.)

	More prosperous	Lower standard	Don't know
Totals	58.6%	22.4%	19.0%
<i>In terms of current information:</i>			
Well-informed	66.6	23.3	10.1
Poorly informed	61.6	22.6	15.8
Uninformed	48.8	21.5	29.7

In terms of occupation:

Executives	68.2	23.7	8.1
Farm proprietors	60.7	21.9	17.4
Factory wage earners	61.0	23.2	15.8

Asked of women 20-35:

Which one of these statements comes closest to what you would like to see us do when the war is over? (Aug. '43—FOR.)

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

499

	Women (this Survey)	National sample (June, 1943)
Stay on our side of the oceans and have as little as possible to do with Europe and Asia	15.2%	13.0%
Try to keep the world at peace but make no definite agreements with other countries	32.8	25.2
Take an active part in some sort of international organization with a court and police force strong enough to enforce its decisions	46.6	56.6
Don't know	5.4	5.2

If you had to take a choice between a peace planned by Roosevelt and his Cabinet and one planned by the present Congress, which would you prefer to take your chances on? (June '43—For.)

	Total	High	Economic Level Upper middle	Lower middle	Low	Negro
Roosevelt	58.1%	45.4%	53.2%	59.5%	60.7%	67.2%
Congress	27.9	45.1	35.6	27.9	20.9	11.1
Don't know	14.0	9.5	11.2	12.6	18.4	21.7

Should the countries fighting the Axis set up an international police force after the war is over to try to keep peace throughout the world? (June 4, '43—AIPO)

Yes 74% No 14% Undecided 12%

People were questioned on whether the United States should take an active role in the post-war world, and also on the more specific issue whether we should join with others in setting up an international police force after the war. (June 20, '43—AIPO)

	Take active part	Stay out	Undecided
New England	81%	9%	10%
Pacific Coast	80	12	8
Mountain States	79	11	10
West Central	78	13	9
South	76	11	13
Middle Atlantic	76	15	9
East Central	71	18	11

79% or more in favor
of active participation

Vt. S.C.
Conn. Nev.
N.D. Va.
Ore. S.D.
N.H. Calif.
Mont. Fla.
Mass. Md.
Minn. N.Y.

76%-78%

Ariz. Neb.
Tex. Wash.
Idaho Colo.
N.C. Wis.
Me. Ala.
Iowa Wyo.
Kan. Miss.
N.M. N.J.
Utah

75% or less

Ga. Del.
La. R.I.
Mo. Ind.
Pa. Ill.
Mich. Ohio
Ark. Ky.
Okla. W.Va.
Tenn.

The House Resolution on Post-War Policy provides: "That the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein."

The question was asked: Do you want your Congressman to vote for or against this resolution? (July 9, '43—AIPQ)

For 78% Against 9% Undecided 13%

THE CHURCH

Do you think that the churches should make plans for the kind of peace which should be established after the war, or don't you think this is part of their work? (July '43—NORC)

	<i>Should plan</i>	<i>Not plan</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	63%	33%	4%
Protestants	69	27	4
Catholics	58	37	5
Unaffiliated	51	42	7
Women	68	27	5
Men	57	39	4
Largest metropolitan areas	55	41	4
Other urban areas	68	29	3
Rural areas	65	29	6

(If "Make plans") Do you think it would be better for Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant churches to have their own separate plans for world peace, or do you think it would be better if they would all get together and agree on one plan?

	<i>Single plan</i>	<i>Separate plan</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	63%	5%	1%
Protestants	62	6	1
Catholics	54	4	—
Unaffiliated	47	3	1

(If "Get together") Do you think it is likely that they *will* get together and agree on one plan, or not?

	<i>Will get together</i>	<i>Will not</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	29%	18%	10%
Protestants	32	21	9
Catholics	32	12	10
Unaffiliated	20	19	8

TERRITORIAL GAINS

Do you think the U.S. should come out of this war with more military bases outside this country than we had before the war? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Well-informed</i>	<i>Poorly informed</i>	<i>Uninformed</i>
Should	84.0%	89.1%	87.0%	77.1%
Should not	8.1	8.9	8.6	6.9
Don't know	7.9	2.0	4.4	16.0

Aside from military bases, do you think the U.S. should or should not come out of this war with more territory under our control than when we went into the war? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Well-informed</i>	<i>Poorly informed</i>	<i>Uninformed</i>
Should	30.9%	18.9%	30.0%	42.7%
Should not	59.6	78.5	63.5	39.0
Don't know	9.5	2.6	6.5	18.3

STATUS QUO

After the war would you like to see many changes or reforms made in the United States, or would you rather have the country remain pretty much the way it was before the war? (Aug. 21, '43—AIPO)

<i>American survey</i>	<i>Reform</i>	<i>No reform</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	32%	58%	10%
Age 21-29	35	55	10
30-49	32	58	10
50 & over	30	60	10
Upper income	41	50	9
Middle	33	58	9
Lower	30	59	11
<i>British survey</i>			
National	57	34	9
Age 21-29	62	28	10
30-49	61	31	8
50 & over	51	40	9
Upper income	40	56	4
Middle	45	46	9
Lower	62	29	9

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Do you think there will probably be another big war during the next twenty-five to thirty years, or do you think there is a fairly good chance to avoid it? (June '43—FOR.)

Chance to avoid 61.9% Another war 30.8% Don't know 7.3%

After the war, do you think the U.S. should play a larger part, about the same part, or a smaller part in world affairs than it did before the war? (June '43—FOR.)

	<i>Larger</i>	<i>Same</i>	<i>Smaller</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
December, 1941	58.4%	18.3%	10.1%	13.2%
Now	76.6	12.1	5.0	7.3

Which country do you think we can get along with better after the war—Germany or Japan? (June 10, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
National	67%	8%	25%
Negro	30	22	48
White	70	7	23
New Eng. & M. Atl.	65	7	28
East Central	70	6	24
West Central	78	6	16
South, inc. Negroes	59	13	28
Far West	70	9	21

If we win the war, which of these things comes closest to what you think should be done with Germany? (June '43—FOR.)

	Total	Well-informed	Poorly informed	Uninformed
Set up a United Nations council to rule Germany for ten years or so, and eventually make her adopt a democratic government and see that she sticks to it	36.9%	48.4%	37.7%	25.7%
Bring to trial and execute all found to be leading Nazi officials	31.5	43.1	31.9	20.6
Make Germany use all her available men, money, and materials to rebuild the damage done in other countries	27.2	25.9	29.4	26.8
Set up an international government to rule Germany for 100 years	20.7	19.8	23.7	19.3
Do nothing to Germany but see to it she stays within her own boundaries	13.2	10.5	12.1	16.4
Carve Germany up and divide her among some of the United Nations	11.2	8.2	12.7	13.0
Kill a Nazi for every person killed by the Germans in occupied countries	3.7	3.4	2.7	4.7
None or don't know	6.9	3.3	4.1	12.3
*Totals	151.3%	162.6%	154.3%	138.8%

* Many people gave more than one answer.

Do you expect that Russia will want about the same kind of peace that we do or that she will make demands that we can't agree to? (June '43—For.)

	Total	Executives	Well-informed	Poorly informed	Uninformed
Same kind	30.0%	38.6%	33.1%	30.4%	26.8%
Make demands	48.1	52.5	55.2	52.0	38.6
Don't know	21.9	8.9	11.7	17.6	34.6

After the war, do you think Russia will or will not try to bring about Communist governments in other European countries? (June '43—For.)

	Total	Executives	Well-informed	Poorly informed	Uninformed
Will	40.5%	41.1%	46.3%	44.4%	32.4%
Will not	31.1	47.9	39.5	33.2	21.6
Don't know	28.4	11.0	14.2	22.4	46.0

OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH

On the whole, after the war do you think the average young man will have more opportunity, about the same opportunity, or less opportunity to get ahead than a young man had after the last war? (June '43—For.)

	Total a year ago	Total now	Well-informed	Poorly informed	Uninformed
More	46.0%	59.5%	63.8%	61.0%	54.4%
Less	17.2	14.8	14.6	15.5	14.6
Same	26.3	16.7	17.3	16.5	16.1
Don't know	10.5	9.0	4.3	7.0	14.9

Do you think the men in the armed forces will have trouble finding jobs when the war is over? (June 25, '43—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Don't know
General public	56%	35%	9%
Families with member in armed forces	55	35	10

Do you think men should be released from the armed forces after the war if they have no jobs, or should they be kept in service until they can show they have jobs? (June 25, '43—AIPO)

	Released	Kept in service	Undecided
General public	38%	50%	12%
Families of service men	41	48	11

After the war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to serve one year in the army, navy, or air force? (July 23, '43—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Australia	79%	7%	14%
Canada	56	34	10
United States	66	27	7

FORTUNE survey among women aged 20 to 35:

(If now employed) When the war is over do you think you will probably keep on doing the same kind of work, get another kind of job, or stop working? (Aug. '43—FOR.)

	All women	Married	Single
Same kind of work	47.8%	38.4%	50.7%
Another kind	16.9	8.6	21.8
Stop working	29.2	47.5	21.1
Don't know	6.1	5.5	6.4

(If not now employed) Do you think you might try to get one in the next year or so? (Aug. '43—FOR.)

	All women	Married	Single
Yes	33.2%	27.7%	67.2%
No	59.0	64.7	23.0
Don't know	7.8	7.6	9.8

After the war, do you think that opportunities for women to advance in business will be better, worse, or about the same as they were before the war? What about opportunities in government? (Aug. '43—FOR.)

	Better	Same	Worse	Don't know
In business	43.1%	28.5%	19.4%	9.0%
In government	45.4	30.2	12.0	12.4

2. IN AUSTRALIA

After the war, should the coal mines be operated by the government, or should the owners be left in charge? (July 23, '43—AIPO)

Operated by government 37% Owners in charge 46% Undecided 17%

3. IN GREAT BRITAIN

After the war, would you like to see Britain joining with other countries to form an international police force? (June 4, '43—AIPO)

Yes 74% No 10% Undecided 16%

4. IN CANADA

Which of these things would you like to see Canada do after the war?

- (1) Continue as a member of the British Commonwealth as at present.
- (2) Leave the British Commonwealth and become a part of the United States.
- (3) Leave the British Commonwealth and become a completely independent nation. (June 22, '43—AIPQ)

	<i>Stay in Commonwealth</i>	<i>Join with U.S.A.</i>	<i>Become Independent</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	49%	21%	24%	6%
Maritimes	58	23	12	7
Quebec*	24	18	50	8
Ontario	64	20	11	5
Prairies	57	26	11	6
B.C.	48	33	15	4

* Includes French and English-speaking.

After the war, do you think we should have free trade with United States—that is, that all products and merchandise crossing the border either way should be free of all tariff and customs duties? (June 2, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Favor</i>	<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
National	67%	17%	16%
Eastern Canada	63	20	17
Western Canada	78	9	13
Quebec	64	18	18
Ontario	64	22	14
Business, prof.	50	30	20
White collar	65	19	16
Labor	71	15	14
Farm	72	13	15
Upper-income	57	26	17
Middle-income	71	17	12
Lower-income	67	15	18

In your opinion, which of these is the best way to run the airlines in Canada after the war? (July 31, '43—CIPQ)

- (1) To have all airlines owned and operated by the government.
- (2) To allow privately owned airlines to compete with government lines.
- (3) To leave all air transportation to privately owned airlines.

All government 50% All private 19% Both gov't & private 31%

By political parties:

	<i>Pro-Cons.</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>C.C.F.</i>
Gov't lines	38%	46%	59%
Private lines	19	18	13
Both	34	27	21
Undecided	9	9	7

After the war, do you think all interested countries should get together and set up a joint board to regulate international airlines, or do you think all countries should be free to start international airlines, when and where they please? (Aug. 4, '43—CIPQ)

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

505

	National	Upper-income	Middle-income	Lower-income
Joint board	61%	79%	67%	33%
Free competition	26	16	24	30
Undecided	13	5	9	17

If, after the war, income taxes are cut in half, would you be willing to pay five cents in every dollar of your (or your family's) income in addition to these income taxes, so that the government could guarantee every Canadian enough to live on if he were out of a job? (July 17, '43—CIFO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
National	65%	20%	15%
Pro-Cons.	66	18	16
Liberals	69	18	13
C.C.F.	69	18	13
Upper-income	68	20	12
Middle-income	68	21	11
Lower-income	60	20	20
Farmers	54	24	22
Labor	65	17	18
Bus. & prof.	69	19	12
White collar	71	21	8

After the war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to serve one year in the army, navy, or air force? (July 19, '43—CIFO)

Percentage voting yes:

Australia 79% Canada 56% United States 66%

Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us when the war is over? (June 12, '43—CIFO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Canada	51%	27%	22%
United States*	44	34	22
Ontario	62	17	21
Quebec	30	44	26

* Poll taken before announcement of Comintern's dissolution.

5. IN SWEDEN

Would you prefer a coalition government after the war or straight party government? (June 28, '43—CIFO)

Coalition 42% Party 15% Undecided 43%

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- MENNINGER, KARL AUGUSTUS; and MENNINGER, JEANETTA LYLE. *Love against Hate*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942. 311 pp.
Semi-popular statement of the findings of psychoanalysis with respect to anxiety, cruelty and war, with discussion of the curative value of love. Dr. Karl Menninger is a well-known U.S. psychoanalyst. Bibliography, pp. 295-301.
- O'ROURKE, VERNON ALFRED; and CAMPBELL, DOUGLAS WHITNEY. *Constitution-Making in a Democracy: Theory and Practice in New York State*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1943. 286 pp.
The constitutional convention, its theory and practice, as shown by the 1938 New York State convention. By two U.S. political scientists (Dr. O'Rourke at Swarthmore, Dr. Campbell at Union College). Bibliographic footnotes.

PADOVER, SAUL K. *Wilson's Ideals*.

Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. 151 pp.

A collection of statements on problems affecting World War II, prepared by well-known U.S. historian, assistant to Secretary Ickes. Bibliography, pp. 148-49.

PERHAM, MARGERY FREDA. *Africans and British Rule*. London: Oxford University, 1942. 89 pp.

Written with a standard vocabulary of 2,000 of the most frequently used words in the English language, the book explains the prerequisites of emancipatory legislation and self-rule in a manner believed to be adapted to native African public opinion. The author is a member of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Education, which meets at the Colonial Office.

SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH ALOIS. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harpers, 1942. 381 pp.

Analysis of the relation between democracy and capitalism, and of the practicability of socialism, by Harvard economist, who predicts the growth, all over the world, of a kind of "militarist socialism" with certain "fascist features." Pp. 146-55 are on the sociology of the intellectuals. Bibliographic footnotes.

SIRICH, JOHN BLACK. *The Revolutionary Committees in the Departments of France, 1793-1794*. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1943. 238 pp.

By instructor in history, University of Illinois. Bibliography, pp. 219-27.

SULZBACH, WALTER. *National Consciousness*, introduction by Hans Kohn.

Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. 168 pp.

Viewing nationalism as a "secular religion" which does not greatly "impress the intelligence," this Claremont Colleges professor of social economics presents an extended essay on its manifestations in modern history. Bibliographic footnotes.

TOLISCHUS, OTTO DAVID. *Tokyo Record*. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943. 462 pp.

A chronological record of events, impressions and personal experiences, 1941-42, of New York Times Tokyo correspondent, based on a reproduction of the author's original data, confiscated by the Japanese police, on his dispatches, and on his memory.

WERTH, ALEXANDER. *Moscow War Diary*. New York: Knopf, 1942. 297 pp.

Eyewitness account of events in Russia in 1941, when Mr. Werth, who was born in Russia of Anglo-Russian parents, was Moscow correspondent of London Sunday Times.

WERTH, ALEXANDER. *The Twilight of France, 1933-1940*, introduction by Denis W. Brogan. New York: Harpers, 1942. 368 pp.

Survey of the decline and fall of the Third Republic. Mr. Werth was stationed in Paris as correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* during a large part of the period covered by the book.

WHITE, WILLIAM ALANSON. *Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and After*. Washington, D.C.: William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1943. 28 pp.

An essay first published in 1919, by famous U.S. psychiatrist, reprinted by the Foundation because of its timeliness.

PART V. CHANNELS OF PROPAGANDA

Agents Who Specialize in Managing Propaganda

ABBOTT, NABIA. *Aishah, The Beloved of Mohammed*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1942. 230 pp.

"The first full-length biography" of one of

Mohammed's favorite wives, who became a leader of Islam. By assistant professor of Islamic studies, Oriental Institute, University of Chicago. Bibliographic footnotes.

ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and VELTFOOT, HELENE R. "Social Psychology and the Civilian War Effort," *Journal of*

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- Social Psychology*, 18: 165-233 (1943). Detailed survey of war-connected activities and publications of social psychologists and related scientists since 1940, by two Harvard psychologists. Bibliography cites 306 items.
- BIDDLE, FRANCIS (BEVERLEY). *Mr. Justice Holmes*. New York: Scribners, 1942. 214 pp.
A portrait by his former secretary, who is now Attorney General of the United States.
- BROUGHTON, AVERELL. *Careers in Public Relations: The New Profession*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943. 255 pp.
U.S. public relations counsel's account of public relations activities of U.S. government, army, navy and large corporations. Completely non-technical. Bibliography 245-46.
- BROWN, LOUISE FARGO. *Apostle of Democracy: The Life of Lucy Maynard Salmon*. New York: Harpers, 1943. 315 pp.
Dr. Salmon, late Professor of History at Vassar, was author of a number of well-known treatises on public opinion and journalism. Bibliographic footnotes.
- BURNETT, VERNE EDWIN. *You and Your Public: A Guide Book to the New Career—Public Relations*. New York: Harpers, 1943. 194 pp.
By vice-president in charge of public relations, General Foods, Inc. Completely non-technical.
- COPELAND, FAYETTE. *Kendall of the Picayune*. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1943. 351 pp.
Biography of George Wilkins Kendall, founder of the New Orleans *Picayune*, by professor of journalism, University of Oklahoma. Bibliography, pp. 321-33.
- DREWRY, JOHN ELDRIDGE, editor. *Post Biographies of Famous Journalists*. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia, 1942. 518 pp.
Sketches of twenty-two famous editors, publishers and news writers of the past and present generation, which first appeared in *The Saturday Evening Post*. By a score of well-known U.S. journalists.
- GOLDMAN, ERIC FREDERICK. *John Bach McMaster, American Historian*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1943. 194 pp.
By Johns Hopkins historian. Bibliography, pp. 185-86.
- HYNEMAN, CHARLES S. "The Political Scientist and National Service in War-time," *American Political Science Review*, 36: 931-45 (October 1942).
Report of the Committee on Wartime Services of the American Political Science Association.
- ICKES, HAROLD LECLAIRE. *The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon*. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943. 350 pp.
F. D. Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior.
- IRWIN, WILL (IAM HENRY). *The Making of a Reporter*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942. 440 pp.
Autobiography of famous U.S. journalist.
- KINGDON, FRANK. *Jacob's Ladder: The Days of My Youth*. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1943. 312 pp.
Autobiography of clergyman, lecturer and radio commentator, president of University of Newark (1934-40), and president (1941-) of Union for Democratic Action.
- LEE, JENNIE. *This Great Journey*, introduction by William L. Shirer. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942. 298 pp.
Autobiography of British socialist Member of Parliament, wife of Aneurin Bevan, M.P.
- MACNEIL, NEIL. *How to be a Newspaperman*. New York: Harpers, 1942. 195 pp.
Rules for success in various branches of news writing, by assistant managing editor of New York Times.
- "Oregonian to OWI," *Time*, July 5, 1943, p. 66.
New head of OWI Domestic Branch, succeeding Gardner ("Mike") Cowles, is Edwin Palmer ("Ep") Hoyt, "up-from-the ranks editor and publisher of the popular Portland *Oregonian*," who styles himself a "lifelong Republican."

- OSBORNE, GEORGE COLEMAN. *John Sharp Williams: Planter-Statesman of the Deep South* (Southern Biography Series). Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University, 1943. 501 pp.
Biography of Senator from Mississippi, by a native Mississippian, head of Social Science Department, Berry College, Georgia. Bibliography, pp. 479-88.
- PRATT, JOHN BARNES. *Personal Recollections: Sixty Years of Book Publishing*. New York: Barnes, 1942. 67 pp.
Reminiscences by the president of A. S. Barnes & Co.
- REYNOLDS, ERNEST EDWIN. *Baden-Powell: A Biography of Lord Baden-Powell of Gilwell, O.M., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.* New York: Oxford University, 1943. 274 pp.
Biography of the founder of the Boy Scouts, "undertaken at the request of the Council of The Boy Scouts Association." Bibliography in text.
- RUNES, DAGOBERT D., editor, in collaboration with DENONN, LESTER E.; and WINN, RALPH B. *Who's Who in Philosophy: Vol. 1, Anglo-American Philosophers*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1942. 293 pp.
Biographies and bibliographies (including major periodical articles) of living philosophers. Volume 2 will deal with those in non-English-speaking countries. The principal editor is a professional compiler of reference materials in the fields of mathematics and philosophy.
- SHARPE, DORES ROBINSON. *Walter Rauschenbusch*. New York: Macmillan, 1942. 463 pp.
Biography of U.S. minister, teacher, and social philosopher. The author states that he knew Dr. Rauschenbusch, "first as his student, then as his confidential secretary, during the most creatively active years of his life." Bibliographic footnotes.
- STEWART, KENNETH NORMAN. *News is What We Make It: A Running Story of the Working Press*. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1943. 340 pp.
Autobiography of U.S. newspaper man granted leave from PM staff to be a Nieman fellow at Harvard, with his views on activities of his fellow workers.
- STRAUSS, PATRICIA. *Cripps: Advocate Extraordinary*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943. 423 pp.
Biography of British Labour Party leader Sir Stafford Cripps. Mrs. Strauss has herself been active in Labour politics for 12 years or more.
- THOMAS, ELBERT DUNCAN. *Thomas Jefferson, World Citizen*. New York: Modern Age, 1942. 280 pp.
A portrait, based chiefly on Jefferson's words on democracy, liberty, religion, agriculture and foreign affairs. By U.S. Senator from Utah (Ph.D. California 1924), a former professor of political science in University of Utah. Bibliography, pp. 272-74.
- Twentieth Century Authors: A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Literature*, edited by Sidney Jasspon Kunitz and Howard Haycraft. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942. 1577 pp.
"Primary emphasis has been on professional men and women of letters whose vocation is the writing of books of fiction, poetry, history, biography, criticism, etc. . . . writers of this century, of all nations, whose books are familiar to readers of English. . . . The sketches range, in assigned length, from 300 to 1500 words, roughly in proportion to the importance of the subject, but frequently influenced by extraneous considerations, such as . . . amount of available data. . . . Sketches of others of the same generation who flourished earlier may be found in two biographical dictionaries by the same editors: *British Authors of the Nineteenth Century* (1936) and *American Authors: 1600-1900* (1938). . . . The names of such authors have been entered in the present alphabet, with cross-references to the pertinent volume. . . . Every living author in this volume who could be reached was invited to write his own sketch. . . . [Other data have been added by the editors.—BLS] Each biographical sketch is followed by a list of the principal works of the author in question, with original dates of publication. A list of biographical and critical sources about each author is

- also given. . . . Included are 1850 biographies and 1700 portraits; many are social theorists, journalists, political propagandists.
- WALLIS, WILSON DALLAM. *Messiahs: Their Rôle in Civilization*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. 217 pp.
Historical-analytic study by University of Minnesota anthropologist. Bibliography, pp. 203-10.
- WELLING, RICHARD. *As the Twig is Bent*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942. 295 pp.
Autobiography of leader of U.S. "good government" movement of the past 50 years. Bibliographic footnotes.
- WOODWORTH, ROBERT SESSIONS. *The Columbia University Psychological Laboratory: A Fifty-Year Retrospect*. New York: Published by the author, Columbia University, 1942. 23 pp.
History of Columbia's psychology department, with data on careers of its 278 Ph.D. graduates, by one of its senior professors.
- YBARRA, THOMAS RUSSELL. *Young Man of the World*. New York: Ives Washburn, 1942. 316 pp.
New York Times correspondent continues the autobiography begun in *Young Man of Caracas* (New York, 1941).
- Agencies Used in Disseminating Propaganda**
- AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION. COMMITTEE ON MOTION PICTURES IN EDUCATION. *The Other Americas through Films and Records*, second edition. Washington, D.C., 1943. 48 pp.
Prepared in collaboration with Pan-American Union.
- AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION. COMMITTEE ON MOTION PICTURES IN EDUCATION. *Selected Educational Motion Pictures: A Descriptive Encyclopedia*. Washington, D.C., 1942. 372 pp.
- BOGARDUS, EMORY STEPHEN. *Democracy by Discussion*, foreword by Chester Williams. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942. 59 pp.
The role of the discussion group and techniques for conducting it, described by University of Southern California sociologist. Bibliography, pp. 56-58.
- BURKE, WILLIAM JEREMIAH; and HOWE, WILL D. *American Authors and Books, 1640-1940*. New York: Gramercy Publishing Co., 1943. 858 pp.
A reference book listing biographical data on U.S. authors and editors, descriptions of publishing houses, magazines and newspapers, libraries, literary clubs, and societies, etc. Includes copious bibliography.
- DE MARCO, ROLAND REINALD. *The Italianization of African Natives: Government Native Education in the Italian Colonies 1890-1937* (Ph.D. thesis; Teachers College Contributions to Education, no. 880). New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1943. 150 pp.
Bibliography, pp. 95-150.
- FINE, BENJAMIN. *Educational Publicity*. New York: Harpers, 1943. 320 pp.
Practical, non-technical manual by education editor of New York Times, whose Ph.D. thesis (Teachers College, 1941) was on "College Publicity in the United States." Bibliography, pp. 311-13.
- FOERTSCH, GERDA VIKTORIA. *Buchbesprechung und Zeitschrift* (Leipziger Beiträge zur Erforschung der Publizistik). Dresden: Dittert, 1940. 142 pp.
"Book Reviewing and the Newspaper."
- FRANZMEYER, FRITZ. *Presse-Dissertationen an deutschen Hochschulen, 1885-1938*, herausgegeben von Walther Heide. Leipzig: Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler, 1940. 167 pp.
Indexed list of 1353 German, Austrian and Bohemian theses, more than 300 of them published since 1935, dealing with the press. A large number of the theses are regional and local histories or histories of individual

- journalists and newspapers. "Ludwig Solomon's *Geschichte des deutschen Zeitungswesens* (Oldenburg, 1906) remains to this day the only full-length study of the evolution of German journalism."—Marc Jaryc, *Journal of Modern History*, 15: 130 (June 1943).
- FREEDOM CALLING!: The Story of the Secret German Radio**, by the representative in Great Britain of the Freedom Station. London: F. Muller, 1939. 64 pp.
- FRIEDRICH, CARL JOACHIM; and SMITH, JEANETTE SAYRE. Radiobroadcasting and Higher Education** (Studies in the Control of Radio, no. 4). Cambridge, Mass.: Radiobroadcasting Research Project at the Littauer Center, Harvard University, 1942. 81 pp.
- Study of recent U.S. efforts in educational broadcasting at the University level, by two U.S. research specialists. Bibliographic footnotes.
- GIESE, HANS-JOACHIM. Die Film-Wochenschau im Dienste der Politik** (Leipziger Beiträge zur Erforschung der Publizistik, Band 5). Dresden: M. Dittert, 1940. 163 pp.
- "The Weekly Newsreel in the Service of Politics." A study of political use of newsreels in the U.S.A. and various countries of Europe, Asia and Latin America up to 1939, written by Dr. Giese for the Institut für Zeitungswissenschaft, University of Leipzig. Bibliography, pp. 160-63, cites German sources almost exclusively.
- HARRAL, STEWART. Public Relations for Higher Education**. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1942. 292 pp.
- Practical, non-technical manual. Bibliography, pp. 269-85.
- HEIDE, WALTHER; and LEHMANN, ERNST HERBERT, editors. Handbuch der Zeitungswissenschaft**. Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1940—.
- An alphabetical encyclopedia on all subjects relating to the press, edited by two well-known German professors of journalism. The first two issues (out of a projected nine) contain biographies of famous journalists and publishers, and articles on such topics as "Advertising," "Bibliography of the Press," and the press in various geographical areas. Plan of the *Handbuch* is outlined by Dr. Lehmann in *Zeitungswissenschaft*, 12: 290-96 (May 1937).
- HOENIG, HANS OTTO. Das Aktuelle in der deutschen Presse: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der politischen Publizistik der Gegenwart**. (Dissertation, 1938, Leipzig; Leipziger Beiträge zur Erforschung der Publizistik). Dresden: Dittert, 1938. 65 pp.
- "Current Actuality in the German Press."
- JARYC, MARC. "Studies of 1935-42 on the History of the Periodical Press: Bibliographical Article,"** *Journal of Modern History*, 15: 127-41 (June 1943).
- By late secretary of International Committee of Historical Sciences, an authority on the history of the press. Critically reviews about 150 contributions of recent years, dealing with the history of the press in all quarters of the world.
- LEDERER, MAX. Secondary Education in Austria, 1918-38** (U.S. Office of Education Bulletin 1941, no. 9). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941. 41 pp.
- The "democratic" period of Austrian education. "The author was an Austrian secondary school teacher from 1906 to 1920 and a *Hofrat* concerned with secondary education in the pedagogical division of the Federal Ministry of Education at Vienna from 1920 to 1938."—Introduction.
- Leipziger Beiträge zur Erforschung der Publizistik** series, edited by Dr. Hans Amandus Münster, Direktor of the Institut für Zeitungswissenschaft of the University of Leipzig. Dresden: Dittert, ca. 1939—.
- A series of monographs on radio, press and movies, with special emphasis on their political potentialities.
- LOESCH, WERNER. Wesen und Bedeutung der Korrespondenz in der Publizistik** (Leipziger Beiträge zur Er-

- forschung der Publizistik). Dresden: Dittert, 1939. 70 pp.
 "The Nature of the Correspondent's Work in [Political] Publicity."
- MANLEY, MARIAN C. *Public Library Service to Business: A Comparative Study of its Development in Cities of 70,000 and more*. Newark, N.J.: Public Library, 1943. 220 pp.
 A study of the part played by the public library in daily business life in large U.S. cities in 1942. By librarian of the Business Branch of Newark Public Library. Bibliography, pp. 213-20.
- MERRITT, LEROY CHARLES. *The United States Government as Publisher* (University of Chicago Studies in Library Science). Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, 1943. 179 pp.
 A general picture of the material to be found in United States public documents, and a study of their distribution and utilization, by a staff member of Farmville, Virginia, State Teachers College. Data are presented in terms of federal departments sponsoring the publications; functions of the publications; and subject-matter. Bibliography, pp. 175-76.
- Pechat strany sotsializma*. Moscow: Vsesoiuzny Nauchnoizdatelsky institut, 1939. 80 pp.
 "The Press of Land of Socialism." Study of the number and geographic distribution of Soviet newspapers, magazines, libraries, printing presses, etc. Includes data on distribution of individual authors. The whole is presented as a series of striking pictorial statistics, in eight colors. Bibliography, pp. 78-79.
- RAICHEL, WALTHER. *Das ungarische Zeitungswesen: Seine Entwicklung bis zum Jahre 1938* (Ungarische Bibliothek, vol. 1, no. 22; inaugural dissertation, Berlin). Berlin: de Gruyter, 1939. 151 pp.
 "The Press of Hungary to 1938." Bibliography, pp. 148-51.
- RECK, FRANKLIN MERING. *Radio from Start to Finish*. New York: Crowell, 1942. 160 pp.
 Semi-popular history of the technology of radio, and an account of it today.
- REED, ALBERT ALISON. *Radio Education Pioneering in the Mid-West*. Boston: Meador, 1943. 128 pp.
 A history of radio education in the early days of radio, by University of Nebraska professor of education.
- RICHMOND, REBECCA LANGWORTHY. *Chautauqua: An American Place*. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943. 180 pp.
 Traces Chautauqua's history from its founding in 1874 to the present. Included in the book are biographical sketches of the two founders of Chautauqua, John Heyl Vincent and Lewis Miller, and of others who have served the organization. Bibliography, pp. vi and 178-80.
- ROBINSON, THOMAS PORTER. *Radio Networks and the Federal Government* (Ph.D. thesis, political science, Columbia). New York: Columbia University, 1943. 278 pp.
 Dr. Robinson, economist and former public relations man, on staff of the Office of Price Administration, submits a history of network broadcasting and a scholarly diagnosis of current differences between the broadcasters and the FCC. Bibliography, pp. 265-67.
- SCHATZMANN, IMAN ELSIE. *The Country School: At Home and Abroad*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1942. 233 pp.
 Account of rural schools in Europe and in the United States. The author has been a researcher for International Bureau of Education, International Labor Organization, and International Institute of Agriculture. Since 1939 she has been on the staff of American Country Life Association. Bibliography, pp. 213-21.
- SCHMIDT, ALFRED. *Publizistik im Dorf* (Leipziger Beiträge zur Erforschung der Publizistik). Dresden: Dittert, 1939. 195 pp.
 "[Political] Publicity in the Village."
- SELDES, GEORGE. *The Facts Are: A Guide to Falsehood and Propaganda*

- in the Press and Radio*. New York: In Fact, Inc., 1942. 127 pp.
By U.S. journalist.
- SEYBOLD, GENEVA, compiler. *American Foundations and Their Fields* (vol. 5). New York: Raymond Rich Associates, 1942. 274 pp.
Data for the year 1940.
- Sifri o pechati SSSR. Moscow: Vsesoiuzny knizhnaya palata, 1939. 52 pp.
"Figures on the Press of the Soviet Union." Statistical tables on production of books, magazines, newspapers, and on circulation of works of particular authors.
- SPENCER, GWLADYS. *The Chicago Public Library: Origins and Backgrounds* (University of Chicago Studies in Library Science). Chicago: University of Chicago, 1943. 473 pp.
History of the public library system in Chicago since 1872. Bibliography, pp. 423-37.
- STEHMANN, OTTO. *Geschichte und Bedeutung der Leipziger Sender: Ein Beitrag zur Publizistik des Rundfunks* (Leipziger Beiträge zur Erforschung der Publizistik). Dresden: Dittert, 1939. 108 pp.
"History and Significance of the Leipzig Radio."
- Thirty Schools Tell Their Story* (Adventures in American Education, vol. 5). New York: Harpers, 1943. 802 pp.
- "The last of five volumes reporting the Eight-Year Study (1933-41), conducted by the Commission on Relation of School and College of the Progressive Education Association," by the terms of which experimental high school curricula were developed in thirty schools, whose graduates were admitted by cooperating colleges on an experimental basis. The particular arrangements made by each of the Thirty Schools are reported in detail in this volume. See also vol. 4, *Did They Succeed in College?: The Follow-Up Study*.
- ULLSTEIN, HERMAN. *The Rise and Fall of the House of Ullstein*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1943. 308 pp.
Herman Ullstein, one of five brothers who ruled the largest publishing house of Europe before the Nazis took power, tells what happened to the firm under Nazi rule.
- WEILL, GEORGES JACQUES. *El Diario: Historia y función de la prensa periódica, versión española de Paolino Masip, con un apéndice sobre periodismo y periodistas en Hispano-América por J. A. Fernández de Castro y Andrés Henestrosa*. Mexico: Fondo de cultura económica, 1941. 441 pp.
Translation of *Le journal* (Paris: La Renaissance du livre, 1934. 450 pp.), celebrated general history of the press in all countries by University of Caen historian. Two Latin-American scholars have added a 100-page Appendix on "Journalism and Journalists in Hispanic America." Bibliography, pp. 397-408. Bibliography to Appendix, pp. 409-12.

PART VI. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA

- ANDERSON, H(OBSON) DEWEY; and DAVIDSON, PERCY ERWIN. *Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle: A Study in the Background of Political Education*. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1943. London: Oxford University, 1943. 377 pp.
A quantified investigation of the influence of occupation, income and social stratification upon groups in elections, based on detailed data concerning the social structure and election behavior of Santa Clara County, California. The authors are U.S. social scientists, well-known for their two previous studies, *Occupational Mobility in an American Community* (1937) and *Occupational Trends in the United States* (1940). Pp. 286-355 are a discussion of possibilities for "Realism in Education for Citizenship" in the U.S., and include statistical material on voting behavior of school administrators and teachers. Bibliographic footnotes.
- BROOKOVER, WILBUR. *Relation of Social*

Factors to Teaching Ability (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin Library, 1943).

This work, done under the supervision of Dr. T. C. McCormick, is a study of 66 United States History teachers in the rural consolidated high schools of 12 north central Indiana counties, by a staff member of Indiana State Technical College. After all pertinent variables such as age of pupils, size of school, size of classes, previous knowledge of history, and teaching materials were eliminated, the mean gain in knowledge of United States History during a period of 60 days was obtained for the pupils of each of these 66 teachers. The 1275 United States History students of these teachers replied to a series of questions concerning the teacher's relations with them. These data were set up in tables with mean gains in history information as one variable and the pupils' responses to one of the questions as the other variable in each case.

A quantitative analysis shows that those teachers who maintain congenial democratic relationships teach significantly less history information than those who assume more autocratic roles. According to the study, this may result from the fact that most students in American schools expect dictation and hence do not respond effectively to democratic patterns.

GOSNELL, HAROLD FOOTE. *Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942. 195 pp.

University of Chicago political scientist's comparison of national vote in recent elections with the votes of six states ("Industrial" Pennsylvania, "Progressive" Wisconsin, "Farm Belt" Iowa, "Utopian" California, Illinois—scene of "rural-urban conflict"—Long's Louisiana) which, taken together, may be regarded as an indicator of "the main outlines of the pattern of national politics." Concludes with an essay on "The Future of the American Party System." Bibliographic notes, pp. 159-86.

JANIS, IRVING L.; and FADNER, RAYMOND H. "A Coefficient of Imbalance for Content Analysis," *Psychometrika*, 8:105-19 (June 1943).

By two members of Special War Policies Unit, U.S. Department of Justice. This article presents a Coefficient of Imbalance applicable to any type of communication that may be classified into favorable content, unfavorable content, neutral content, and non-relevant content. The combined influence of the average presentation of relevant content and the average presentation of total content is reduced to two components, the coefficients of favorable imbalance and of unfavorable imbalance. A precise definition of imbalance is developed and measured against ten criteria.

LAZARSFELD, PAUL FELIX; and DURANT, RUTH. "National Morale, Social Cleavage and Political Allegiance," *Journalism Quarterly*, 19 : 150-59 (June 1942).

Analysis of relation of party allegiance to attitudes on Administration domestic and foreign policy, as shown by Gallup polls. Includes a pioneering discussion of "opinion turnover": "This phenomenon of turnover, in itself worthy of investigation, has been so far neglected in public opinion research. It is possible for net change of opinion to be small between two time-periods; still, this might be the result of many persons' changing in one direction, while about as many change in the opposite direction. Such a situation could be called socially vulnerable. It would indicate that a people's attitudes are ambivalent, and that any major event could bring about sudden shifts in opinion."

REMMERS, HERMANN HENRY; and GAGE, NATHANIEL LEES. *Educational Measurement and Evaluation*. New York: Harpers, 1943. 580 pp.

Methods and techniques for obtaining the data necessary for valid guidance. By two Purdue University professors of education. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

PART VII. PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION. *Freedom in Wartime*. New York: 1943. 80 pp.

Annual report of the Union. "The striking contrast between the state of civil liberty in the first eighteen months of World War II and in World War I offers strong evidence to support the thesis that our democracy can fight even the greatest of all wars and still maintain the essentials of liberty. The country in World War II is almost wholly free of those pressures which in the first World War resulted in mob violence against dissenters, hundreds of prosecutions for utterances; in the creation of a universal volunteer vigilante system, officially recognized, to report dissent to the F.B.I.; in hysterical hatred of everything German; in savage sentences for private expressions of criticism; and in suppressions of public debate of the issues of the war and the peace. . . .

"The government has not resorted to prosecution or censorship on any appreciable scale. War-time prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice for utterances, and publications barred by the Post Office Department as obstructive, have so far numbered about forty-five, involving less than two hundred persons, compared with over a thousand persons involved in almost as many cases in World War I. Even though some of

the proceedings were hardly justified by any reasonable interpretation of the 'clear and present danger' test laid down by the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice has on the whole shown commendable restraint."

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